package consul import ( "fmt" "sort" "sync" "time" metrics "github.com/armon/go-metrics" "github.com/hashicorp/consul/acl" "github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/structs" "github.com/hashicorp/consul/logging" "github.com/hashicorp/go-hclog" "golang.org/x/sync/singleflight" "golang.org/x/time/rate" ) // These must be kept in sync with the constants in command/agent/acl.go. const ( // anonymousToken is the token ID we re-write to if there is no token ID // provided. anonymousToken = "anonymous" // redactedToken is shown in structures with embedded tokens when they // are not allowed to be displayed. redactedToken = "" // aclUpgradeBatchSize controls how many tokens we look at during each round of upgrading. Individual raft logs // will be further capped using the aclBatchUpsertSize. This limit just prevents us from creating a single slice // with all tokens in it. aclUpgradeBatchSize = 128 // aclUpgradeRateLimit is the number of batch upgrade requests per second allowed. aclUpgradeRateLimit rate.Limit = 1.0 // aclTokenReapingRateLimit is the number of batch token reaping requests per second allowed. aclTokenReapingRateLimit rate.Limit = 1.0 // aclTokenReapingBurst is the number of batch token reaping requests per second // that can burst after a period of idleness. aclTokenReapingBurst = 5 // aclBatchDeleteSize is the number of deletions to send in a single batch operation. 4096 should produce a batch that is <150KB // in size but should be sufficiently large to handle 1 replication round in a single batch aclBatchDeleteSize = 4096 // aclBatchUpsertSize is the target size in bytes we want to submit for a batch upsert request. We estimate the size at runtime // due to the data being more variable in its size. aclBatchUpsertSize = 256 * 1024 // DEPRECATED (ACL-Legacy-Compat) aclModeCheck* are all only for legacy usage // aclModeCheckMinInterval is the minimum amount of time between checking if the // agent should be using the new or legacy ACL system. All the places it is // currently used will backoff as it detects that it is remaining in legacy mode. // However the initial min value is kept small so that new cluster creation // can enter into new ACL mode quickly. aclModeCheckMinInterval = 50 * time.Millisecond // aclModeCheckMaxInterval controls the maximum interval for how often the agent // checks if it should be using the new or legacy ACL system. aclModeCheckMaxInterval = 30 * time.Second // Maximum number of re-resolution requests to be made if the token is modified between // resolving the token and resolving its policies that would remove one of its policies. tokenPolicyResolutionMaxRetries = 5 // Maximum number of re-resolution requests to be made if the token is modified between // resolving the token and resolving its roles that would remove one of its roles. tokenRoleResolutionMaxRetries = 5 ) // missingIdentity is used to return some identity in the event that the real identity cannot be ascertained type missingIdentity struct { reason string token string } func (id *missingIdentity) ID() string { return id.reason } func (id *missingIdentity) SecretToken() string { return id.token } func (id *missingIdentity) PolicyIDs() []string { return nil } func (id *missingIdentity) RoleIDs() []string { return nil } func (id *missingIdentity) EmbeddedPolicy() *structs.ACLPolicy { return nil } func (id *missingIdentity) ServiceIdentityList() []*structs.ACLServiceIdentity { return nil } func (id *missingIdentity) NodeIdentityList() []*structs.ACLNodeIdentity { return nil } func (id *missingIdentity) IsExpired(asOf time.Time) bool { return false } func (id *missingIdentity) IsLocal() bool { return false } func (id *missingIdentity) EnterpriseMetadata() *structs.EnterpriseMeta { return structs.DefaultEnterpriseMeta() } func minTTL(a time.Duration, b time.Duration) time.Duration { if a < b { return a } return b } type ACLRemoteError struct { Err error } func (e ACLRemoteError) Error() string { return fmt.Sprintf("Error communicating with the ACL Datacenter: %v", e.Err) } func IsACLRemoteError(err error) bool { _, ok := err.(ACLRemoteError) return ok } func tokenSecretCacheID(token string) string { return "token-secret:" + token } type ACLResolverDelegate interface { ACLsEnabled() bool ACLDatacenter(legacy bool) string UseLegacyACLs() bool ResolveIdentityFromToken(token string) (bool, structs.ACLIdentity, error) ResolvePolicyFromID(policyID string) (bool, *structs.ACLPolicy, error) ResolveRoleFromID(roleID string) (bool, *structs.ACLRole, error) RPC(method string, args interface{}, reply interface{}) error EnterpriseACLResolverDelegate } type policyOrRoleTokenError struct { Err error token string } func (e policyOrRoleTokenError) Error() string { return e.Err.Error() } // ACLResolverConfig holds all the configuration necessary to create an ACLResolver type ACLResolverConfig struct { Config *Config Logger hclog.Logger // CacheConfig is a pass through configuration for ACL cache limits CacheConfig *structs.ACLCachesConfig // Delegate that implements some helper functionality that is server/client specific Delegate ACLResolverDelegate // AutoDisable indicates that RPC responses should be checked and if they indicate ACLs are disabled // remotely then disable them locally as well. This is particularly useful for the client agent // so that it can detect when the servers have gotten ACLs enabled. AutoDisable bool // ACLConfig is the configuration necessary to pass through to the acl package when creating authorizers // and when authorizing access ACLConfig *acl.Config } // ACLResolver is the type to handle all your token and policy resolution needs. // // Supports: // - Resolving tokens locally via the ACLResolverDelegate // - Resolving policies locally via the ACLResolverDelegate // - Resolving roles locally via the ACLResolverDelegate // - Resolving legacy tokens remotely via an ACL.GetPolicy RPC // - Resolving tokens remotely via an ACL.TokenRead RPC // - Resolving policies remotely via an ACL.PolicyResolve RPC // - Resolving roles remotely via an ACL.RoleResolve RPC // // Remote Resolution: // Remote resolution can be done synchronously or asynchronously depending // on the ACLDownPolicy in the Config passed to the resolver. // // When the down policy is set to async-cache and we have already cached values // then go routines will be spawned to perform the RPCs in the background // and then will update the cache with either the positive or negative result. // // When the down policy is set to extend-cache or the token/policy/role is not already // cached then the same go routines are spawned to do the RPCs in the background. // However in this mode channels are created to receive the results of the RPC // and are registered with the resolver. Those channels are immediately read/blocked // upon. // type ACLResolver struct { config *Config logger hclog.Logger delegate ACLResolverDelegate aclConf *acl.Config cache *structs.ACLCaches identityGroup singleflight.Group policyGroup singleflight.Group roleGroup singleflight.Group legacyGroup singleflight.Group down acl.Authorizer autoDisable bool disabled time.Time disabledLock sync.RWMutex } func NewACLResolver(config *ACLResolverConfig) (*ACLResolver, error) { if config == nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("ACL Resolver must be initialized with a config") } if config.Config == nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("ACLResolverConfig.Config must not be nil") } if config.Delegate == nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("ACL Resolver must be initialized with a valid delegate") } if config.Logger == nil { config.Logger = hclog.New(&hclog.LoggerOptions{}) } cache, err := structs.NewACLCaches(config.CacheConfig) if err != nil { return nil, err } var down acl.Authorizer switch config.Config.ACLDownPolicy { case "allow": down = acl.AllowAll() case "deny": down = acl.DenyAll() case "async-cache", "extend-cache": // Leave the down policy as nil to signal this. default: return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid ACL down policy %q", config.Config.ACLDownPolicy) } return &ACLResolver{ config: config.Config, logger: config.Logger.Named(logging.ACL), delegate: config.Delegate, aclConf: config.ACLConfig, cache: cache, autoDisable: config.AutoDisable, down: down, }, nil } func (r *ACLResolver) Close() { r.aclConf.Close() } func (r *ACLResolver) fetchAndCacheTokenLegacy(token string, cached *structs.AuthorizerCacheEntry) (acl.Authorizer, error) { req := structs.ACLPolicyResolveLegacyRequest{ Datacenter: r.delegate.ACLDatacenter(true), ACL: token, } cacheTTL := r.config.ACLTokenTTL if cached != nil { cacheTTL = cached.TTL } var reply structs.ACLPolicyResolveLegacyResponse err := r.delegate.RPC("ACL.GetPolicy", &req, &reply) if err == nil { parent := acl.RootAuthorizer(reply.Parent) if parent == nil { var authorizer acl.Authorizer if cached != nil { authorizer = cached.Authorizer } r.cache.PutAuthorizerWithTTL(token, authorizer, cacheTTL) return authorizer, acl.ErrInvalidParent } var policies []*acl.Policy policy := reply.Policy if policy != nil { policies = append(policies, policy.ConvertFromLegacy()) } authorizer, err := acl.NewPolicyAuthorizerWithDefaults(parent, policies, r.aclConf) r.cache.PutAuthorizerWithTTL(token, authorizer, reply.TTL) return authorizer, err } if acl.IsErrNotFound(err) { // Make sure to remove from the cache if it was deleted r.cache.PutAuthorizerWithTTL(token, nil, cacheTTL) return nil, acl.ErrNotFound } // some other RPC error switch r.config.ACLDownPolicy { case "allow": r.cache.PutAuthorizerWithTTL(token, acl.AllowAll(), cacheTTL) return acl.AllowAll(), nil case "async-cache", "extend-cache": if cached != nil { r.cache.PutAuthorizerWithTTL(token, cached.Authorizer, cacheTTL) return cached.Authorizer, nil } fallthrough default: r.cache.PutAuthorizerWithTTL(token, acl.DenyAll(), cacheTTL) return acl.DenyAll(), nil } } func (r *ACLResolver) resolveTokenLegacy(token string) (structs.ACLIdentity, acl.Authorizer, error) { defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"acl", "resolveTokenLegacy"}, time.Now()) // Attempt to resolve locally first (local results are not cached) // This is only useful for servers where either legacy replication is being // done or the server is within the primary datacenter. if done, identity, err := r.delegate.ResolveIdentityFromToken(token); done { if err == nil && identity != nil { policies, err := r.resolvePoliciesForIdentity(identity) if err != nil { return identity, nil, err } authz, err := policies.Compile(r.cache, r.aclConf) if err != nil { return identity, nil, err } return identity, acl.NewChainedAuthorizer([]acl.Authorizer{authz, acl.RootAuthorizer(r.config.ACLDefaultPolicy)}), nil } return nil, nil, err } identity := &missingIdentity{ reason: "legacy-token", token: token, } // Look in the cache prior to making a RPC request entry := r.cache.GetAuthorizer(token) if entry != nil && entry.Age() <= minTTL(entry.TTL, r.config.ACLTokenTTL) { metrics.IncrCounter([]string{"acl", "token", "cache_hit"}, 1) if entry.Authorizer != nil { return identity, entry.Authorizer, nil } return identity, nil, acl.ErrNotFound } metrics.IncrCounter([]string{"acl", "token", "cache_miss"}, 1) // Resolve the token in the background and wait on the result if we must waitChan := r.legacyGroup.DoChan(token, func() (interface{}, error) { authorizer, err := r.fetchAndCacheTokenLegacy(token, entry) return authorizer, err }) waitForResult := entry == nil || r.config.ACLDownPolicy != "async-cache" if !waitForResult { // waitForResult being false requires the cacheEntry to not be nil if entry.Authorizer != nil { return identity, entry.Authorizer, nil } return identity, nil, acl.ErrNotFound } // block waiting for the async RPC to finish. res := <-waitChan var authorizer acl.Authorizer if res.Val != nil { // avoid a nil-not-nil bug authorizer = res.Val.(acl.Authorizer) } return identity, authorizer, res.Err } func (r *ACLResolver) fetchAndCacheIdentityFromToken(token string, cached *structs.IdentityCacheEntry) (structs.ACLIdentity, error) { cacheID := tokenSecretCacheID(token) req := structs.ACLTokenGetRequest{ Datacenter: r.delegate.ACLDatacenter(false), TokenID: token, TokenIDType: structs.ACLTokenSecret, QueryOptions: structs.QueryOptions{ Token: token, AllowStale: true, }, } var resp structs.ACLTokenResponse err := r.delegate.RPC("ACL.TokenRead", &req, &resp) if err == nil { if resp.Token == nil { r.cache.PutIdentity(cacheID, nil) return nil, acl.ErrNotFound } else if resp.Token.Local && r.config.Datacenter != resp.SourceDatacenter { r.cache.PutIdentity(cacheID, nil) return nil, acl.PermissionDeniedError{Cause: fmt.Sprintf("This is a local token in datacenter %q", resp.SourceDatacenter)} } else { r.cache.PutIdentity(cacheID, resp.Token) return resp.Token, nil } } if acl.IsErrNotFound(err) { // Make sure to remove from the cache if it was deleted r.cache.PutIdentity(cacheID, nil) return nil, acl.ErrNotFound } // some other RPC error if cached != nil && (r.config.ACLDownPolicy == "extend-cache" || r.config.ACLDownPolicy == "async-cache") { // extend the cache r.cache.PutIdentity(cacheID, cached.Identity) return cached.Identity, nil } r.cache.PutIdentity(cacheID, nil) return nil, err } // resolveIdentityFromToken takes a token secret as a string and returns an ACLIdentity. // We read the value from ACLResolver's cache if available, and if the read misses // we initiate an RPC for the value. func (r *ACLResolver) resolveIdentityFromToken(token string) (structs.ACLIdentity, error) { // Attempt to resolve locally first (local results are not cached) if done, identity, err := r.delegate.ResolveIdentityFromToken(token); done { return identity, err } // Check the cache before making any RPC requests cacheEntry := r.cache.GetIdentity(tokenSecretCacheID(token)) if cacheEntry != nil && cacheEntry.Age() <= r.config.ACLTokenTTL { metrics.IncrCounter([]string{"acl", "token", "cache_hit"}, 1) return cacheEntry.Identity, nil } metrics.IncrCounter([]string{"acl", "token", "cache_miss"}, 1) // Background a RPC request and wait on it if we must waitChan := r.identityGroup.DoChan(token, func() (interface{}, error) { identity, err := r.fetchAndCacheIdentityFromToken(token, cacheEntry) return identity, err }) waitForResult := cacheEntry == nil || r.config.ACLDownPolicy != "async-cache" if !waitForResult { // waitForResult being false requires the cacheEntry to not be nil return cacheEntry.Identity, nil } // block on the read here, this is why we don't need chan buffering res := <-waitChan var identity structs.ACLIdentity if res.Val != nil { // avoid a nil-not-nil bug identity = res.Val.