package consul import ( "context" "crypto/x509" "errors" "fmt" "net/url" "reflect" "strings" "sync" "time" "github.com/hashicorp/go-hclog" "github.com/hashicorp/go-uuid" "golang.org/x/time/rate" "github.com/hashicorp/consul/acl" "github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/connect" "github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/connect/ca" "github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/consul/state" "github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/structs" "github.com/hashicorp/consul/lib" "github.com/hashicorp/consul/lib/routine" "github.com/hashicorp/consul/lib/semaphore" ) type caState string const ( caStateUninitialized caState = "UNINITIALIZED" caStateInitializing caState = "INITIALIZING" caStateInitialized caState = "INITIALIZED" caStateRenewIntermediate caState = "RENEWING" caStateReconfig caState = "RECONFIGURING" ) // caServerDelegate is an interface for server operations for facilitating // easier testing. type caServerDelegate interface { ca.ConsulProviderStateDelegate State() *state.Store IsLeader() bool ApplyCALeafRequest() (uint64, error) forwardDC(method, dc string, args interface{}, reply interface{}) error generateCASignRequest(csr string) *structs.CASignRequest ServersSupportMultiDCConnectCA() error } // CAManager is a wrapper around CA operations such as updating roots, an intermediate // or the configuration. All operations should go through the CAManager in order to // avoid data races. type CAManager struct { delegate caServerDelegate serverConf *Config logger hclog.Logger // rate limiter to use when signing leaf certificates caLeafLimiter connectSignRateLimiter providerLock sync.RWMutex // provider is the current CA provider in use for Connect. This is // only non-nil when we are the leader. provider ca.Provider // providerRoot is the CARoot that was stored along with the ca.Provider // active. It's only updated in lock-step with the provider. This prevents // races between state updates to active roots and the fetch of the provider // instance. providerRoot *structs.CARoot // stateLock protects the internal state used for administrative CA tasks. stateLock sync.Mutex state caState primaryRoots structs.IndexedCARoots // The most recently seen state of the root CAs from the primary datacenter. leaderRoutineManager *routine.Manager // providerShim is used to test CAManager with a fake provider. providerShim ca.Provider // shim time.Now for testing timeNow func() time.Time } type caDelegateWithState struct { *Server } func (c *caDelegateWithState) State() *state.Store { return c.fsm.State() } func (c *caDelegateWithState) ApplyCARequest(req *structs.CARequest) (interface{}, error) { return c.Server.raftApplyMsgpack(structs.ConnectCARequestType, req) } func (c *caDelegateWithState) ApplyCALeafRequest() (uint64, error) { // TODO(banks): when we implement IssuedCerts table we can use the insert to // that as the raft index to return in response. // // UPDATE(mkeeler): The original implementation relied on updating the CAConfig // and using its index as the ModifyIndex for certs. This was buggy. The long // term goal is still to insert some metadata into raft about the certificates // and use that raft index for the ModifyIndex. This is a partial step in that // direction except that we only are setting an index and not storing the // metadata. req := structs.CALeafRequest{ Op: structs.CALeafOpIncrementIndex, Datacenter: c.Server.config.Datacenter, } resp, err := c.Server.raftApplyMsgpack(structs.ConnectCALeafRequestType|structs.IgnoreUnknownTypeFlag, &req) if err != nil { return 0, err } modIdx, ok := resp.(uint64) if !ok { return 0, fmt.Errorf("Invalid response from updating the leaf cert index") } return modIdx, err } func (c *caDelegateWithState) generateCASignRequest(csr string) *structs.CASignRequest { return &structs.CASignRequest{ Datacenter: c.Server.config.PrimaryDatacenter, CSR: csr, WriteRequest: structs.WriteRequest{Token: c.Server.tokens.ReplicationToken()}, } } func (c *caDelegateWithState) ServersSupportMultiDCConnectCA() error { versionOk, primaryFound := ServersInDCMeetMinimumVersion(c.Server, c.Server.config.PrimaryDatacenter, minMultiDCConnectVersion) if !primaryFound { return fmt.Errorf("primary datacenter is unreachable") } if !versionOk { return fmt.Errorf("all servers in the primary datacenter are not at the minimum version %v", minMultiDCConnectVersion) } return nil } func (c *caDelegateWithState) ProviderState(id string) (*structs.CAConsulProviderState, error) { _, s, err := c.fsm.State().CAProviderState(id) return s, err } func NewCAManager(delegate caServerDelegate, leaderRoutineManager *routine.Manager, logger hclog.Logger, config *Config) *CAManager { return &CAManager{ delegate: delegate, logger: logger, serverConf: config, state: caStateUninitialized, leaderRoutineManager: leaderRoutineManager, timeNow: time.Now, } } // setState attempts to update the CA state to the given state. // Valid state transitions are: // // caStateInitialized -> // caStateUninitialized -> caStateInitializing // caStateUninitialized -> caStateReconfig // // Other state transitions may be forced if the validateState parameter is set to false. // This will mainly be used in deferred functions which aim to set the final status based // a successful/error return. func (c *CAManager) setState(newState caState, validateState bool) (caState, error) { c.stateLock.Lock() defer c.stateLock.Unlock() state := c.state if !validateState || (state == caStateInitialized && newState != caStateInitializing) || (state == caStateUninitialized && newState == caStateInitializing) || (state == caStateUninitialized && newState == caStateReconfig) { c.state = newState } else { return state, &caStateError{Current: state} } return state, nil } type caStateError struct { Current caState } func (e *caStateError) Error() string { return fmt.Sprintf("CA is already in state %q", e.Current) } // secondarySetPrimaryRoots updates the most recently seen roots from the primary. func (c *CAManager) secondarySetPrimaryRoots(newRoots structs.IndexedCARoots) { // TODO: this could be a different lock, as long as its the same lock in secondaryGetPrimaryRoots c.stateLock.Lock() defer c.stateLock.Unlock() c.primaryRoots = newRoots } func (c *CAManager) secondaryGetActivePrimaryCARoot() (*structs.CARoot, error) { // TODO: this could be a different lock, as long as its the same lock in secondarySetPrimaryRoots c.stateLock.Lock() primaryRoots := c.primaryRoots c.stateLock.Unlock() for _, root := range primaryRoots.Roots { if root.ID == primaryRoots.ActiveRootID && root.Active { return root, nil } } return nil, fmt.Errorf("primary datacenter does not have an active root CA for Connect") } // initializeCAConfig is used to initialize the CA config if necessary // when setting up the CA during establishLeadership. The state should be set to // non-ready before calling this. func (c *CAManager) initializeCAConfig() (*structs.CAConfiguration, error) { st := c.delegate.State() _, config, err := st.CAConfig(nil) if err != nil { return nil, err } if config == nil { config = c.serverConf.CAConfig if c.serverConf.Datacenter == c.serverConf.PrimaryDatacenter && config.ClusterID == "" { id, err := uuid.GenerateUUID() if err != nil { return nil, err } config.ClusterID = id } } else if _, ok := config.Config["IntermediateCertTTL"]; !ok { dup := *config copied := make(map[string]interface{}) for k, v := range dup.Config { copied[k] = v } copied["IntermediateCertTTL"] = connect.DefaultIntermediateCertTTL.String() dup.Config = copied config = &dup } else { return config, nil } req := structs.CARequest{ Op: structs.CAOpSetConfig, Config: config, } if _, err := c.delegate.ApplyCARequest(&req); err != nil { return nil, err } return config, nil } // newCARoot returns a filled-in structs.CARoot from a raw PEM value. func newCARoot(pemValue, provider, clusterID string) (*structs.CARoot, error) { primaryCert, err := connect.ParseCert(pemValue) if err != nil { return nil, err } keyType, keyBits, err := connect.KeyInfoFromCert(primaryCert) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("error extracting root key info: %v", err) } return &structs.CARoot{ ID: connect.CalculateCertFingerprint(primaryCert.Raw), Name: fmt.Sprintf("%s CA Primary Cert", providerPrettyName(provider)), SerialNumber: primaryCert.SerialNumber.Uint64(), SigningKeyID: connect.EncodeSigningKeyID(primaryCert.SubjectKeyId), ExternalTrustDomain: clusterID, NotBefore: primaryCert.NotBefore, NotAfter: primaryCert.NotAfter, RootCert: lib.EnsureTrailingNewline(pemValue), PrivateKeyType: keyType, PrivateKeyBits: keyBits, Active: true, }, nil } // getCAProvider returns the currently active instance of the CA Provider, // as well as the active root. func (c *CAManager) getCAProvider() (ca.Provider, *structs.CARoot) { retries := 0 for { c.providerLock.RLock() result := c.provider resultRoot := c.providerRoot c.providerLock.RUnlock() // In cases where an agent is started with managed proxies, we may ask // for the provider before establishLeadership completes. If we're the // leader, then wait and get the provider again if result == nil && c.delegate.IsLeader() && retries < 10 { retries++ time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond) continue } return result, resultRoot } } // setCAProvider is being called while holding the stateLock // which means it must never take that lock itself or call anything that does. func (c *CAManager) setCAProvider(newProvider ca.Provider, root *structs.CARoot) { c.providerLock.Lock() c.provider = newProvider c.providerRoot = root c.providerLock.Unlock() } func (c *CAManager) Start(ctx context.Context) { // Attempt to initialize the Connect CA now. This will // happen during leader establishment and it would be great // if the CA was ready to go once that process was finished. if err := c.Initialize(); err != nil { c.logger.Error("Failed to initialize Connect CA", "error", err) // we failed to fully initialize the CA so we need to spawn a // go routine to retry this process until it succeeds or we lose // leadership and the go routine gets stopped. c.leaderRoutineManager.Start(ctx, backgroundCAInitializationRoutineName, c.backgroundCAInitialization) } else { // We only start these if CA initialization was successful. If not the completion of the // background CA initialization will start these routines. c.startPostInitializeRoutines(ctx) } } func (c *CAManager) Stop() { c.leaderRoutineManager.Stop(secondaryCARootWatchRoutineName) c.leaderRoutineManager.Stop(intermediateCertRenewWatchRoutineName) c.leaderRoutineManager.Stop(backgroundCAInitializationRoutineName) if provider, _ := c.getCAProvider(); provider != nil { if needsStop, ok := provider.(ca.NeedsStop); ok { needsStop.Stop() } } c.setState(caStateUninitialized, false) c.primaryRoots = structs.IndexedCARoots{} c.setCAProvider(nil, nil) } func (c *CAManager) startPostInitializeRoutines(ctx context.Context) { // Start the Connect secondary DC actions if enabled. if c.serverConf.Datacenter != c.serverConf.PrimaryDatacenter { c.leaderRoutineManager.Start(ctx, secondaryCARootWatchRoutineName, c.secondaryCARootWatch) } c.leaderRoutineManager.Start(ctx, intermediateCertRenewWatchRoutineName, c.runRenewIntermediate) } func (c *CAManager) backgroundCAInitialization(ctx context.Context) error { retryLoopBackoffAbortOnSuccess(ctx, c.Initialize, func(err error) { c.logger.Error("Failed to initialize Connect CA", "routine", backgroundCAInitializationRoutineName, "error", err, ) }) if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil { return err } c.logger.Info("Successfully initialized the Connect CA") c.startPostInitializeRoutines(ctx) return nil } // Initialize sets up the CA provider when gaining leadership, either bootstrapping // the CA if this is the primary DC or making a remote RPC for intermediate signing // if this is a secondary DC. func (c *CAManager) Initialize() (reterr error) { // Bail if connect isn't enabled. if !c.serverConf.ConnectEnabled { return nil } // Update the state before doing anything else. _, err := c.setState(caStateInitializing, true) var errCaState *caStateError switch { case errors.As(err, &errCaState) && errCaState.Current == caStateInitialized: return nil case err != nil: return err } defer func() { // Using named return values in deferred funcs isnt too common in our code // but it is first class Go functionality. The error erturned from the // main func will be available by its given name within deferred functions. // See: https://blog.golang.org/defer-panic-and-recover if reterr == nil { c.setState(caStateInitialized, false) } else { c.setState(caStateUninitialized, false) } }() // Initialize the provider based on the current config. conf, err := c.initializeCAConfig() if err != nil { return err } provider, err := c.newProvider(conf) if err != nil { return err } c.setCAProvider(provider, nil) if c.serverConf.PrimaryDatacenter == c.serverConf.Datacenter { return c.primaryInitialize(provider, conf) } return c.secondaryInitialize(provider, conf) } func (c *CAManager) secondaryInitialize(provider ca.Provider, conf *structs.CAConfiguration) error { if err := c.delegate.ServersSupportMultiDCConnectCA(); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("initialization will be deferred: %w", err) } // Get the root CA to see if we need to refresh our intermediate. args := structs.DCSpecificRequest{ Datacenter: c.serverConf.PrimaryDatacenter, } var roots structs.IndexedCARoots if err := c.delegate.forwardDC("ConnectCA.Roots", c.serverConf.PrimaryDatacenter, &args, &roots); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("failed to get CA roots from primary DC: %w", err) } c.secondarySetPrimaryRoots(roots) // Configure the CA provider and initialize the intermediate certificate if necessary. if err := c.secondaryInitializeProvider(provider, roots); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("error