structs.ACLForceSet was deprecated 4 years ago, it should be safe to remove now.
ACLBootstrapNow was removed in a recent commit. While it is technically possible that a cluster with mixed version
could still attempt a legacy boostrap, we documented that the legacy system was deprecated in 1.4, so no
clusters that are being upgraded should be attempting a legacy boostrap.
* A GET of the /acl/auth-method/:name endpoint returns the fields
MaxTokenTTL and TokenLocality, while a LIST (/acl/auth-methods) does
not.
The list command returns a filtered subset of the full set. This is
somewhat deliberate, so that secrets aren't shown, but the TTL and
Locality fields aren't (IMO) security critical, and it is useful for
the front end to be able to show them.
For consistency these changes mirror the 'omit empty' and string
representation choices made for the GET call.
This includes changes to the gRPC and API code in the client.
The new output looks similar to this
curl 'http://localhost:8500/v1/acl/auth-methods' | jq '.'
{
"MaxTokenTTL": "8m20s",
"Name": "minikube-ttl-local2",
"Type": "kubernetes",
"Description": "minikube auth method",
"TokenLocality": "local",
"CreateIndex": 530,
"ModifyIndex": 530,
"Namespace": "default"
}
]
Signed-off-by: Mark Anderson <manderson@hashicorp.com>
* Add changelog
Signed-off-by: Mark Anderson <manderson@hashicorp.com>
Previously the tokens would fail to insert into the secondary's state
store because the AuthMethod field of the ACLToken did not point to a
known auth method from the primary.
A Node Identity is very similar to a service identity. Its main targeted use is to allow creating tokens for use by Consul agents that will grant the necessary permissions for all the typical agent operations (node registration, coordinate updates, anti-entropy).
Half of this commit is for golden file based tests of the acl token and role cli output. Another big updates was to refactor many of the tests in agent/consul/acl_endpoint_test.go to use the same style of tests and the same helpers. Besides being less boiler plate in the tests it also uses a common way of starting a test server with ACLs that should operate without any warnings regarding deprecated non-uuid master tokens etc.
We set RawToString=true so that []uint8 => string when decoding an interface{}.
We set the MapType so that map[interface{}]interface{} decodes to map[string]interface{}.
Add tests to ensure that this doesn't break existing usages.
Fixes#7223
• Renamed EnterpriseACLConfig to just Config
• Removed chained_authorizer_oss.go as it was empty
• Renamed acl.go to errors.go to more closely describe its contents
Ensure we close the Sentinel Evaluator so as not to leak go routines
Fix a bunch of test logging so that various warnings when starting a test agent go to the ltest logger and not straight to stdout.
Various canned ent meta types always return a valid pointer (no more nils). This allows us to blindly deref + assign in various places.
Update ACL index tracking to ensure oss -> ent upgrades will work as expected.
Update ent meta parsing to include function to disallow wildcarding.
Also update the Docs and fixup the HTTP API to return proper errors when someone attempts to use Namespaces with an OSS agent.
Add Namespace HTTP API docs
Make all API endpoints disallow unknown fields
* Implement endpoint to query whether the given token is authorized for a set of operations
* Updates to allow for remote ACL authorization via RPC
This is only used when making an authorization request to a different datacenter.
Main Changes:
• method signature updates everywhere to account for passing around enterprise meta.
• populate the EnterpriseAuthorizerContext for all ACL related authorizations.
• ACL resource listings now operate like the catalog or kv listings in that the returned entries are filtered down to what the token is allowed to see. With Namespaces its no longer all or nothing.
• Modified the acl.Policy parsing to abstract away basic decoding so that enterprise can do it slightly differently. Also updated method signatures so that when parsing a policy it can take extra ent metadata to use during rules validation and policy creation.
Secondary Changes:
• Moved protobuf encoding functions out of the agentpb package to eliminate circular dependencies.
• Added custom JSON unmarshalers for a few ACL resource types (to support snake case and to get rid of mapstructure)
• AuthMethod validator cache is now an interface as these will be cached per-namespace for Consul Enterprise.
• Added checks for policy/role link existence at the RPC API so we don’t push the request through raft to have it fail internally.
• Forward ACL token delete request to the primary datacenter when the secondary DC doesn’t have the token.
• Added a bunch of ACL test helpers for inserting ACL resource test data.
* ACL Authorizer overhaul
To account for upcoming features every Authorization function can now take an extra *acl.EnterpriseAuthorizerContext. These are unused in OSS and will always be nil.
Additionally the acl package has received some thorough refactoring to enable all of the extra Consul Enterprise specific authorizations including moving sentinel enforcement into the stubbed structs. The Authorizer funcs now return an acl.EnforcementDecision instead of a boolean. This improves the overall interface as it makes multiple Authorizers easily chainable as they now indicate whether they had an authoritative decision or should use some other defaults. A ChainedAuthorizer was added to handle this Authorizer enforcement chain and will never itself return a non-authoritative decision.
* Include stub for extra enterprise rules in the global management policy
* Allow for an upgrade of the global-management policy
Roles are named and can express the same bundle of permissions that can
currently be assigned to a Token (lists of Policies and Service
Identities). The difference with a Role is that it not itself a bearer
token, but just another entity that can be tied to a Token.
This lets an operator potentially curate a set of smaller reusable
Policies and compose them together into reusable Roles, rather than
always exploding that same list of Policies on any Token that needs
similar permissions.
This also refactors the acl replication code to be semi-generic to avoid
3x copypasta.
This is mainly to avoid having the API return "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z" as
a value for the ExpirationTime field when it is not set. Unfortunately
time.Time doesn't respect the json marshalling "omitempty" directive.
These act like a special cased version of a Policy Template for granting
a token the privileges necessary to register a service and its connect
proxy, and read upstreams from the catalog.
Fix error in detecting raft replication errors.
Detect redacted token secrets and prevent attempting to insert.
Add a Redacted field to the TokenBatchRead and TokenRead RPC endpoints
This will indicate whether token secrets have been redacted.
Ensure any token with a redacted secret in secondary datacenters is removed.
Test that redacted tokens cannot be replicated.
* Add leader token upgrade test and fix various ACL enablement bugs
* Update the leader ACL initialization tests.
* Add a StateStore ACL tests for ACLTokenSet and ACLTokenGetBy* functions
* Advertise the agents acl support status with the agent/self endpoint.
* Make batch token upsert CAS’able to prevent consistency issues with token auto-upgrade
* Finish up the ACL state store token tests
* Finish the ACL state store unit tests
Also rename some things to make them more consistent.
* Do as much ACL replication testing as I can.
Daniel Nephin