(structs.ACLIdentity) } if res.Err != nil && !acl.IsErrNotFound(res.Err) { return identity, ACLRemoteError{Err: res.Err} } return identity, res.Err } func (r *ACLResolver) fetchAndCachePoliciesForIdentity(identity structs.ACLIdentity, policyIDs []string, cached map[string]*structs.PolicyCacheEntry) (map[string]*structs.ACLPolicy, error) { req := structs.ACLPolicyBatchGetRequest{ Datacenter: r.delegate.ACLDatacenter(false), PolicyIDs: policyIDs, QueryOptions: structs.QueryOptions{ Token: identity.SecretToken(), AllowStale: true, }, } var resp structs.ACLPolicyBatchResponse err := r.delegate.RPC("ACL.PolicyResolve", &req, &resp) if err == nil { out := make(map[string]*structs.ACLPolicy) for _, policy := range resp.Policies { out[policy.ID] = policy } for _, policyID := range policyIDs { if policy, ok := out[policyID]; ok { r.cache.PutPolicy(policyID, policy) } else { r.cache.PutPolicy(policyID, nil) } } return out, nil } if handledErr := r.maybeHandleIdentityErrorDuringFetch(identity, err); handledErr != nil { return nil, handledErr } // other RPC error - use cache if available extendCache := r.config.ACLDownPolicy == "extend-cache" || r.config.ACLDownPolicy == "async-cache" out := make(map[string]*structs.ACLPolicy) insufficientCache := false for _, policyID := range policyIDs { if entry, ok := cached[policyID]; extendCache && ok { r.cache.PutPolicy(policyID, entry.Policy) if entry.Policy != nil { out[policyID] = entry.Policy } } else { r.cache.PutPolicy(policyID, nil) insufficientCache = true } } if insufficientCache { return nil, ACLRemoteError{Err: err} } return out, nil } func (r *ACLResolver) fetchAndCacheRolesForIdentity(identity structs.ACLIdentity, roleIDs []string, cached map[string]*structs.RoleCacheEntry) (map[string]*structs.ACLRole, error) { req := structs.ACLRoleBatchGetRequest{ Datacenter: r.delegate.ACLDatacenter(false), RoleIDs: roleIDs, QueryOptions: structs.QueryOptions{ Token: identity.SecretToken(), AllowStale: true, }, } var resp structs.ACLRoleBatchResponse err := r.delegate.RPC("ACL.RoleResolve", &req, &resp) if err == nil { out := make(map[string]*structs.ACLRole) for _, role := range resp.Roles { out[role.ID] = role } for _, roleID := range roleIDs { if role, ok := out[roleID]; ok { r.cache.PutRole(roleID, role) } else { r.cache.PutRole(roleID, nil) } } return out, nil } if handledErr := r.maybeHandleIdentityErrorDuringFetch(identity, err); handledErr != nil { return nil, handledErr } // other RPC error - use cache if available extendCache := r.config.ACLDownPolicy == "extend-cache" || r.config.ACLDownPolicy == "async-cache" out := make(map[string]*structs.ACLRole) insufficientCache := false for _, roleID := range roleIDs { if entry, ok := cached[roleID]; extendCache && ok { r.cache.PutRole(roleID, entry.Role) if entry.Role != nil { out[roleID] = entry.Role } } else { r.cache.PutRole(roleID, nil) insufficientCache = true } } if insufficientCache { return nil, ACLRemoteError{Err: err} } return out, nil } func (r *ACLResolver) maybeHandleIdentityErrorDuringFetch(identity structs.ACLIdentity, err error) error { if acl.IsErrNotFound(err) { // make sure to indicate that this identity is no longer valid within // the cache r.cache.PutIdentity(tokenSecretCacheID(identity.SecretToken()), nil) // Do not touch the cache. Getting a top level ACL not found error // only indicates that the secret token used in the request // no longer exists return &policyOrRoleTokenError{acl.ErrNotFound, identity.SecretToken()} } if acl.IsErrPermissionDenied(err) { // invalidate our ID cache so that identity resolution will take place // again in the future r.cache.RemoveIdentity(tokenSecretCacheID(identity.SecretToken())) // Do not remove from the cache for permission denied // what this does indicate is that our view of the token is out of date return &policyOrRoleTokenError{acl.ErrPermissionDenied, identity.SecretToken()} } return nil } func (r *ACLResolver) filterPoliciesByScope(policies structs.ACLPolicies) structs.ACLPolicies { var out structs.ACLPolicies for _, policy := range policies { if len(policy.Datacenters) == 0 { out = append(out, policy) continue } for _, dc := range policy.Datacenters { if dc == r.config.Datacenter { out = append(out, policy) continue } } } return out } func (r *ACLResolver) resolvePoliciesForIdentity(identity structs.ACLIdentity) (structs.ACLPolicies, error) { policyIDs := identity.PolicyIDs() roleIDs := identity.RoleIDs() serviceIdentities := identity.ServiceIdentityList() nodeIdentities := identity.NodeIdentityList() if len(policyIDs) == 0 && len(serviceIdentities) == 0 && len(roleIDs) == 0 && len(nodeIdentities) == 0 { policy := identity.EmbeddedPolicy() if policy != nil { return []*structs.ACLPolicy{policy}, nil } // In this case the default policy will be all that is in effect. return nil, nil } // Collect all of the roles tied to this token. roles, err := r.collectRolesForIdentity(identity, roleIDs) if err != nil { return nil, err } // Merge the policies and service identities across Token and Role fields. for _, role := range roles { for _, link := range role.Policies { policyIDs = append(policyIDs, link.ID) } serviceIdentities = append(serviceIdentities, role.ServiceIdentities...) nodeIdentities = append(nodeIdentities, role.NodeIdentityList()...) } // Now deduplicate any policies or service identities that occur more than once. policyIDs = dedupeStringSlice(policyIDs) serviceIdentities = dedupeServiceIdentities(serviceIdentities) nodeIdentities = dedupeNodeIdentities(nodeIdentities) // Generate synthetic policies for all service identities in effect. syntheticPolicies := r.synthesizePoliciesForServiceIdentities(serviceIdentities, identity.EnterpriseMetadata()) syntheticPolicies = append(syntheticPolicies, r.synthesizePoliciesForNodeIdentities(nodeIdentities)...) // For the new ACLs policy replication is mandatory for correct operation on servers. Therefore // we only attempt to resolve policies locally policies, err := r.collectPoliciesForIdentity(identity, policyIDs, len(syntheticPolicies)) if err != nil { return nil, err } policies = append(policies, syntheticPolicies...) filtered := r.filterPoliciesByScope(policies) return filtered, nil } func (r *ACLResolver) synthesizePoliciesForServiceIdentities(serviceIdentities []*structs.ACLServiceIdentity, entMeta *structs.EnterpriseMeta) []*structs.ACLPolicy { if len(serviceIdentities) == 0 { return nil } syntheticPolicies := make([]*structs.ACLPolicy, 0, len(serviceIdentities)) for _, s := range serviceIdentities { syntheticPolicies = append(syntheticPolicies, s.SyntheticPolicy(entMeta)) } return syntheticPolicies } func (r *ACLResolver) synthesizePoliciesForNodeIdentities(nodeIdentities []*structs.ACLNodeIdentity) []*structs.ACLPolicy { if len(nodeIdentities) == 0 { return nil } syntheticPolicies := make([]*structs.ACLPolicy, 0, len(nodeIdentities)) for _, n := range nodeIdentities { syntheticPolicies = append(syntheticPolicies, n.SyntheticPolicy()) } return syntheticPolicies } func dedupeServiceIdentities(in []*structs.ACLServiceIdentity) []*structs.ACLServiceIdentity { // From: https://github.com/golang/go/wiki/SliceTricks#in-place-deduplicate-comparable if len(in) <= 1 { return in } sort.Slice(in, func(i, j int) bool { return in[i].ServiceName < in[j].ServiceName }) j := 0 for i := 1; i < len(in); i++ { if in[j].ServiceName == in[i].ServiceName { // Prefer increasing scope. if len(in[j].Datacenters) == 0 || len(in[i].Datacenters) == 0 { in[j].Datacenters = nil } else { in[j].Datacenters = mergeStringSlice(in[j].Datacenters, in[i].Datacenters) } continue } j++ in[j] = in[i] } // Discard the skipped items. for i := j + 1; i < len(in); i++ { in[i] = nil } return in[:j+1] } func dedupeNodeIdentities(in []*structs.ACLNodeIdentity) []*structs.ACLNodeIdentity { // From: https://github.com/golang/go/wiki/SliceTricks#in-place-deduplicate-comparable if len(in) <= 1 { return in } sort.Slice(in, func(i, j int) bool { if in[i].NodeName < in[j].NodeName { return true } return in[i].Datacenter < in[j].Datacenter }) j := 0 for i := 1; i < len(in); i++ { if in[j].NodeName == in[i].NodeName && in[j].Datacenter == in[i].Datacenter { continue } j++ in[j] = in[i] } // Discard the skipped items. for i := j + 1; i < len(in); i++ { in[i] = nil } return in[:j+1] } func mergeStringSlice(a, b []string) []string { out := make([]string, 0, len(a)+len(b)) out = append(out, a...) out = append(out, b...) return dedupeStringSlice(out) } func dedupeStringSlice(in []string) []string { // From: https://github.com/golang/go/wiki/SliceTricks#in-place-deduplicate-comparable if len(in) <= 1 { return in } sort.Strings(in) j := 0 for i := 1; i < len(in); i++ { if in[j] == in[i] { continue } j++ in[j] = in[i] } return in[:j+1] } func (r *ACLResolver) collectPoliciesForIdentity(identity structs.ACLIdentity, policyIDs []string, extraCap int) ([]*structs.ACLPolicy, error) { policies := make([]*structs.ACLPolicy, 0, len(policyIDs)+extraCap) // Get all associated policies var missing []string var expired []*structs.ACLPolicy expCacheMap := make(map[string]*structs.PolicyCacheEntry) var accessorID string if identity != nil { accessorID = identity.ID() } for _, policyID := range policyIDs { if done, policy, err := r.delegate.ResolvePolicyFromID(policyID); done { if err != nil && !acl.IsErrNotFound(err) { return nil, err } if policy != nil { policies = append(policies, policy) } else { r.logger.Warn("policy not found for identity", "policy", policyID, "accessorID", accessorID, ) } continue } // create the missing list which we can execute an RPC to get all the missing policies at once entry := r.cache.GetPolicy(policyID) if entry == nil { missing = append(missing, policyID) continue } if entry.Policy == nil { // this happens when we cache a negative response for the policy's existence continue } if entry.Age() >= r.config.ACLPolicyTTL { expired = append(expired, entry.Policy) expCacheMap[policyID] = entry } else { policies = append(policies, entry.Policy) } } // Hot-path if we have no missing or expired policies if len(missing)+len(expired) == 0 { return policies, nil } hasMissing := len(missing) > 0 fetchIDs := missing for _, policy := range expired { fetchIDs = append(fetchIDs, policy.ID) } // Background a RPC request and wait on it if we must waitChan := r.policyGroup.DoChan(identity.SecretToken(), func() (interface{}, error) { policies, err := r.fetchAndCachePoliciesForIdentity(identity, fetchIDs, expCacheMap) return policies, err }) waitForResult := hasMissing || r.config.ACLDownPolicy != "async-cache" if !waitForResult { // waitForResult being false requires that all the policies were cached already policies = append(policies, expired...) return policies, nil } res := <-waitChan if res.Err != nil { return nil, res.Err } if res.Val != nil { foundPolicies := res.Val.(map[string]*structs.ACLPolicy) for _, policy := range foundPolicies { policies = append(policies, policy) } } return policies, nil } func (r *ACLResolver) resolveRolesForIdentity(identity structs.ACLIdentity) (structs.ACLRoles, error) { return r.collectRolesForIdentity(identity, identity.RoleIDs()) } func (r *ACLResolver) collectRolesForIdentity(identity structs.ACLIdentity, roleIDs []string) (structs.ACLRoles, error) { if len(roleIDs) == 0 { return nil, nil } // For the new ACLs policy & role replication is mandatory for correct operation // on servers. Therefore we only attempt to resolve roles locally roles := make([]*structs.ACLRole, 0, len(roleIDs)) var missing []string var expired []*structs.ACLRole expCacheMap := make(map[string]*structs.RoleCacheEntry) for _, roleID := range roleIDs { if done, role, err := r.delegate.ResolveRoleFromID(roleID); done { if err != nil && !acl.IsErrNotFound(err) { return nil, err } if role != nil { roles = append(roles, role) } else { var accessorID string if identity != nil { accessorID = identity.ID() } r.logger.Warn("role not found for identity", "role", roleID, "accessorID", accessorID, ) } continue } // create the missing list which we can execute an RPC to get all the missing roles at once entry := r.cache.GetRole(roleID) if entry == nil { missing = append(missing, roleID) continue } if entry.Role == nil { // this happens when we cache a negative response for the role's existence continue } if entry.Age() >= r.config.ACLRoleTTL { expired = append(expired, entry.Role) expCacheMap[roleID] = entry } else { roles = append(roles, entry.Role) } } // Hot-path if we have no missing or expired roles if len(missing)+len(expired) == 0 { return roles, nil } hasMissing := len(missing) > 0 fetchIDs := missing for _, role := range expired { fetchIDs = append(fetchIDs, role.ID) } waitChan := r.roleGroup.DoChan(identity.SecretToken(), func() (interface{}, error) { roles, err := r.fetchAndCacheRolesForIdentity(identity, fetchIDs, expCacheMap) return roles, err }) waitForResult := hasMissing || r.config.ACLDownPolicy != "async-cache" if !waitForResult { // waitForResult being false requires that all the roles were cached already roles = append(roles, expired...) return roles, nil } res := <-waitChan if res.Err != nil { return nil, res.Err } if res.Val != nil { foundRoles := res.Val.(map[string]*structs.ACLRole) for _, role := range foundRoles { roles = append(roles, role) } } return roles, nil } func (r *ACLResolver) resolveTokenToPolicies(token string) (structs.ACLPolicies, error) { _, policies, err := r.resolveTokenToIdentityAndPolicies(token) return policies, err } func (r *ACLResolver) resolveTokenToIdentityAndPolicies(token string) (structs.ACLIdentity, structs.ACLPolicies, error) { var lastErr error var lastIdentity structs.ACLIdentity for i := 0; i < tokenPolicyResolutionMaxRetries; i++ { // Resolve the token to an ACLIdentity identity, err := r.resolveIdentityFromToken(token) if err != nil { return nil, nil, err } else if identity == nil { return nil, nil, acl.ErrNotFound } else if identity.IsExpired(time.Now()) { return nil, nil, acl.ErrNotFound } lastIdentity = identity policies, err := r.resolvePoliciesForIdentity(identity) if err == nil { return identity, policies, nil } lastErr = err if tokenErr, ok := err.(*policyOrRoleTokenError); ok { if acl.IsErrNotFound(err) && tokenErr.token == identity.SecretToken() { // token was deleted while resolving policies return nil, nil, acl.ErrNotFound } // other types of policyOrRoleTokenErrors should cause retrying the whole token // resolution process } else { return identity, nil, err } } return lastIdentity, nil, lastErr } func (r *ACLResolver) resolveTokenToIdentityAndRoles(token string) (structs.ACLIdentity, structs.ACLRoles, error) { var lastErr error var lastIdentity structs.ACLIdentity for i := 0; i < tokenRoleResolutionMaxRetries; i++ { // Resolve the token to an ACLIdentity identity, err := r.resolveIdentityFromToken(token) if err != nil { return nil, nil, err } else if identity == nil { return nil, nil, acl.ErrNotFound } else if identity.IsExpired(time.Now()) { return nil, nil, acl.ErrNotFound } lastIdentity = identity roles, err := r.resolveRolesForIdentity(identity) if err == nil { return identity, roles, nil } lastErr = err if tokenErr, ok := err.