configuring provider: %v", err) } if err := c.secondaryInitializeIntermediateCA(provider, nil); err != nil { return err } c.logger.Info("initialized secondary datacenter CA with provider", "provider", conf.Provider) return nil } // createProvider returns a connect CA provider from the given config. func (c *CAManager) newProvider(conf *structs.CAConfiguration) (ca.Provider, error) { logger := c.logger.Named(conf.Provider) switch conf.Provider { case structs.ConsulCAProvider: return ca.NewConsulProvider(c.delegate, logger), nil case structs.VaultCAProvider: return ca.NewVaultProvider(logger), nil case structs.AWSCAProvider: return ca.NewAWSProvider(logger), nil default: if c.providerShim != nil { return c.providerShim, nil } return nil, fmt.Errorf("unknown CA provider %q", conf.Provider) } } // primaryInitialize runs the initialization logic for a root CA. It should only // be called while the state lock is held by setting the state to non-ready. func (c *CAManager) primaryInitialize(provider ca.Provider, conf *structs.CAConfiguration) error { pCfg := ca.ProviderConfig{ ClusterID: conf.ClusterID, Datacenter: c.serverConf.Datacenter, IsPrimary: true, RawConfig: conf.Config, State: conf.State, } if err := provider.Configure(pCfg); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("error configuring provider: %v", err) } root, err := provider.GenerateRoot() if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("error generating CA root certificate: %v", err) } rootCA, err := newCARoot(root.PEM, conf.Provider, conf.ClusterID) if err != nil { return err } // TODO: https://github.com/hashicorp/consul/issues/12386 interPEM, err := provider.GenerateIntermediate() if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("error generating intermediate cert: %v", err) } intermediateCert, err := connect.ParseCert(interPEM) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("error getting intermediate cert: %v", err) } // If the provider has state to persist and it's changed or new then update // CAConfig. pState, err := provider.State() if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("error getting provider state: %v", err) } if !reflect.DeepEqual(conf.State, pState) { // Update the CAConfig in raft to persist the provider state conf.State = pState req := structs.CARequest{ Op: structs.CAOpSetConfig, Config: conf, } if _, err = c.delegate.ApplyCARequest(&req); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("error persisting provider state: %v", err) } } var rootUpdateRequired bool // Versions prior to 1.9.3, 1.8.8, and 1.7.12 incorrectly used the primary // rootCA's subjectKeyID here instead of the intermediate. For // provider=consul this didn't matter since there are no intermediates in // the primaryDC, but for vault it does matter. expectedSigningKeyID := connect.EncodeSigningKeyID(intermediateCert.SubjectKeyId) if rootCA.SigningKeyID != expectedSigningKeyID { c.logger.Info("Correcting stored CARoot values", "previous-signing-key", rootCA.SigningKeyID, "updated-signing-key", expectedSigningKeyID) rootCA.SigningKeyID = expectedSigningKeyID rootUpdateRequired = true } // Add the local leaf signing cert to the rootCA struct. This handles both // upgrades of existing state, and new rootCA. if c.getLeafSigningCertFromRoot(rootCA) != interPEM { rootCA.IntermediateCerts = append(rootCA.IntermediateCerts, interPEM) rootUpdateRequired = true } // Check if the CA root is already initialized and exit if it is, // adding on any existing intermediate certs since they aren't directly // tied to the provider. // Every change to the CA after this initial bootstrapping should // be done through the rotation process. state := c.delegate.State() _, activeRoot, err := state.CARootActive(nil) if err != nil { return err } if activeRoot != nil && !rootUpdateRequired { // This state shouldn't be possible to get into because we update the root and // CA config in the same FSM operation. if activeRoot.ID != rootCA.ID { return fmt.Errorf("stored CA root %q is not the active root (%s)", rootCA.ID, activeRoot.ID) } // TODO: why doesn't this c.setCAProvider(provider, activeRoot) ? rootCA.IntermediateCerts = activeRoot.IntermediateCerts c.setCAProvider(provider, rootCA) c.logger.Info("initialized primary datacenter CA from existing CARoot with provider", "provider", conf.Provider) return nil } if err := c.persistNewRootAndConfig(provider, rootCA, conf); err != nil { return err } c.setCAProvider(provider, rootCA) c.logger.Info("initialized primary datacenter CA with provider", "provider", conf.Provider) return nil } // getLeafSigningCertFromRoot returns the PEM encoded certificate that should be used to // sign leaf certificates in the local datacenter. The SubjectKeyId of the // returned cert should always match the SigningKeyID of the CARoot. // // TODO: fix the data model so that we don't need this complicated lookup to // find the leaf signing cert. See github.com/hashicorp/consul/issues/11347. func (c *CAManager) getLeafSigningCertFromRoot(root *structs.CARoot) string { if !c.isIntermediateUsedToSignLeaf() { return root.RootCert } if len(root.IntermediateCerts) == 0 { return "" } return root.IntermediateCerts[len(root.IntermediateCerts)-1] } // secondaryInitializeIntermediateCA generates a Certificate Signing Request (CSR) // for the intermediate CA that is used to sign leaf certificates in the secondary. // The CSR is signed by the primary DC and then persisted in the state store. // // This method should only be called while the state lock is held by setting the // state to non-ready. func (c *CAManager) secondaryInitializeIntermediateCA(provider ca.Provider, config *structs.CAConfiguration) error { activeIntermediate, err := provider.ActiveIntermediate() if err != nil { return err } _, activeRoot, err := c.delegate.State().CARootActive(nil) if err != nil { return err } var currentSigningKeyID string if activeRoot != nil { currentSigningKeyID = activeRoot.SigningKeyID } var expectedSigningKeyID string if activeIntermediate != "" { intermediateCert, err := connect.ParseCert(activeIntermediate) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("error parsing active intermediate cert: %v", err) } expectedSigningKeyID = connect.EncodeSigningKeyID(intermediateCert.SubjectKeyId) } newActiveRoot, err := c.secondaryGetActivePrimaryCARoot() if err != nil { return err } // Get a signed intermediate from the primary DC if the provider // hasn't been initialized yet or if the primary's root has changed. needsNewIntermediate := activeIntermediate == "" if activeRoot != nil && newActiveRoot.ID != activeRoot.ID { needsNewIntermediate = true } // Also we take this opportunity to correct an incorrectly persisted SigningKeyID // in secondary datacenters (see PR-6513). if expectedSigningKeyID != "" && currentSigningKeyID != expectedSigningKeyID { needsNewIntermediate = true } if needsNewIntermediate { if err := c.secondaryRequestNewSigningCert(provider, newActiveRoot); err != nil { return err } } else { // Discard the primary's representation since our local one is // sufficiently up to date. newActiveRoot = activeRoot } // Determine whether a root update is needed, and persist the roots/config accordingly. var newRoot *structs.CARoot if activeRoot == nil || needsNewIntermediate { newRoot = newActiveRoot } if err := c.persistNewRootAndConfig(provider, newRoot, config); err != nil { return err } c.setCAProvider(provider, newActiveRoot) return nil } // persistNewRootAndConfig should only be called while the state lock is held // by setting the state to non-ready. // If newActiveRoot is non-nil, it will be appended to the current roots list. // If config is non-nil, it will be used to overwrite the existing config. func (c *CAManager) persistNewRootAndConfig(provider ca.Provider, newActiveRoot *structs.CARoot, config *structs.CAConfiguration) error { state := c.delegate.State() idx, oldRoots, err := state.CARoots(nil) if err != nil { return err } // Look up the existing CA config if a new one wasn't provided. var newConf structs.CAConfiguration _, storedConfig, err := state.CAConfig(nil) if err != nil { return err } if storedConfig == nil { return fmt.Errorf("local CA not initialized yet") } // Exit early if the change is a no-op. if !shouldPersistNewRootAndConfig(newActiveRoot, storedConfig, config) { return nil } if config != nil { newConf = *config } else { newConf = *storedConfig } // Update the trust domain for the config if there's a new root, or keep the old // one if the root isn't being updated. newConf.ModifyIndex = storedConfig.ModifyIndex if newActiveRoot != nil { newConf.ClusterID = newActiveRoot.ExternalTrustDomain } else { _, activeRoot, err := state.CARootActive(nil) if err != nil { return err } newConf.ClusterID = activeRoot.ExternalTrustDomain } // Persist any state the provider needs us to newConf.State, err = provider.State() if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("error getting provider state: %v", err) } // If there's a new active root, copy the root list and append it, updating // the old root with the time it was rotated out. var newRoots structs.CARoots for _, r := range oldRoots { newRoot := *r if newRoot.Active && newActiveRoot != nil { newRoot.Active = false newRoot.RotatedOutAt = c.timeNow() } if newRoot.ExternalTrustDomain == "" { newRoot.ExternalTrustDomain = newConf.ClusterID } newRoots = append(newRoots, &newRoot) } if newActiveRoot != nil { newRoots = append(newRoots, newActiveRoot) } args := &structs.CARequest{ Op: structs.CAOpSetRootsAndConfig, Index: idx, Roots: newRoots, Config: &newConf, } resp, err := c.delegate.ApplyCARequest(args) if err != nil { return err } if respOk, ok := resp.(bool); ok && !respOk { return fmt.Errorf("could not atomically update roots and config") } c.logger.Info("updated root certificates from primary datacenter") return nil } func shouldPersistNewRootAndConfig(newActiveRoot *structs.CARoot, oldConfig, newConfig *structs.CAConfiguration) bool { if newActiveRoot != nil { return true } if newConfig == nil { return false } return newConfig.Provider == oldConfig.Provider && reflect.DeepEqual(newConfig.Config, oldConfig.Config) } func (c *CAManager) UpdateConfiguration(args *structs.CARequest) (reterr error) { // Attempt to update the state first. oldState, err := c.setState(caStateReconfig, true) if err != nil { return err } defer func() { // Using named return values in deferred funcs isnt too common in our code // but it is first class Go functionality. The error erturned from the // main func will be available by its given name within deferred functions. // See: https://blog.golang.org/defer-panic-and-recover if reterr == nil { c.setState(caStateInitialized, false) } else { c.setState(oldState, false) } }() // Attempt to initialize the config if we failed to do so in Initialize for some reason prevConfig, err := c.initializeCAConfig() if err != nil { return err } // Exit early if it's a no-op change state := c.delegate.State() _, config, err := state.CAConfig(nil) if err != nil { return err } // Don't allow state changes. Either it needs to be empty or the same to allow // read-modify-write loops that don't touch the State field. if len(args.Config.State) > 0 && !reflect.DeepEqual(args.Config.State, config.State) { return ErrStateReadOnly } // Don't allow users to change the ClusterID. args.Config.ClusterID = config.ClusterID if args.Config.Provider == config.Provider && reflect.DeepEqual(args.Config.Config, config.Config) { return nil } // If the provider hasn't changed, we need to load the current Provider state // so it can decide if it needs to change resources or not based on the config // change. if args.Config.Provider == config.Provider { // Note this is a shallow copy since the State method doc requires the // provider return a map that will not be further modified and should not // modify the one we pass to Configure. args.Config.State = config.State } // Create a new instance of the provider described by the config // and get the current active root CA. This acts as a good validation // of the config and makes sure the provider is functioning correctly // before we commit any changes to Raft. newProvider, err := c.newProvider(args.Config) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("could not initialize provider: %v", err) } pCfg := ca.ProviderConfig{ ClusterID: args.Config.ClusterID, Datacenter: c.serverConf.Datacenter, // This endpoint can be called in a secondary DC too so set this correctly. IsPrimary: c.serverConf.Datacenter == c.serverConf.PrimaryDatacenter, RawConfig: args.Config.Config, State: args.Config.State, } if args.Config.Provider == config.Provider { if validator, ok := newProvider.(ValidateConfigUpdater); ok { if err := validator.ValidateConfigUpdate(prevConfig.Config, args.Config.Config); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("new configuration is incompatible with previous configuration: %w", err) } } } if err := newProvider.Configure(pCfg); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("error configuring provider: %v", err) } cleanupNewProvider := func() { if err := newProvider.Cleanup(args.Config.Provider != config.Provider, args.Config.Config); err != nil { c.logger.Warn("failed to clean up CA provider while handling startup failure", "provider", newProvider, "error", err) } } // If this is a secondary, just check if the intermediate needs to be regenerated. if c.serverConf.Datacenter != c.serverConf.PrimaryDatacenter { if err := c.secondaryInitializeIntermediateCA(newProvider, args.Config); err != nil { cleanupNewProvider() return fmt.Errorf("Error updating secondary datacenter CA config: %v", err) } c.logger.Info("Secondary CA provider config updated") return nil } if err := c.primaryUpdateRootCA(newProvider, args, config); err != nil { cleanupNewProvider() return err } return nil } // ValidateConfigUpdater is an optional interface that may be implemented // by a ca.Provider. If