Whenever an upsert/deletion of a config entry happens, within the open
state store transaction we speculatively test compile all discovery
chains that may be affected by the pending modification to verify that
the write would not create an erroneous scenario (such as splitting
traffic to a subset that did not exist).
If a single discovery chain evaluation references two config entries
with the same kind and name in different namespaces then sometimes the
upsert/deletion would be falsely rejected. It does not appear as though
this bug would've let invalid writes through to the state store so the
correction does not require a cleanup phase.
During gossip encryption key rotation it would be nice to be able to see if all nodes are using the same key. This PR adds another field to the json response from `GET v1/operator/keyring` which lists the primary keys in use per dc. That way an operator can tell when a key was successfully setup as primary key.
Based on https://github.com/hashicorp/serf/pull/611 to add primary key to list keyring output:
```json
[
{
"WAN": true,
"Datacenter": "dc2",
"Segment": "",
"Keys": {
"0OuM4oC3Os18OblWiBbZUaHA7Hk+tNs/6nhNYtaNduM=": 6,
"SINm887hKTzmMWeBNKTJReaTLX3mBEJKriDyt88Ad+g=": 6
},
"PrimaryKeys": {
"SINm887hKTzmMWeBNKTJReaTLX3mBEJKriDyt88Ad+g=": 6
},
"NumNodes": 6
},
{
"WAN": false,
"Datacenter": "dc2",
"Segment": "",
"Keys": {
"0OuM4oC3Os18OblWiBbZUaHA7Hk+tNs/6nhNYtaNduM=": 8,
"SINm887hKTzmMWeBNKTJReaTLX3mBEJKriDyt88Ad+g=": 8
},
"PrimaryKeys": {
"SINm887hKTzmMWeBNKTJReaTLX3mBEJKriDyt88Ad+g=": 8
},
"NumNodes": 8
},
{
"WAN": false,
"Datacenter": "dc1",
"Segment": "",
"Keys": {
"0OuM4oC3Os18OblWiBbZUaHA7Hk+tNs/6nhNYtaNduM=": 3,
"SINm887hKTzmMWeBNKTJReaTLX3mBEJKriDyt88Ad+g=": 8
},
"PrimaryKeys": {
"SINm887hKTzmMWeBNKTJReaTLX3mBEJKriDyt88Ad+g=": 8
},
"NumNodes": 8
}
]
```
I intentionally did not change the CLI output because I didn't find a good way of displaying this information. There are a couple of options that we could implement later:
* add a flag to show the primary keys
* add a flag to show json output
Fixes#3393.
Fixes#8466
Since Consul 1.8.0 there was a bug in how ingress gateway protocol
compatibility was enforced. At the point in time that an ingress-gateway
config entry was modified the discovery chain for each upstream was
checked to ensure the ingress gateway protocol matched. Unfortunately
future modifications of other config entries were not validated against
existing ingress-gateway definitions, such as:
1. create tcp ingress-gateway pointing to 'api' (ok)
2. create service-defaults for 'api' setting protocol=http (worked, but not ok)
3. create service-splitter or service-router for 'api' (worked, but caused an agent panic)
If you were to do these in a different order, it would fail without a
crash:
1. create service-defaults for 'api' setting protocol=http (ok)
2. create service-splitter or service-router for 'api' (ok)
3. create tcp ingress-gateway pointing to 'api' (fail with message about
protocol mismatch)
This PR introduces the missing validation. The two new behaviors are:
1. create tcp ingress-gateway pointing to 'api' (ok)
2. (NEW) create service-defaults for 'api' setting protocol=http ("ok" for back compat)
3. (NEW) create service-splitter or service-router for 'api' (fail with
message about protocol mismatch)
In consideration for any existing users that may be inadvertently be
falling into item (2) above, that is now officiall a valid configuration
to be in. For anyone falling into item (3) above while you cannot use
the API to manufacture that scenario anymore, anyone that has old (now
bad) data will still be able to have the agent use them just enough to
generate a new agent/proxycfg error message rather than a panic.
Unfortunately we just don't have enough information to properly fix the
config entries.
A query made with AllowNotModifiedResponse and a MinIndex, where the
result has the same Index as MinIndex, will return an empty response
with QueryMeta.NotModified set to true.
Co-authored-by: Pierre Souchay <pierresouchay@users.noreply.github.com>
Highlights:
- add new endpoint to query for intentions by exact match
- using this endpoint from the CLI instead of the dump+filter approach
- enforcing that OSS can only read/write intentions with a SourceNS or
DestinationNS field of "default".