(*policyOrRoleTokenError); ok { if acl.IsErrNotFound(err) && tokenErr.token == identity.SecretToken() { // token was deleted while resolving roles return nil, nil, acl.ErrNotFound } // other types of policyOrRoleTokenErrors should cause retrying the whole token // resolution process } else { return identity, nil, err } } return lastIdentity, nil, lastErr } func (r *ACLResolver) disableACLsWhenUpstreamDisabled(err error) error { if !r.autoDisable || err == nil || !acl.IsErrDisabled(err) { return err } r.logger.Debug("ACLs disabled on upstream servers, will retry", "retry_interval", r.config.ACLDisabledTTL) r.disabledLock.Lock() r.disabled = time.Now().Add(r.config.ACLDisabledTTL) r.disabledLock.Unlock() return err } func (r *ACLResolver) ResolveTokenToIdentityAndAuthorizer(token string) (structs.ACLIdentity, acl.Authorizer, error) { if !r.ACLsEnabled() { return nil, nil, nil } if acl.RootAuthorizer(token) != nil { return nil, nil, acl.ErrRootDenied } // handle the anonymous token if token == "" { token = anonymousToken } if r.delegate.UseLegacyACLs() { identity, authorizer, err := r.resolveTokenLegacy(token) return identity, authorizer, r.disableACLsWhenUpstreamDisabled(err) } defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"acl", "ResolveToken"}, time.Now()) identity, policies, err := r.resolveTokenToIdentityAndPolicies(token) if err != nil { r.disableACLsWhenUpstreamDisabled(err) if IsACLRemoteError(err) { r.logger.Error("Error resolving token", "error", err) return &missingIdentity{reason: "primary-dc-down", token: token}, r.down, nil } return nil, nil, err } // Build the Authorizer var chain []acl.Authorizer authz, err := policies.Compile(r.cache, r.aclConf) if err != nil { return nil, nil, err } chain = append(chain, authz) authz, err = r.resolveEnterpriseDefaultsForIdentity(identity) if err != nil { if IsACLRemoteError(err) { r.logger.Error("Error resolving identity defaults", "error", err) return identity, r.down, nil } return nil, nil, err } else if authz != nil { chain = append(chain, authz) } chain = append(chain, acl.RootAuthorizer(r.config.ACLDefaultPolicy)) return identity, acl.NewChainedAuthorizer(chain), nil } func (r *ACLResolver) ResolveToken(token string) (acl.Authorizer, error) { _, authz, err := r.ResolveTokenToIdentityAndAuthorizer(token) return authz, err } func (r *ACLResolver) ResolveTokenToIdentity(token string) (structs.ACLIdentity, error) { if !r.ACLsEnabled() { return nil, nil } if acl.RootAuthorizer(token) != nil { return nil, acl.ErrRootDenied } // handle the anonymous token if token == "" { token = anonymousToken } if r.delegate.UseLegacyACLs() { identity, _, err := r.resolveTokenLegacy(token) return identity, r.disableACLsWhenUpstreamDisabled(err) } defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"acl", "ResolveTokenToIdentity"}, time.Now()) return r.resolveIdentityFromToken(token) } func (r *ACLResolver) ACLsEnabled() bool { // Whether we desire ACLs to be enabled according to configuration if !r.delegate.ACLsEnabled() { return false } if r.autoDisable { // Whether ACLs are disabled according to RPCs failing with a ACLs Disabled error r.disabledLock.RLock() defer r.disabledLock.RUnlock() return !time.Now().Before(r.disabled) } return true } func (r *ACLResolver) GetMergedPolicyForToken(token string) (structs.ACLIdentity, *acl.Policy, error) { ident, policies, err := r.resolveTokenToIdentityAndPolicies(token) if err != nil { return nil, nil, err } if len(policies) == 0 { return nil, nil, acl.ErrNotFound } policy, err := policies.Merge(r.cache, r.aclConf) return ident, policy, err } // aclFilter is used to filter results from our state store based on ACL rules // configured for the provided token. type aclFilter struct { authorizer acl.Authorizer logger hclog.Logger } // newACLFilter constructs a new aclFilter. func newACLFilter(authorizer acl.Authorizer, logger hclog.Logger) *aclFilter { if logger == nil { logger = hclog.New(&hclog.LoggerOptions{}) } return &aclFilter{ authorizer: authorizer, logger: logger, } } // allowNode is used to determine if a node is accessible for an ACL. func (f *aclFilter) allowNode(node string, ent *acl.AuthorizerContext) bool { return f.authorizer.NodeRead(node, ent) == acl.Allow } // allowNode is used to determine if the gateway and service are accessible for an ACL func (f *aclFilter) allowGateway(gs *structs.GatewayService) bool { var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext // Need read on service and gateway. Gateway may have different EnterpriseMeta so we fill authzContext twice gs.Gateway.FillAuthzContext(&authzContext) if !f.allowService(gs.Gateway.Name, &authzContext) { return false } gs.Service.FillAuthzContext(&authzContext) if !f.allowService(gs.Service.Name, &authzContext) { return false } return true } // allowService is used to determine if a service is accessible for an ACL. func (f *aclFilter) allowService(service string, ent *acl.AuthorizerContext) bool { if service == "" { return true } return f.authorizer.ServiceRead(service, ent) == acl.Allow } // allowSession is used to determine if a session for a node is accessible for // an ACL. func (f *aclFilter) allowSession(node string, ent *acl.AuthorizerContext) bool { return f.authorizer.SessionRead(node, ent) == acl.Allow } // filterHealthChecks is used to filter a set of health checks down based on // the configured ACL rules for a token. func (f *aclFilter) filterHealthChecks(checks *structs.HealthChecks) { hc := *checks var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext for i := 0; i < len(hc); i++ { check := hc[i] check.FillAuthzContext(&authzContext) if f.allowNode(check.Node, &authzContext) && f.allowService(check.ServiceName, &authzContext) { continue } f.logger.Debug("dropping check from result due to ACLs", "check", check.CheckID) hc = append(hc[:i], hc[i+1:]...) i-- } *checks = hc } // filterServices is used to filter a set of services based on ACLs. func (f *aclFilter) filterServices(services structs.Services, entMeta *structs.EnterpriseMeta) { var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext entMeta.FillAuthzContext(&authzContext) for svc := range services { if f.allowService(svc, &authzContext) { continue } f.logger.Debug("dropping service from result due to ACLs", "service", svc) delete(services, svc) } } // filterServiceNodes is used to filter a set of nodes for a given service // based on the configured ACL rules. func (f *aclFilter) filterServiceNodes(nodes *structs.ServiceNodes) { sn := *nodes var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext for i := 0; i < len(sn); i++ { node := sn[i] node.FillAuthzContext(&authzContext) if f.allowNode(node.Node, &authzContext) && f.allowService(node.ServiceName, &authzContext) { continue } f.logger.Debug("dropping node from result due to ACLs", "node", node.Node) sn = append(sn[:i], sn[i+1:]...) i-- } *nodes = sn } // filterNodeServices is used to filter services on a given node base on ACLs. func (f *aclFilter) filterNodeServices(services **structs.NodeServices) { if *services == nil { return } var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext structs.WildcardEnterpriseMeta().FillAuthzContext(&authzContext) if !f.allowNode((*services).Node.Node, &authzContext) { *services = nil return } for svcName, svc := range (*services).Services { svc.FillAuthzContext(&authzContext) if f.allowNode((*services).Node.Node, &authzContext) && f.allowService(svcName, &authzContext) { continue } f.logger.Debug("dropping service from result due to ACLs", "service", svc.CompoundServiceID()) delete((*services).Services, svcName) } } // filterNodeServices is used to filter services on a given node base on ACLs. func (f *aclFilter) filterNodeServiceList(services **structs.NodeServiceList) { if services == nil || *services == nil { return } var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext structs.WildcardEnterpriseMeta().FillAuthzContext(&authzContext) if !f.allowNode((*services).Node.Node, &authzContext) { *services = nil return } svcs := (*services).Services modified := false for i := 0; i < len(svcs); i++ { svc := svcs[i] svc.FillAuthzContext(&authzContext) if f.allowNode((*services).Node.Node, &authzContext) && f.allowService(svc.Service, &authzContext) { continue } f.logger.Debug("dropping service from result due to ACLs", "service", svc.CompoundServiceID()) svcs = append(svcs[:i], svcs[i+1:]...) i-- modified = true } if modified { *services = &structs.NodeServiceList{ Node: (*services).Node, Services: svcs, } } } // filterCheckServiceNodes is used to filter nodes based on ACL rules. func (f *aclFilter) filterCheckServiceNodes(nodes *structs.CheckServiceNodes) { csn := *nodes var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext for i := 0; i < len(csn); i++ { node := csn[i] node.Service.FillAuthzContext(&authzContext) if f.allowNode(node.Node.Node, &authzContext) && f.allowService(node.Service.Service, &authzContext) { continue } f.logger.Debug("dropping node from result due to ACLs", "node", node.Node.Node) csn = append(csn[:i], csn[i+1:]...) i-- } *nodes = csn } // filterDatacenterCheckServiceNodes is used to filter nodes based on ACL rules. func (f *aclFilter) filterDatacenterCheckServiceNodes(datacenterNodes *map[string]structs.CheckServiceNodes) { dn := *datacenterNodes out := make(map[string]structs.CheckServiceNodes) for dc := range dn { nodes := dn[dc] f.filterCheckServiceNodes(&nodes) if len(nodes) > 0 { out[dc] = nodes } } *datacenterNodes = out } // filterSessions is used to filter a set of sessions based on ACLs. func (f *aclFilter) filterSessions(sessions *structs.Sessions) { s := *sessions for i := 0; i < len(s); i++ { session := s[i] var entCtx acl.AuthorizerContext session.FillAuthzContext(&entCtx) if f.allowSession(session.Node, &entCtx) { continue } f.logger.Debug("dropping session from result due to ACLs", "session", session.ID) s = append(s[:i], s[i+1:]...) i-- } *sessions = s } // filterCoordinates is used to filter nodes in a coordinate dump based on ACL // rules. func (f *aclFilter) filterCoordinates(coords *structs.Coordinates) { c := *coords var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext structs.WildcardEnterpriseMeta().FillAuthzContext(&authzContext) for i := 0; i < len(c); i++ { node := c[i].Node if f.allowNode(node, &authzContext) { continue } f.logger.Debug("dropping node from result due to ACLs", "node", node) c = append(c[:i], c[i+1:]...) i-- } *coords = c } // filterIntentions is used to filter intentions based on ACL rules. // We prune entries the user doesn't have access to, and we redact any tokens // if the user doesn't have a management token. func (f *aclFilter) filterIntentions(ixns *structs.Intentions) { ret := make(structs.Intentions, 0, len(*ixns)) for _, ixn := range *ixns { if !ixn.CanRead(f.authorizer) { f.logger.Debug("dropping intention from result due to ACLs", "intention", ixn.ID) continue } ret = append(ret, ixn) } *ixns = ret } // filterNodeDump is used to filter through all parts of a node dump and // remove elements the provided ACL token cannot access. func (f *aclFilter) filterNodeDump(dump *structs.NodeDump) { nd := *dump var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext for i := 0; i < len(nd); i++ { info := nd[i] // Filter nodes structs.WildcardEnterpriseMeta().FillAuthzContext(&authzContext) if node := info.Node; !f.allowNode(node, &authzContext) { f.logger.Debug("dropping node from result due to ACLs", "node", node) nd = append(nd[:i], nd[i+1:]...) i-- continue } // Filter services for j := 0; j < len(info.Services); j++ { svc := info.Services[j].Service info.Services[j].FillAuthzContext(&authzContext) if f.allowNode(info.Node, &authzContext) && f.allowService(svc, &authzContext) { continue } f.logger.Debug("dropping service from result due to ACLs", "service", svc) info.Services = append(info.Services[:j], info.Services[j+1:]...) j-- } // Filter checks for j := 0; j < len(info.Checks); j++ { chk := info.Checks[j] chk.FillAuthzContext(&authzContext) if f.allowNode(info.Node, &authzContext) && f.allowService(chk.ServiceName, &authzContext) { continue } f.logger.Debug("dropping check from result due to ACLs", "check", chk.CheckID) info.Checks = append(info.Checks[:j], info.Checks[j+1:]...) j-- } } *dump = nd } // filterServiceDump is used to filter nodes based on ACL rules. func (f *aclFilter) filterServiceDump(services *structs.ServiceDump) { svcs := *services var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext for i := 0; i < len(svcs); i++ { service := svcs[i] if f.allowGateway(service.GatewayService) { // ServiceDump might only have gateway config and no node information if service.Node == nil { continue } service.Service.FillAuthzContext(&authzContext) if f.allowNode(service.Node.Node, &authzContext) { continue } } f.logger.Debug("dropping service from result due to ACLs", "service", service.GatewayService.Service) svcs = append(svcs[:i], svcs[i+1:]...) i-- } *services = svcs } // filterNodes is used to filter through all parts of a node list and remove // elements the provided ACL token cannot access. func (f *aclFilter) filterNodes(nodes *structs.Nodes) { n := *nodes var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext structs.WildcardEnterpriseMeta().FillAuthzContext(&authzContext) for i := 0; i < len(n); i++ { node := n[i].Node if f.allowNode(node, &authzContext) { continue } f.logger.Debug("dropping node from result due to ACLs", "node", node) n = append(n[:i], n[i+1:]...) i-- } *nodes = n } // redactPreparedQueryTokens will redact any tokens unless the client has a // management token. This eases the transition to delegated authority over // prepared queries, since it was easy to capture management tokens in Consul // 0.6.3 and earlier, and we don't want to willy-nilly show those. This does // have the limitation of preventing delegated non-management users from seeing // captured tokens, but they can at least see whether or not a token is set. func (f *aclFilter) redactPreparedQueryTokens(query **structs.PreparedQuery) { // Management tokens can see everything with no filtering. var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext structs.DefaultEnterpriseMeta().FillAuthzContext(&authzContext) if f.authorizer.ACLWrite(&authzContext) == acl.Allow { return } // Let the user see if there's a blank token, otherwise we need // to redact it, since we know they don't have a management // token. if (*query).Token != "" { // Redact the token, using a copy of the query structure // since we could be pointed at a live instance from the // state store so it's not safe to modify it. Note that // this clone will still point to things like underlying // arrays in the original, but for modifying just the // token it will be safe to use. clone := *(*query) clone.Token = redactedToken *query = &clone } } // filterPreparedQueries is used to filter prepared queries based on ACL rules. // We prune entries the user doesn't have access to, and we redact any tokens // if the user doesn't have a management token. func (f *aclFilter) filterPreparedQueries(queries *structs.PreparedQueries) { var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext structs.DefaultEnterpriseMeta().FillAuthzContext(&authzContext) // Management tokens can see everything with no filtering. // TODO is this check even necessary - this looks like a search replace from // the 1.4 ACL rewrite. The global-management token will provide unrestricted query privileges // so asking for ACLWrite should be unnecessary. if f.authorizer.ACLWrite(&authzContext) == acl.Allow { return } // Otherwise, we need to see what the token has access to. ret := make(structs.PreparedQueries, 0, len(*queries)) for _, query := range *queries { // If no prefix ACL applies to this query then filter it, since // we know at this point the user doesn't have a management // token, otherwise see what the policy says. prefix, ok := query.GetACLPrefix() if !ok || f.authorizer.PreparedQueryRead(prefix, &authzContext) != acl.Allow { f.logger.Debug("dropping prepared query from result due to