the provider implements this interface, the // ValidateConfigurationUpdate will be called when a user attempts to change the // CA configuration, and the provider type has not changed from the previous // configuration. type ValidateConfigUpdater interface { // ValidateConfigUpdate should return an error if the next configuration is // incompatible with the previous configuration. // // TODO: use better types after https://github.com/hashicorp/consul/issues/12238 ValidateConfigUpdate(previous, next map[string]interface{}) error } func (c *CAManager) primaryUpdateRootCA(newProvider ca.Provider, args *structs.CARequest, config *structs.CAConfiguration) error { providerRoot, err := newProvider.GenerateRoot() if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("error generating CA root certificate: %v", err) } newRootPEM := providerRoot.PEM newActiveRoot, err := newCARoot(newRootPEM, args.Config.Provider, args.Config.ClusterID) if err != nil { return err } // TODO: https://github.com/hashicorp/consul/issues/12386 intermediate, err := newProvider.ActiveIntermediate() if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("error fetching active intermediate: %w", err) } if intermediate == "" { intermediate, err = newProvider.GenerateIntermediate() if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("error generating intermediate: %w", err) } } if intermediate != newRootPEM { if err := setLeafSigningCert(newActiveRoot, intermediate); err != nil { return err } } // See if the provider needs to persist any state along with the config pState, err := newProvider.State() if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("error getting provider state: %v", err) } args.Config.State = pState state := c.delegate.State() // Compare the new provider's root CA ID to the current one. If they // match, just update the existing provider with the new config. // If they don't match, begin the root rotation process. _, root, err := state.CARootActive(nil) if err != nil { return err } // If the root didn't change, just update the config and return. if root != nil && root.ID == newActiveRoot.ID { args.Op = structs.CAOpSetConfig _, err := c.delegate.ApplyCARequest(args) if err != nil { return err } // If the config has been committed, update the local provider instance c.setCAProvider(newProvider, newActiveRoot) c.logger.Info("CA provider config updated") return nil } // get the old CA provider to be used for Cross Signing and to clean it up at the end // of the functi8on. oldProvider, _ := c.getCAProvider() if oldProvider == nil { return fmt.Errorf("internal error: CA provider is nil") } // We only even think about cross signing if the current provider has a root cert // In some cases such as having a bad CA configuration during startup the provider // may not have been able to generate a cert. We then want to be able to prevent // an attempt to cross sign the cert which will definitely fail. if root != nil { // If it's a config change that would trigger a rotation (different provider/root): // 1. Get the root from the new provider. // 2. Call CrossSignCA on the old provider to sign the new root with the old one to // get a cross-signed certificate. // 3. Take the active root for the new provider and append the intermediate from step 2 // to its list of intermediates. // TODO: this cert is already parsed once in newCARoot, could we remove the second parse? newRoot, err := connect.ParseCert(newRootPEM) if err != nil { return err } // At this point, we know the config change has triggered a root rotation, // either by swapping the provider type or changing the provider's config // to use a different root certificate. // First up, check that the current provider actually supports // cross-signing. canXSign, err := oldProvider.SupportsCrossSigning() if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("CA provider error: %s", err) } if !canXSign && !args.Config.ForceWithoutCrossSigning { return errors.New("The current CA Provider does not support cross-signing. " + "You can try again with ForceWithoutCrossSigningSet but this may cause " + "disruption - see documentation for more.") } if args.Config.ForceWithoutCrossSigning { c.logger.Warn("ForceWithoutCrossSigning set, CA reconfiguration skipping cross-signing") } // If ForceWithoutCrossSigning wasn't set, attempt to have the old CA generate a // cross-signed intermediate. if canXSign && !args.Config.ForceWithoutCrossSigning { // Have the old provider cross-sign the new root xcCert, err := oldProvider.CrossSignCA(newRoot) if err != nil { return err } // Add the cross signed cert to the new CA's intermediates (to be attached // to leaf certs). We do not want it to be the last cert if there are any // existing intermediate certs so we push to the front. newActiveRoot.IntermediateCerts = append([]string{xcCert}, newActiveRoot.IntermediateCerts...) } } // Update the roots and CA config in the state store at the same time idx, roots, err := state.CARoots(nil) if err != nil { return err } var newRoots structs.CARoots for _, r := range roots { newRoot := *r if newRoot.Active { newRoot.Active = false newRoot.RotatedOutAt = c.timeNow() } newRoots = append(newRoots, &newRoot) } newRoots = append(newRoots, newActiveRoot) args.Op = structs.CAOpSetRootsAndConfig args.Index = idx args.Config.ModifyIndex = config.ModifyIndex args.Roots = newRoots resp, err := c.delegate.ApplyCARequest(args) if err != nil { return err } if respOk, ok := resp.(bool); ok && !respOk { return fmt.Errorf("could not atomically update roots and config") } // If the config has been committed, update the local provider instance // and call teardown on the old provider c.setCAProvider(newProvider, newActiveRoot) if err := oldProvider.Cleanup(args.Config.Provider != config.Provider, args.Config.Config); err != nil { c.logger.Warn("failed to clean up old provider", "provider", config.Provider, "error", err) } c.logger.Info("CA rotated to new root under provider", "provider", args.Config.Provider) return nil } // primaryRenewIntermediate regenerates the intermediate cert in the primary datacenter. // This is only run for CAs that require an intermediary in the primary DC, such as Vault. // It should only be called while the state lock is held by setting the state to non-ready. func (c *CAManager) primaryRenewIntermediate(provider ca.Provider, newActiveRoot *structs.CARoot) error { // Generate and sign an intermediate cert using the root CA. intermediatePEM, err := provider.GenerateIntermediate() if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("error generating new intermediate cert: %v", err) } if err := setLeafSigningCert(newActiveRoot, intermediatePEM); err != nil { return err } c.logger.Info("generated new intermediate certificate for primary datacenter") return nil } // secondaryRequestNewSigningCert creates a Certificate Signing Request, sends // the request to the primary, and stores the received certificate in the // provider. // Should only