- preexisting OSS intentions with now-invalid namespace fields will
delete those intentions on initial election or for wildcard namespaces
an attempt will be made to downgrade them to "default" unless one
exists.
- also allow the '-namespace' CLI arg on all of the intention subcommands
- update lots of docs
Split up unused key validation in config entry decode for oss/ent.
This is needed so that we can return an informative error in OSS if namespaces are provided.
Previously, we were only returning a single ListenerPort for a single
service. However, we actually allow a single service to be serviced over
multiple ports, as well as allow users to define what hostnames they
expect their services to be contacted over. When no hosts are defined,
we return the default ingress domain for any configured DNS domain.
To show this in the UI, we modify the gateway-services-nodes API to
return a GatewayConfig.Addresses field, which is a list of addresses
over which the specific service can be contacted.
A Node Identity is very similar to a service identity. Its main targeted use is to allow creating tokens for use by Consul agents that will grant the necessary permissions for all the typical agent operations (node registration, coordinate updates, anti-entropy).
Half of this commit is for golden file based tests of the acl token and role cli output. Another big updates was to refactor many of the tests in agent/consul/acl_endpoint_test.go to use the same style of tests and the same helpers. Besides being less boiler plate in the tests it also uses a common way of starting a test server with ACLs that should operate without any warnings regarding deprecated non-uuid master tokens etc.
Currently opaque config blocks (config entries, and CA provider config) are
modified by PatchSliceOfMaps, making it impossible for these opaque
config sections to contain slices of maps.
In order to fix this problem, any lazy-decoding of these blocks needs to support
weak decoding of []map[string]interface{} to a struct type before
PatchSliceOfMaps is replaces. This is necessary because these config
blobs are persisted, and during an upgrade an older version of Consul
could read one of the new configuration values, which would cause an error.
To support the upgrade path, this commit first introduces the new hooks
for weak decoding of []map[string]interface{} and uses them only in the
lazy-decode paths. That way, in a future release, new style
configuration will be supported by the older version of Consul.
This decode hook has a number of advantages:
1. It no longer panics. It allows mapstructure to report the error
2. It no longer requires the user to declare which fields are slices of
structs. It can deduce that information from the 'to' value.
3. It will make it possible to preserve opaque configuration, allowing
for structured opaque config.
* Fixes#5606: Tokens converted from legacy ACLs get their Hash computed
This allows new style token replication to work for legacy tokens as well when they change.
* tests: fix timestamp comparison
Co-authored-by: Matt Keeler <mjkeeler7@gmail.com>
Found using staticcheck.
binary.Write does not accept int types without a size. The error from binary.Write was ignored, so we never saw this error. Casting the data to uint64 produces a correct hash.
Also deprecate the Default{Addr,Port} fields, and prevent them from being encoded. These fields will always be empty and are not used.
Removing these would break backwards compatibility, so they are left in place for now.
Co-authored-by: Hans Hasselberg <me@hans.io>
* testing: replace most goe/verify.Values with require.Equal
One difference between these two comparisons is that go/verify considers
nil slices/maps to be equal to empty slices/maps, where as testify/require
does not, and does not appear to provide any way to enable that behaviour.
Because of this difference some expected values were changed from empty
slices to nil slices, and some calls to verify.Values were left.
* Remove github.com/pascaldekloe/goe/verify
Reduce the number of assertion packages we use from 2 to 1
Three of the checks are temporarily disabled to limit the size of the
diff, and allow us to enable all the other checks in CI.
In a follow up we can fix the issues reported by the other checks one
at a time, and enable them.
go test will only run tests in parallel within a single package. In this case the package test run time is exactly the same with or without t.Parallel() (~0.7s).
In generally we should avoid t.Parallel() as it causes a number of problems with `go test` not reporting failure messages correctly. I encountered one of these problems, which is what prompted this change. Since `t.Parallel` is not providing any benefit in this package, this commit removes it.
The change was automated with:
git grep -l 't.Parallel' | xargs sed -i -e '/t.Parallel/d'
We can only allow host names that are valid domain names because we put
these hosts into a DNSSAN. In addition, we validate that the wildcard
specifier '*' is only present as the leftmost label to allow for a
wildcard DNSSAN and associated wildcard Host routing in the ingress
gateway proxy.
- Validate that this cannot be set on a 'tcp' listener nor on a wildcard
service.
