package agent import ( "fmt" "github.com/hashicorp/serf/serf" "github.com/hashicorp/consul/acl" "github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/structs" "github.com/hashicorp/consul/api" "github.com/hashicorp/consul/types" ) // aclAccessorID is used to convert an ACLToken's secretID to its accessorID for non- // critical purposes, such as logging. Therefore we interpret all errors as empty-string // so we can safely log it without handling non-critical errors at the usage site. func (a *Agent) aclAccessorID(secretID string) string { ident, err := a.delegate.ResolveTokenToIdentity(secretID) if acl.IsErrNotFound(err) { return "" } if err != nil { a.logger.Debug("non-critical error resolving acl token accessor for logging", "error", err) return "" } if ident == nil { return "" } return ident.ID() } // vetServiceRegister makes sure the service registration action is allowed by // the given token. func (a *Agent) vetServiceRegister(token string, service *structs.NodeService) error { // Resolve the token and bail if ACLs aren't enabled. authz, err := a.delegate.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(token, nil, nil) if err != nil { return err } return a.vetServiceRegisterWithAuthorizer(authz, service) } func (a *Agent) vetServiceRegisterWithAuthorizer(authz acl.Authorizer, service *structs.NodeService) error { var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext service.FillAuthzContext(&authzContext) // Vet the service itself. if authz.ServiceWrite(service.Service, &authzContext) != acl.Allow { serviceName := service.CompoundServiceName() return acl.PermissionDenied("Missing service:write on %s", serviceName.String()) } // Vet any service that might be getting overwritten. if existing := a.State.Service(service.CompoundServiceID()); existing != nil { existing.FillAuthzContext(&authzContext) if authz.ServiceWrite(existing.Service, &authzContext) != acl.Allow { serviceName := service.CompoundServiceName() return acl.PermissionDenied("Missing service:write on %s", serviceName.String()) } } // If the service is a proxy, ensure that it has write on the destination too // since it can be discovered as an instance of that service. if service.Kind == structs.ServiceKindConnectProxy { service.FillAuthzContext(&authzContext) if authz.ServiceWrite(service.Proxy.DestinationServiceName, &authzContext) != acl.Allow { // TODO(partitions) fix this to include namespace and partition return acl.PermissionDenied("Missing service:write on %s", service.Proxy.DestinationServiceName) } } return nil } func (a *Agent) vetServiceUpdateWithAuthorizer(authz acl.Authorizer, serviceID structs.ServiceID) error { var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext // Vet any changes based on the existing services's info. if existing := a.State.Service(serviceID); existing != nil { existing.FillAuthzContext(&authzContext) if authz.ServiceWrite(existing.Service, &authzContext) != acl.Allow { serviceName := existing.CompoundServiceName() return acl.PermissionDenied("Missing service:write on %s", serviceName.String()) } } else { return NotFoundError{Reason: fmt.Sprintf("Unknown service %q", serviceID)} } return nil } func (a *Agent) vetCheckRegisterWithAuthorizer(authz acl.Authorizer, check *structs.HealthCheck) error { // TODO(partitions) var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext check.FillAuthzContext(&authzContext) // Vet the check itself. if len(check.ServiceName) > 0 { if authz.ServiceWrite(check.ServiceName, &authzContext) != acl.Allow { return acl.PermissionDenied("Missing service:write on %v", structs.ServiceIDString(check.ServiceName, &check.EnterpriseMeta)) } } else { if authz.NodeWrite(a.config.NodeName, &authzContext) != acl.Allow { return acl.PermissionDenied("Missing node:write on %s", structs.NodeNameString(a.config.NodeName, a.AgentEnterpriseMeta())) } } // Vet any check that might be getting overwritten. if existing := a.State.Check(check.CompoundCheckID()); existing != nil { if len(existing.ServiceName) > 0 { if authz.ServiceWrite(existing.ServiceName, &authzContext) != acl.Allow { return acl.PermissionDenied("Missing service:write on %s", structs.ServiceIDString(existing.ServiceName, &existing.EnterpriseMeta)) } } else { if authz.NodeWrite(a.config.NodeName, &authzContext) != acl.Allow { return acl.PermissionDenied("Missing node:write on %s", structs.NodeNameString(a.config.NodeName, a.AgentEnterpriseMeta())) } } } return nil } func (a *Agent) vetCheckUpdateWithAuthorizer(authz acl.Authorizer, checkID structs.CheckID) error { var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext checkID.FillAuthzContext(&authzContext) // Vet any changes based on the existing check's info. if existing := a.State.Check(checkID); existing != nil { if len(existing.ServiceName) > 0 { if authz.ServiceWrite(existing.ServiceName, &authzContext) != acl.Allow { return acl.PermissionDenied("Missing service:write on %s", structs.ServiceIDString(existing.ServiceName, &existing.EnterpriseMeta)) } } else { if authz.NodeWrite(a.config.NodeName, &authzContext) != acl.Allow { return acl.PermissionDenied("Missing node:write on %s", structs.NodeNameString(a.config.NodeName, a.AgentEnterpriseMeta())) } } } else { return fmt.Errorf("Unknown check %q", checkID.String()) } return nil } // filterMembers redacts members that the token doesn't have access to. func (a *Agent) filterMembers(token string, members *[]serf.Member) error { // Resolve the token and bail if ACLs aren't enabled. authz, err := a.delegate.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(token, nil, nil) if err != nil { return err } var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext // Filter out members based on the node policy. m := *members for i := 0; i < len(m); i++ { node := m[i].Name serfMemberFillAuthzContext(&m[i], &authzContext) if authz.NodeRead(node, &authzContext) == acl.Allow { continue } accessorID := a.aclAccessorID(token) a.logger.Debug("dropping node from result due to ACLs", "node", node, "accessorID", accessorID) m = append(m[:i], m[i+1:]...) i-- } *members = m return nil } func (a *Agent) filterServicesWithAuthorizer(authz acl.Authorizer, services map[string]*api.AgentService) error { var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext // Filter out services based on the service policy. for id, service := range services { agentServiceFillAuthzContext(service, &authzContext) if authz.ServiceRead(service.Service, &authzContext) == acl.Allow { continue } a.logger.Debug("dropping service from result due to ACLs", "service", id) delete(services, id) } return nil } func (a *Agent) filterChecksWithAuthorizer(authz acl.Authorizer, checks map[types.CheckID]*structs.HealthCheck) error { var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext // Filter out checks based on the node or service policy. for id, check := range checks { check.FillAuthzContext(&authzContext) if len(check.ServiceName) > 0 { if authz.ServiceRead(check.ServiceName, &authzContext) == acl.Allow { continue } } else { if authz.NodeRead(a.config.NodeName, &authzContext) == acl.Allow { continue } } a.logger.Debug("dropping check from result due to ACLs", "check", id) delete(checks, id) } return nil }