be called while the state lock is held by setting the state to non-ready. func (c *CAManager) secondaryRequestNewSigningCert(provider ca.Provider, newActiveRoot *structs.CARoot) error { csr, opaque, err := provider.GenerateIntermediateCSR() if err != nil { return err } var intermediatePEM string if err := c.delegate.forwardDC("ConnectCA.SignIntermediate", c.serverConf.PrimaryDatacenter, c.delegate.generateCASignRequest(csr), &intermediatePEM); err != nil { // this is a failure in the primary and shouldn't be capable of erroring out our establishing leadership c.logger.Warn("Primary datacenter refused to sign our intermediate CA certificate", "error", err) return nil } if err := provider.SetIntermediate(intermediatePEM, newActiveRoot.RootCert, opaque); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("Failed to set the intermediate certificate with the CA provider: %v", err) } if err := setLeafSigningCert(newActiveRoot, intermediatePEM); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("Failed to set the leaf signing cert to the intermediate: %w", err) } c.logger.Info("received new intermediate certificate from primary datacenter") return nil } // setLeafSigningCert updates the CARoot by appending the pem to the list of // intermediate certificates, and setting the SigningKeyID to the encoded // SubjectKeyId of the certificate. func setLeafSigningCert(caRoot *structs.CARoot, pem string) error { cert, err := connect.ParseCert(pem) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("error parsing leaf signing cert: %w", err) } if err := pruneExpiredIntermediates(caRoot); err != nil { return err } caRoot.IntermediateCerts = append(caRoot.IntermediateCerts, pem) caRoot.SigningKeyID = connect.EncodeSigningKeyID(cert.SubjectKeyId) return nil } // pruneExpiredIntermediates removes expired intermediate certificates // from the given CARoot. func pruneExpiredIntermediates(caRoot *structs.CARoot) error { var newIntermediates []string now := time.Now() for _, intermediatePEM := range caRoot.IntermediateCerts { cert, err := connect.ParseCert(intermediatePEM) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("error parsing leaf signing cert: %w", err) } // Only keep the intermediate cert if it's still valid. if cert.NotAfter.After(now) { newIntermediates = append(newIntermediates, intermediatePEM) } } caRoot.IntermediateCerts = newIntermediates return nil } // runRenewIntermediate periodically attempts to renew the intermediate cert. func (c *CAManager) runRenewIntermediate(ctx context.Context) error { for { select { case <-ctx.Done(): return nil case <-time.After(structs.IntermediateCertRenewInterval): retryLoopBackoffAbortOnSuccess(ctx, func() error { return c.RenewIntermediate(ctx) }, func(err error) { c.logger.Error("error renewing intermediate certs", "routine", intermediateCertRenewWatchRoutineName, "error", err, ) }) } } } // RenewIntermediate checks the intermediate cert for // expiration. If more than half the time a cert is valid has passed, // it will try to renew it. func (c *CAManager) RenewIntermediate(ctx context.Context) error { return c.renewIntermediate(ctx, false) } func (c *CAManager) renewIntermediateNow(ctx context.Context) error { return c.renewIntermediate(ctx, true) } func (c *CAManager) renewIntermediate(ctx context.Context, forceNow bool) error { // Grab the 'lock' right away so the provider/config can't be changed out while we check // the intermediate. if _, err := c.setState(caStateRenewIntermediate, true); err != nil { return err } defer c.setState(caStateInitialized, false) isPrimary := c.serverConf.InPrimaryDatacenter() provider, _ := c.getCAProvider() if provider == nil { // this happens when leadership is being revoked and this go routine will be stopped return nil } // If this isn't the primary, make sure the CA has been initialized. if !isPrimary && !c.secondaryHasProviderRoots() { return fmt.Errorf("secondary CA is not yet configured.") } state := c.delegate.State() _, root, err := state.CARootActive(nil) if err != nil { return err } activeRoot := root.Clone() // If this is the primary, check if this is a provider that uses an intermediate cert. If // it isn't, we don't need to check for a renewal. if isPrimary && !primaryUsesIntermediate(provider) { return nil } activeIntermediate, err := provider.ActiveIntermediate() if err != nil { return err } if activeIntermediate == "" { return fmt.Errorf("datacenter doesn't have an active intermediate.") } intermediateCert, err := connect.ParseCert(activeIntermediate) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("error parsing active intermediate cert: %v", err) } if !forceNow { if lessThanHalfTimePassed(c.timeNow(), intermediateCert.NotBefore, intermediateCert.NotAfter) { return nil } } // Enough time has passed, go ahead with getting a new intermediate. renewalFunc := c.primaryRenewIntermediate if !isPrimary { renewalFunc = c.secondaryRequestNewSigningCert } if forceNow { err := renewalFunc(provider, activeRoot) if err != nil { return err } } else { errCh := make(chan error, 1) go func() { errCh <- renewalFunc(provider, activeRoot) }() // Wait for the renewal func to return or for the context to be canceled. select { case <-ctx.Done(): return ctx.Err() case err := <-errCh: if err != nil { return err } } } if err := c.persistNewRootAndConfig(provider, activeRoot, nil); err != nil { return err } c.setCAProvider(provider, activeRoot) return nil } // secondaryCARootWatch maintains a blocking query to the primary datacenter's // ConnectCA.Roots endpoint to monitor when it needs to request a new signed // intermediate certificate. func (c *CAManager) secondaryCARootWatch(ctx context.Context) error { args := structs.DCSpecificRequest{ Datacenter: c.serverConf.PrimaryDatacenter, QueryOptions: structs.QueryOptions{ // the maximum time the primary roots watch query can block before returning MaxQueryTime: c.serverConf.MaxQueryTime, }, } c.logger.Debug("starting Connect CA root replication from primary datacenter", "primary", c.serverConf.PrimaryDatacenter) retryLoopBackoff(ctx, func() error { var roots structs.IndexedCARoots if err := c.delegate.forwardDC("ConnectCA.Roots", c.serverConf.PrimaryDatacenter, &args, &roots); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("Error retrieving the primary datacenter's roots: %v", err) } // Return if the context has been canceled while waiting on the RPC. select { case <-ctx.Done(): return ctx.Err() default: } // Attempt to update the roots using the returned data. if err := c.secondaryUpdateRoots(roots); err != nil { return err } args.QueryOptions.MinQueryIndex = nextIndexVal(args.QueryOptions.MinQueryIndex, roots.QueryMeta.Index) return nil }, func(err error) { c.logger.Error("CA root replication failed, will retry", "routine", secondaryCARootWatchRoutineName, "error", err, ) }) return nil } // secondaryUpdateRoots updates the cached roots from the primary and regenerates the intermediate // certificate if necessary. func (c *CAManager) secondaryUpdateRoots(roots structs.IndexedCARoots) error { // Update the state first to claim the 'lock'. if _, err := c.setState(caStateReconfig, true); err != nil { return err } defer c.setState(caStateInitialized, false) // Update the cached primary roots now that the lock is held. c.secondarySetPrimaryRoots(roots) provider, _ := c.getCAProvider() if provider == nil { // this happens when leadership is being revoked and this go routine will be stopped return nil } // Run the secondary CA init routine to see if we need to request a new // intermediate. if c.secondaryHasProviderRoots() { if err := c.secondaryInitializeIntermediateCA(provider, nil); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("Failed to initialize the secondary CA: %v", err) } return nil } // Attempt to initialize now that we have updated roots. This is an optimization // so that we don't have to wait for the Initialize retry backoff if we were // waiting on roots from the primary to be able to complete initialization. if err := c.delegate.ServersSupportMultiDCConnectCA(); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("failed to initialize while updating primary roots: %w", err) } if err := c.secondaryInitializeProvider(provider, roots); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("Failed to initialize secondary CA provider: %v", err) } if err := c.secondaryInitializeIntermediateCA(provider, nil); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("Failed to initialize the secondary CA: %v", err) } return nil } // secondaryInitializeProvider configures the given provider for a secondary, non-root datacenter. func (c *CAManager) secondaryInitializeProvider(provider ca.Provider, roots structs.IndexedCARoots) error { if roots.TrustDomain == "" { return fmt.Errorf("trust domain from primary datacenter is not initialized") } clusterID := strings.Split(roots.TrustDomain, ".")[0] _, conf, err := c.delegate.State().CAConfig(nil) if err != nil { return err } pCfg := ca.ProviderConfig{ ClusterID: clusterID, Datacenter: c.serverConf.Datacenter, IsPrimary: false, RawConfig: conf.Config, State: conf.State, } if err := provider.Configure(pCfg); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("error configuring provider: %v", err) } return nil } // secondaryHasProviderRoots returns true after providerRoot has been set. This // method is used to detect when the secondary has received the roots from the // primary DC. func (c *CAManager) secondaryHasProviderRoots() bool { // TODO: this could potentially also use primaryRoots instead of providerRoot c.providerLock.Lock() defer c.providerLock.Unlock() return c.providerRoot != nil } type connectSignRateLimiter struct { // csrRateLimiter limits the rate of signing new certs if configured. Lazily // initialized from current config to support dynamic changes. // csrRateLimiterMu must be held while dereferencing the pointer or storing a // new one, but methods can be called on the limiter object outside of the // locked section. This is done only in the getCSRRateLimiterWithLimit method. csrRateLimiter *rate.Limiter csrRateLimiterMu sync.RWMutex // csrConcurrencyLimiter is a dynamically resizable semaphore used to limit // Sign RPC concurrency if configured. The zero value is usable as soon as // SetSize is called which we do dynamically in the RPC handler to avoid // having to hook elaborate synchronization mechanisms through the CA config // endpoint and config reload etc. csrConcurrencyLimiter semaphore.Dynamic } // getCSRRateLimiterWithLimit returns a rate.Limiter with the desired limit set. // It uses the shared server-wide limiter unless the limit has been changed in // config or the limiter has not been setup yet in which case it just-in-time // configures the new limiter. We assume that limit changes are relatively rare // and that all callers (there is currently only one) use the same config value // as the limit. There might be some flapping if there are multiple concurrent // requests in flight at the time the config changes where A sees the new value // and updates, B sees the old but then gets this lock second and changes back. // Eventually though and very soon (once all current RPCs are complete) we are // guaranteed to have the correct limit set by the next RPC that comes in so I // assume this is fine. If we observe strange behavior because of it, we could // add hysteresis that prevents changes too soon after a previous change but // that seems unnecessary for now. func (l *connectSignRateLimiter) getCSRRateLimiterWithLimit(limit rate.Limit) *rate.Limiter { l.csrRateLimiterMu.RLock() lim := l.csrRateLimiter l.csrRateLimiterMu.RUnlock() // If there is a current limiter with the same limit, return it. This should // be the common case. if lim != nil && lim.Limit() == limit { return lim } // Need to change limiter, get write lock l.csrRateLimiterMu.Lock() defer l.csrRateLimiterMu.Unlock() // No limiter yet, or limit changed in CA config, reconfigure a new limiter. // We use burst of 1 for a hard limit. Note that either bursting or waiting is // necessary to get expected behavior in fact of random arrival times, but we // don't need both and we use Wait with a small delay to smooth noise. See // https://github.com/banks/sim-rate-limit-backoff/blob/master/README.md. l.csrRateLimiter = rate.NewLimiter(limit, 1) return l.csrRateLimiter } // AuthorizeAndSignCertificate signs a leaf certificate for the service or agent // identified by the SPIFFE ID in the given CSR's SAN. It performs authorization // using the given acl.Authorizer. func (c *CAManager) AuthorizeAndSignCertificate(csr *x509.CertificateRequest, authz acl.Authorizer) (*structs.IssuedCert, error) { // Note that only one spiffe id is allowed currently. If more than one is desired // in future implmentations, then each ID should have authorization checks. if len(csr.URIs) != 1 { return nil, connect.InvalidCSRError("CSR SAN contains an invalid number of URIs: %v", len(csr.URIs)) } if len(csr.EmailAddresses) > 0 { return nil, connect.InvalidCSRError("CSR SAN does not allow specifying email addresses") } // Parse the SPIFFE ID from the CSR SAN. spiffeID, err := connect.ParseCertURI(csr.URIs[0]) if err != nil { return nil, err } // Perform authorization. var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext allow := authz.ToAllowAuthorizer() switch v := spiffeID.