ACLs", "query", query.ID) continue } // Redact any tokens if necessary. We make a copy of just the // pointer so we don't mess with the caller's slice. final := query f.redactPreparedQueryTokens(&final) ret = append(ret, final) } *queries = ret } func (f *aclFilter) filterToken(token **structs.ACLToken) { var entCtx acl.AuthorizerContext if token == nil || *token == nil || f == nil { return } (*token).FillAuthzContext(&entCtx) if f.authorizer.ACLRead(&entCtx) != acl.Allow { // no permissions to read *token = nil } else if f.authorizer.ACLWrite(&entCtx) != acl.Allow { // no write permissions - redact secret clone := *(*token) clone.SecretID = redactedToken *token = &clone } } func (f *aclFilter) filterTokens(tokens *structs.ACLTokens) { ret := make(structs.ACLTokens, 0, len(*tokens)) for _, token := range *tokens { final := token f.filterToken(&final) if final != nil { ret = append(ret, final) } } *tokens = ret } func (f *aclFilter) filterTokenStub(token **structs.ACLTokenListStub) { var entCtx acl.AuthorizerContext if token == nil || *token == nil || f == nil { return } (*token).FillAuthzContext(&entCtx) if f.authorizer.ACLRead(&entCtx) != acl.Allow { *token = nil } } func (f *aclFilter) filterTokenStubs(tokens *[]*structs.ACLTokenListStub) { ret := make(structs.ACLTokenListStubs, 0, len(*tokens)) for _, token := range *tokens { final := token f.filterTokenStub(&final) if final != nil { ret = append(ret, final) } } *tokens = ret } func (f *aclFilter) filterPolicy(policy **structs.ACLPolicy) { var entCtx acl.AuthorizerContext if policy == nil || *policy == nil || f == nil { return } (*policy).FillAuthzContext(&entCtx) if f.authorizer.ACLRead(&entCtx) != acl.Allow { // no permissions to read *policy = nil } } func (f *aclFilter) filterPolicies(policies *structs.ACLPolicies) { ret := make(structs.ACLPolicies, 0, len(*policies)) for _, policy := range *policies { final := policy f.filterPolicy(&final) if final != nil { ret = append(ret, final) } } *policies = ret } func (f *aclFilter) filterRole(role **structs.ACLRole) { var entCtx acl.AuthorizerContext if role == nil || *role == nil || f == nil { return } (*role).FillAuthzContext(&entCtx) if f.authorizer.ACLRead(&entCtx) != acl.Allow { // no permissions to read *role = nil } } func (f *aclFilter) filterRoles(roles *structs.ACLRoles) { ret := make(structs.ACLRoles, 0, len(*roles)) for _, role := range *roles { final := role f.filterRole(&final) if final != nil { ret = append(ret, final) } } *roles = ret } func (f *aclFilter) filterBindingRule(rule **structs.ACLBindingRule) { var entCtx acl.AuthorizerContext if rule == nil || *rule == nil || f == nil { return } (*rule).FillAuthzContext(&entCtx) if f.authorizer.ACLRead(&entCtx) != acl.Allow { // no permissions to read *rule = nil } } func (f *aclFilter) filterBindingRules(rules *structs.ACLBindingRules) { ret := make(structs.ACLBindingRules, 0, len(*rules)) for _, rule := range *rules { final := rule f.filterBindingRule(&final) if final != nil { ret = append(ret, final) } } *rules = ret } func (f *aclFilter) filterAuthMethod(method **structs.ACLAuthMethod) { var entCtx acl.AuthorizerContext if method == nil || *method == nil || f == nil { return } (*method).FillAuthzContext(&entCtx) if f.authorizer.ACLRead(&entCtx) != acl.Allow { // no permissions to read *method = nil } } func (f *aclFilter) filterAuthMethods(methods *structs.ACLAuthMethods) { ret := make(structs.ACLAuthMethods, 0, len(*methods)) for _, method := range *methods { final := method f.filterAuthMethod(&final) if final != nil { ret = append(ret, final) } } *methods = ret } func (f *aclFilter) filterServiceList(services *structs.ServiceList) { ret := make(structs.ServiceList, 0, len(*services)) for _, svc := range *services { var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext svc.FillAuthzContext(&authzContext) if f.authorizer.ServiceRead(svc.Name, &authzContext) != acl.Allow { sid := structs.NewServiceID(svc.Name, &svc.EnterpriseMeta) f.logger.Debug("dropping service from result due to ACLs", "service", sid.String()) continue } ret = append(ret, svc) } *services = ret } // filterGatewayServices is used to filter gateway to service mappings based on ACL rules. func (f *aclFilter) filterGatewayServices(mappings *structs.GatewayServices) { ret := make(structs.GatewayServices, 0, len(*mappings)) for _, s := range *mappings { // This filter only checks ServiceRead on the linked service. // ServiceRead on the gateway is checked in the GatewayServices endpoint before filtering. var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext s.Service.FillAuthzContext(&authzContext) if f.authorizer.ServiceRead(s.Service.Name, &authzContext) != acl.Allow { f.logger.Debug("dropping service from result due to ACLs", "service", s.Service.String()) continue } ret = append(ret, s) } *mappings = ret } func (r *ACLResolver) filterACLWithAuthorizer(authorizer acl.Authorizer, subj interface{}) error { if authorizer == nil { return nil } // Create the filter filt := newACLFilter(authorizer, r.logger) switch v := subj.(type) { case *structs.CheckServiceNodes: filt.filterCheckServiceNodes(v) case *structs.IndexedCheckServiceNodes: filt.filterCheckServiceNodes(&v.Nodes) case *structs.DatacenterIndexedCheckServiceNodes: filt.filterDatacenterCheckServiceNodes(&v.DatacenterNodes) case *structs.IndexedCoordinates: filt.filterCoordinates(&v.Coordinates) case *structs.IndexedHealthChecks: filt.filterHealthChecks(&v.HealthChecks) case *structs.IndexedIntentions: filt.filterIntentions(&v.Intentions) case *structs.IndexedNodeDump: filt.filterNodeDump(&v.Dump) case *structs.IndexedServiceDump: filt.filterServiceDump(&v.Dump) case *structs.IndexedNodes: filt.filterNodes(&v.Nodes) case *structs.IndexedNodeServices: filt.filterNodeServices(&v.NodeServices) case **structs.NodeServiceList: filt.filterNodeServiceList(v) case *structs.IndexedServiceNodes: filt.filterServiceNodes(&v.ServiceNodes) case *structs.IndexedServices: filt.filterServices(v.Services, &v.EnterpriseMeta) case *structs.IndexedSessions: filt.filterSessions(&v.Sessions) case *structs.IndexedPreparedQueries: filt.filterPreparedQueries(&v.Queries) case **structs.PreparedQuery: filt.redactPreparedQueryTokens(v) case *structs.ACLTokens: filt.filterTokens(v) case **structs.ACLToken: filt.filterToken(v) case *[]*structs.ACLTokenListStub: filt.filterTokenStubs(v) case **structs.ACLTokenListStub: filt.filterTokenStub(v) case *structs.ACLPolicies: filt.filterPolicies(v) case **structs.ACLPolicy: filt.filterPolicy(v) case *structs.ACLRoles: filt.filterRoles(v) case **structs.ACLRole: filt.filterRole(v) case *structs.ACLBindingRules: filt.filterBindingRules(v) case **structs.ACLBindingRule: filt.filterBindingRule(v) case *structs.ACLAuthMethods: filt.filterAuthMethods(v) case **structs.ACLAuthMethod: filt.filterAuthMethod(v) case *structs.IndexedServiceList: filt.filterServiceList(&v.Services) case *structs.GatewayServices: filt.filterGatewayServices(v) default: panic(fmt.Errorf("Unhandled type passed to ACL filter: %T %#v", subj, subj)) } return nil } // filterACL is used to filter results from our service catalog based on the // rules configured for the provided token. func (r *ACLResolver) filterACL(token string, subj interface{}) error { // Get the ACL from the token authorizer, err := r.ResolveToken(token) if err != nil { return err } // Fast path if ACLs are not enabled if authorizer == nil { return nil } return r.filterACLWithAuthorizer(authorizer, subj) } // vetRegisterWithACL applies the given ACL's policy to the catalog update and // determines if it is allowed. Since the catalog register request is so // dynamic, this