package agent import ( "fmt" "net/http" "github.com/hashicorp/serf/serf" "github.com/hashicorp/consul/acl" "github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/structs" "github.com/hashicorp/consul/api" "github.com/hashicorp/consul/types" ) // aclAccessorID is used to convert an ACLToken's secretID to its accessorID for non- // critical purposes, such as logging. Therefore we interpret all errors as empty-string // so we can safely log it without handling non-critical errors at the usage site. func (a *Agent) aclAccessorID(secretID string) string { ident, err := a.delegate.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(secretID, nil, nil) if acl.IsErrNotFound(err) { return "" } if err != nil { a.logger.Debug("non-critical error resolving acl token accessor for logging", "error", err) return "" } return ident.AccessorID() } // vetServiceRegister makes sure the service registration action is allowed by // the given token. func (a *Agent) vetServiceRegister(token string, service *structs.NodeService) error { // Resolve the token and bail if ACLs aren't enabled. authz, err := a.delegate.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(token, nil, nil) if err != nil { return err } return a.vetServiceRegisterWithAuthorizer(authz, service) } func (a *Agent) vetServiceRegisterWithAuthorizer(authz acl.Authorizer, service *structs.NodeService) error { var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext // Vet the service itself. service.FillAuthzContext(&authzContext) if err := authz.ToAllowAuthorizer().ServiceWriteAllowed(service.Service, &authzContext); err != nil { return err } // Vet any service that might be getting overwritten. if existing := a.State.Service(service.CompoundServiceID()); existing != nil { existing.FillAuthzContext(&authzContext) if err := authz.ToAllowAuthorizer().ServiceWriteAllowed(existing.Service, &authzContext); err != nil { return err } } // If the service is a proxy, ensure that it has write on the destination too // since it can be discovered as an instance of that service. if service.Kind == structs.ServiceKindConnectProxy { service.FillAuthzContext(&authzContext) if err := authz.ToAllowAuthorizer().ServiceWriteAllowed(service.Proxy.DestinationServiceName, &authzContext); err != nil { return err } } return nil } func (a *Agent) vetServiceUpdateWithAuthorizer(authz acl.Authorizer, serviceID structs.ServiceID) error { var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext // Vet any changes based on the existing services's info. if existing := a.State.Service(serviceID); existing != nil { existing.FillAuthzContext(&authzContext) if err := authz.ToAllowAuthorizer().ServiceWriteAllowed(existing.Service, &authzContext); err != nil { return err } } else { // Take care if modifying this error message. // agent/local/state.go's deleteService assumes the Catalog.Deregister RPC call // will include "Unknown service"in the error if deregistration fails due to a // service with that ID not existing. return HTTPError{ StatusCode: http.StatusNotFound, Reason: fmt.Sprintf("Unknown service ID %q. Ensure that the service ID is passed, not the service name.", serviceID), } } return nil } func (a *Agent) vetCheckRegisterWithAuthorizer(authz acl.Authorizer, check *structs.HealthCheck) error { var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext check.FillAuthzContext(&authzContext) // Vet the check itself. if len(check.ServiceName) > 0 { if err := authz.ToAllowAuthorizer().ServiceWriteAllowed(check.ServiceName, &authzContext); err != nil { return err } } else { // N.B. Should this authzContext be derived from a.AgentEnterpriseMeta() if err := authz.ToAllowAuthorizer().NodeWriteAllowed(a.config.NodeName, &authzContext); err != nil { return err } } // Vet any check that might be getting overwritten. if existing := a.State.Check(check.CompoundCheckID()); existing != nil { if len(existing.ServiceName) > 0 { // N.B. Should this authzContext be derived from existing.EnterpriseMeta? if err := authz.ToAllowAuthorizer().ServiceWriteAllowed(existing.ServiceName, &authzContext); err != nil { return err } } else { // N.B. Should this authzContext be derived from a.AgentEnterpriseMeta() if err := authz.ToAllowAuthorizer().NodeWriteAllowed(a.config.NodeName, &authzContext); err != nil { return err } } } return nil } func (a *Agent) vetCheckUpdateWithAuthorizer(authz acl.Authorizer, checkID structs.CheckID) error { var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext checkID.FillAuthzContext(&authzContext) // Vet any changes based on the existing check's info. if existing := a.State.Check(checkID); existing != nil { if len(existing.ServiceName) > 0 { if err := authz.ToAllowAuthorizer().ServiceWriteAllowed(existing.ServiceName, &authzContext); err != nil { return err } } else { if err := authz.ToAllowAuthorizer().NodeWriteAllowed(a.config.NodeName, &authzContext); err != nil { return err } } } else { return HTTPError{ StatusCode: http.StatusNotFound, Reason: fmt.Sprintf("Unknown check ID %q. Ensure that the check ID is passed, not the check name.", checkID.String()), } } return nil } // filterMembers redacts members that the token doesn't have access to. func (a *Agent) filterMembers(token string, members *[]serf.Member) error { // Resolve the token and bail if ACLs aren't enabled. authz, err := a.delegate.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(token, nil, nil) if err != nil { return err } var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext // Filter out members based on the node policy. m := *members for i := 0; i < len(m); i++ { node := m[i].Name serfMemberFillAuthzContext(&m[i], &authzContext) if authz.NodeRead(node, &authzContext) == acl.Allow { continue } accessorID := authz.AccessorID() a.logger.Debug("dropping node from result due to ACLs", "node", node, "accessorID", accessorID) m = append(m[:i], m[i+1:]...) i-- } *members = m return nil } func (a *Agent) filterServicesWithAuthorizer(authz acl.Authorizer, services map[string]*api.AgentService) error { var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext // Filter out services based on the service policy. for id, service := range services { agentServiceFillAuthzContext(service, &authzContext) if authz.ServiceRead(service.Service, &authzContext) == acl.Allow { continue } a.logger.Debug("dropping service from result due to ACLs", "service", id) delete(services, id) } return nil } func (a *Agent) filterChecksWithAuthorizer(authz acl.Authorizer, checks map[types.CheckID]*structs.HealthCheck) error { var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext // Filter out checks based on the node or service policy. for id, check := range checks { check.FillAuthzContext(&authzContext) if len(check.ServiceName) > 0 { if authz.ServiceRead(check.ServiceName, &authzContext) == acl.Allow { continue } } else { if authz.NodeRead(a.config.NodeName, &authzContext) == acl.Allow { continue } } a.logger.Debug("dropping check from result due to ACLs", "check", id) delete(checks, id) } return nil }