(type) { case *connect.SpiffeIDService: v.GetEnterpriseMeta().FillAuthzContext(&authzContext) if err := allow.ServiceWriteAllowed(v.Service, &authzContext); err != nil { return nil, err } // Verify that the DC in the service URI matches us. We might relax this // requirement later but being restrictive for now is safer. dc := c.serverConf.Datacenter if v.Datacenter != dc { return nil, connect.InvalidCSRError("SPIFFE ID in CSR from a different datacenter: %s, "+ "we are %s", v.Datacenter, dc) } case *connect.SpiffeIDAgent: v.GetEnterpriseMeta().FillAuthzContext(&authzContext) if err := allow.NodeWriteAllowed(v.Agent, &authzContext); err != nil { return nil, err } case *connect.SpiffeIDMeshGateway: // TODO(peering): figure out what is appropriate here for ACLs v.GetEnterpriseMeta().FillAuthzContext(&authzContext) if err := allow.MeshWriteAllowed(&authzContext); err != nil { return nil, err } // Verify that the DC in the gateway URI matches us. We might relax this // requirement later but being restrictive for now is safer. dc := c.serverConf.Datacenter if v.Datacenter != dc { return nil, connect.InvalidCSRError("SPIFFE ID in CSR from a different datacenter: %s, "+ "we are %s", v.Datacenter, dc) } case *connect.SpiffeIDServer: // The authorizer passed in should have unlimited permissions. if err := allow.ACLWriteAllowed(&authzContext); err != nil { return nil, err } // Verify that the DC in the URI matches us. // The request must have been issued by a local server. dc := c.serverConf.Datacenter if v.Datacenter != dc { return nil, connect.InvalidCSRError("SPIFFE ID in CSR from a different datacenter: %s, "+ "we are %s", v.Datacenter, dc) } default: return nil, connect.InvalidCSRError("SPIFFE ID in CSR must be a service, mesh-gateway, or agent ID") } return c.SignCertificate(csr, spiffeID) } func (c *CAManager) SignCertificate(csr *x509.CertificateRequest, spiffeID connect.CertURI) (*structs.IssuedCert, error) { provider, caRoot := c.getCAProvider() if provider == nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("CA is uninitialized and unable to sign certificates yet: provider is nil") } else if caRoot == nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("CA is uninitialized and unable to sign certificates yet: no root certificate") } // Verify that the CSR entity is in the cluster's trust domain state := c.delegate.State() _, config, err := state.CAConfig(nil) if err != nil { return nil, err } signingID := connect.SpiffeIDSigningForCluster(config.ClusterID) serviceID, isService := spiffeID.(*connect.SpiffeIDService) agentID, isAgent := spiffeID.(*connect.SpiffeIDAgent) serverID, isServer := spiffeID.(*connect.SpiffeIDServer) mgwID, isMeshGateway := spiffeID.(*connect.SpiffeIDMeshGateway) var entMeta acl.EnterpriseMeta switch { case isService: if !signingID.CanSign(spiffeID) { return nil, connect.InvalidCSRError("SPIFFE ID in CSR from a different trust domain: %s, "+ "we are %s", serviceID.Host, signingID.Host()) } entMeta.Merge(serviceID.GetEnterpriseMeta()) case isMeshGateway: if !signingID.CanSign(spiffeID) { return nil, connect.InvalidCSRError("SPIFFE ID in CSR from a different trust domain: %s, "+ "we are %s", mgwID.Host, signingID.Host()) } entMeta.Merge(mgwID.GetEnterpriseMeta()) case isServer: if !signingID.CanSign(spiffeID) { return nil, connect.InvalidCSRError("SPIFFE ID in CSR from a different trust domain: %s, "+ "we are %s", serverID.Host, signingID.Host()) } entMeta.Normalize() case isAgent: // isAgent - if we support more ID types then this would need to be an else if // here we are just automatically fixing the trust domain. For auto-encrypt and // auto-config they make certificate requests before learning about the roots // so they will have a dummy trust domain in the CSR. trustDomain := signingID.Host() if agentID.Host != trustDomain { originalURI := agentID.URI() agentID.Host = trustDomain // recreate the URIs list uris := make([]*url.URL, len(csr.URIs)) for i, uri := range csr.URIs { if originalURI.String() == uri.String() { uris[i] = agentID.URI() } else { uris[i] = uri } } csr.URIs = uris } entMeta.Merge(agentID.GetEnterpriseMeta()) default: return nil, connect.InvalidCSRError("SPIFFE ID in CSR must be a service, agent, server, or mesh gateway ID") } commonCfg, err := config.GetCommonConfig() if err != nil { return nil, err } if commonCfg.CSRMaxPerSecond > 0 { lim := c.caLeafLimiter.getCSRRateLimiterWithLimit(rate.Limit(commonCfg.CSRMaxPerSecond)) // Wait up to the small threshold we allow for a token. ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), csrLimitWait) defer cancel() if lim.Wait(ctx) != nil { return nil, ErrRateLimited } } else if commonCfg.CSRMaxConcurrent > 0 { c.caLeafLimiter.csrConcurrencyLimiter.SetSize(int64(commonCfg.CSRMaxConcurrent)) ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), csrLimitWait) defer cancel() if err := c.caLeafLimiter.csrConcurrencyLimiter.Acquire(ctx); err != nil { return nil, ErrRateLimited } defer c.caLeafLimiter.csrConcurrencyLimiter.Release() } connect.HackSANExtensionForCSR(csr) // Check if the root expired before using it to sign. // TODO: we store NotBefore and NotAfter on this struct, so we could avoid // parsing the cert here. err = c.checkExpired(caRoot.RootCert) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("root expired: %w", err) } if c.isIntermediateUsedToSignLeaf() && len(caRoot.IntermediateCerts) > 0 { inter := caRoot.IntermediateCerts[len(caRoot.IntermediateCerts)-1] if err := c.checkExpired(inter); err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("intermediate expired: %w", err) } } // All seems to be in order, actually sign it. pem, err := provider.Sign(csr) if err == ca.ErrRateLimited { return nil, ErrRateLimited } if err != nil { return nil, err } // Append any intermediates needed by this root. for _, p := range caRoot.IntermediateCerts { pem = pem + lib.EnsureTrailingNewline(p) } modIdx, err := c.delegate.ApplyCALeafRequest() if err != nil { return nil, err } cert, err := connect.ParseCert(pem) if err != nil { return nil, err } // Set the response reply := structs.IssuedCert{ SerialNumber: connect.EncodeSerialNumber(cert.SerialNumber), CertPEM: pem, ValidAfter: cert.NotBefore, ValidBefore: cert.NotAfter, EnterpriseMeta: entMeta, RaftIndex: structs.RaftIndex{ ModifyIndex: modIdx, CreateIndex: modIdx, }, } switch { case isService: reply.Service = serviceID.Service reply.ServiceURI = cert.URIs[0].String() case isMeshGateway: reply.Kind = structs.ServiceKindMeshGateway reply.KindURI = cert.URIs[0].String() case isAgent: reply.Agent = agentID.Agent reply.AgentURI = cert.URIs[0].String() case isServer: reply.ServerURI = cert.URIs[0].String() default: return nil, errors.New("not possible") } return &reply, nil } func (c *CAManager) checkExpired(pem string) error { cert, err := connect.ParseCert(pem) if err != nil { return err } if cert.NotAfter.Before(c.timeNow()) { return fmt.Errorf("certificate expired, expiration date: %s ", cert.NotAfter.String()) } return nil } func primaryUsesIntermediate(provider ca.Provider) bool { _, ok := provider.(ca.PrimaryUsesIntermediate) return ok } func (c *CAManager) isIntermediateUsedToSignLeaf() bool { if c.serverConf.Datacenter != c.serverConf.PrimaryDatacenter { return true } provider, _ := c.getCAProvider() return primaryUsesIntermediate(provider) } func providerPrettyName(provider string) string { switch provider { case "consul": return "Consul" case "vault": return "Vault" case "aws-pca": return "Aws-Pca" case "provider-name": return "Provider-Name" default: return provider } }