is a pretty complex algorithm and was worth breaking out of the // endpoint. The NodeServices record for the node must be supplied, and can be // nil. // // This is a bit racy because we have to check the state store outside of a // transaction. It's the best we can do because we don't want to flow ACL // checking down there. The node information doesn't change in practice, so this // will be fine. If we expose ways to change node addresses in a later version, // then we should split the catalog API at the node and service level so we can // address this race better (even then it would be super rare, and would at // worst let a service update revert a recent node update, so it doesn't open up // too much abuse). func vetRegisterWithACL(rule acl.Authorizer, subj *structs.RegisterRequest, ns *structs.NodeServices) error { // Fast path if ACLs are not enabled. if rule == nil { return nil } var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext subj.FillAuthzContext(&authzContext) // Vet the node info. This allows service updates to re-post the required // node info for each request without having to have node "write" // privileges. needsNode := ns == nil || subj.ChangesNode(ns.Node) if needsNode && rule.NodeWrite(subj.Node, &authzContext) != acl.Allow { return acl.ErrPermissionDenied } // Vet the service change. This includes making sure they can register // the given service, and that we can write to any existing service that // is being modified by id (if any). if subj.Service != nil { if rule.ServiceWrite(subj.Service.Service, &authzContext) != acl.Allow { return acl.ErrPermissionDenied } if ns != nil { other, ok := ns.Services[subj.Service.ID] if ok { // This is effectively a delete, so we DO NOT apply the // sentinel scope to the service we are overwriting, just // the regular ACL policy. var secondaryCtx acl.AuthorizerContext other.FillAuthzContext(&secondaryCtx) if rule.ServiceWrite(other.Service, &secondaryCtx) != acl.Allow { return acl.ErrPermissionDenied } } } } // Make sure that the member was flattened before we got there. This // keeps us from having to verify this check as well. if subj.Check != nil { return fmt.Errorf("check member must be nil") } // Vet the checks. Node-level checks require node write, and // service-level checks require service write. for _, check := range subj.Checks { // Make sure that the node matches - we don't allow you to mix // checks from other nodes because we'd have to pull a bunch // more state store data to check this. If ACLs are enabled then // we simply require them to match in a given request. There's a // note in state_store.go to ban this down there in Consul 0.8, // but it's good to leave this here because it's required for // correctness wrt. ACLs. if check.Node != subj.Node { return fmt.Errorf("Node '%s' for check '%s' doesn't match register request node '%s'", check.Node, check.CheckID, subj.Node) } // Node-level check. if check.ServiceID == "" { if rule.NodeWrite(subj.Node, &authzContext) != acl.Allow { return acl.ErrPermissionDenied } continue } // Service-level check, check the common case where it // matches the service part of this request, which has // already been vetted above, and might be being registered // along with its checks. if subj.Service != nil && subj.Service.ID == check.ServiceID { continue } // Service-level check for some other service. Make sure they've // got write permissions for that service. if ns == nil { return fmt.Errorf("Unknown service '%s' for check '%s'", check.ServiceID, check.CheckID) } other, ok := ns.Services[check.ServiceID] if !ok { return fmt.Errorf("Unknown service '%s' for check '%s'", check.ServiceID, check.CheckID) } // We are only adding a check here, so we don't add the scope, // since the sentinel policy doesn't apply to adding checks at // this time. var secondaryCtx acl.AuthorizerContext other.FillAuthzContext(&secondaryCtx) if rule.ServiceWrite(other.Service, &secondaryCtx) != acl.Allow { return acl.ErrPermissionDenied } } return nil } // vetDeregisterWithACL applies the given ACL's policy to the catalog update and // determines if it is allowed. Since the catalog deregister request is so // dynamic, this is a pretty complex algorithm and was worth breaking out of the // endpoint. The NodeService for the referenced service must be supplied, and can // be nil; similar for the HealthCheck for the referenced health check. func vetDeregisterWithACL(rule acl.Authorizer, subj *structs.DeregisterRequest, ns *structs.NodeService, nc *structs.HealthCheck) error { // Fast path if ACLs are not enabled. if rule == nil { return nil } // We don't apply sentinel in this path, since at this time sentinel // only applies to create and update operations. var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext // fill with the defaults for use with the NodeWrite check subj.FillAuthzContext(&authzContext) // Allow service deregistration if the token has write permission for the node. // This accounts for cases where the agent no longer has a token with write permission // on the service to deregister it. if rule.NodeWrite(subj.Node, &authzContext) == acl.Allow { return nil } // This order must match the code in applyDeregister() in // fsm/commands_oss.go since it also evaluates things in this order, // and will ignore fields based on this precedence. This lets us also // ignore them from an ACL perspective. if subj.ServiceID != "" { if ns == nil { return fmt.Errorf("Unknown service '%s'", subj.ServiceID) } ns.FillAuthzContext(&authzContext) if rule.ServiceWrite(ns.Service, &authzContext) != acl.Allow { return acl.ErrPermissionDenied } } else if subj.CheckID != "" { if nc == nil { return fmt.Errorf("Unknown check '%s'", subj.CheckID) } nc.FillAuthzContext(&authzContext) if nc.ServiceID != "" { if rule.ServiceWrite(nc.ServiceName, &authzContext) != acl.Allow { return acl.ErrPermissionDenied } } else { if rule.NodeWrite(subj.Node, &authzContext) != acl.Allow { return acl.ErrPermissionDenied } } } else { // Since NodeWrite is not given - otherwise the earlier check // would've returned already - we can deny here. return acl.ErrPermissionDenied } return nil } // vetNodeTxnOp applies the given ACL policy to a node transaction operation. func vetNodeTxnOp(op *structs.TxnNodeOp, rule acl.Authorizer) error { // Fast path if ACLs are not enabled. if rule == nil { return nil } var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext op.FillAuthzContext(&authzContext) if rule != nil && rule.NodeWrite(op.Node.Node, &authzContext) != acl.Allow { return acl.ErrPermissionDenied } return nil } // vetServiceTxnOp applies the given ACL policy to a service transaction operation. func vetServiceTxnOp(op *structs.TxnServiceOp, rule acl.Authorizer) error { // Fast path if ACLs are not enabled. if rule == nil { return nil } var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext op.FillAuthzContext(&authzContext) if rule.ServiceWrite(op.Service.Service, &authzContext) != acl.Allow { return acl.ErrPermissionDenied } return nil } // vetCheckTxnOp applies the given ACL policy to a check transaction operation. func vetCheckTxnOp(op *structs.TxnCheckOp, rule acl.Authorizer) error { // Fast path if ACLs are not enabled. if rule == nil { return nil } var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext op.FillAuthzContext(&authzContext) if op.Check.ServiceID == "" { // Node-level check. if rule.NodeWrite(op.Check.Node, &authzContext) != acl.Allow { return acl.ErrPermissionDenied } } else { // Service-level check. if rule.ServiceWrite(op.Check.ServiceName, &authzContext) != acl.Allow { return acl.ErrPermissionDenied } } return nil }