- Add Hosts field to api and test in consul config write CLI
- xds: Configure envoy with user-provided hosts from ingress gateways
This commit adds the necessary changes to allow an ingress gateway to
route traffic from a single defined port to multiple different upstream
services in the Consul mesh.
To do this, we now require all HTTP requests coming into the ingress
gateway to specify a Host header that matches "<service-name>.*" in
order to correctly route traffic to the correct service.
- Differentiate multiple listener's route names by port
- Adds a case in xds for allowing default discovery chains to create a
route configuration when on an ingress gateway. This allows default
services to easily use host header routing
- ingress-gateways have a single route config for each listener
that utilizes domain matching to route to different services.
This makes it so that both OSS and enterprise tests pass correctly
In the api tests, explicitly set namespace to empty string so that tests
can be shared.
* Implements a simple, tcp ingress gateway workflow
This adds a new type of gateway for allowing Ingress traffic into Connect from external services.
Co-authored-by: Chris Piraino <cpiraino@hashicorp.com>
The Init method provided the same functionality as the New constructor.
The constructor is both more widely used, and more idiomatic, so remove
the Init method.
This change is in preparation for fixing printing of these IDs.
* Enable filtering language support for the v1/connect/intentions listing API
* Update website for filtering of Intentions
* Update website/source/api/connect/intentions.html.md
This config entry will be used to configure terminating gateways.
It accepts the name of the gateway and a list of services the gateway will represent.
For each service users will be able to specify: its name, namespace, and additional options for TLS origination.
Co-authored-by: Kyle Havlovitz <kylehav@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Chris Piraino <cpiraino@hashicorp.com>
* Add Ingress gateway config entry and other relevant structs
* Add api package tests for ingress gateways
* Embed EnterpriseMeta into ingress service struct
* Add namespace fields to api module and test consul config write decoding
* Don't require a port for ingress gateways
* Add snakeJSON and camelJSON cases in command test
* Run Normalize on service's ent metadata
Sadly cannot think of a way to test this in OSS.
* Every protocol requires at least 1 service
* Validate ingress protocols
* Update agent/structs/config_entry_gateways.go
Co-authored-by: Chris Piraino <cpiraino@hashicorp.com>
Co-authored-by: Freddy <freddygv@users.noreply.github.com>
This is like a Möbius strip of code due to the fact that low-level components (serf/memberlist) are connected to high-level components (the catalog and mesh-gateways) in a twisty maze of references which make it hard to dive into. With that in mind here's a high level summary of what you'll find in the patch:
There are several distinct chunks of code that are affected:
* new flags and config options for the server
* retry join WAN is slightly different
* retry join code is shared to discover primary mesh gateways from secondary datacenters
* because retry join logic runs in the *agent* and the results of that
operation for primary mesh gateways are needed in the *server* there are
some methods like `RefreshPrimaryGatewayFallbackAddresses` that must occur
at multiple layers of abstraction just to pass the data down to the right
layer.
* new cache type `FederationStateListMeshGatewaysName` for use in `proxycfg/xds` layers
* the function signature for RPC dialing picked up a new required field (the
node name of the destination)
* several new RPCs for manipulating a FederationState object:
`FederationState:{Apply,Get,List,ListMeshGateways}`
* 3 read-only internal APIs for debugging use to invoke those RPCs from curl
* raft and fsm changes to persist these FederationStates
* replication for FederationStates as they are canonically stored in the
Primary and replicated to the Secondaries.
* a special derivative of anti-entropy that runs in secondaries to snapshot
their local mesh gateway `CheckServiceNodes` and sync them into their upstream
FederationState in the primary (this works in conjunction with the
replication to distribute addresses for all mesh gateways in all DCs to all
other DCs)
* a "gateway locator" convenience object to make use of this data to choose
the addresses of gateways to use for any given RPC or gossip operation to a
remote DC. This gets data from the "retry join" logic in the agent and also
directly calls into the FSM.
* RPC (`:8300`) on the server sniffs the first byte of a new connection to
determine if it's actually doing native TLS. If so it checks the ALPN header
for protocol determination (just like how the existing system uses the
type-byte marker).
* 2 new kinds of protocols are exclusively decoded via this native TLS
mechanism: one for ferrying "packet" operations (udp-like) from the gossip
layer and one for "stream" operations (tcp-like). The packet operations
re-use sockets (using length-prefixing) to cut down on TLS re-negotiation
overhead.
* the server instances specially wrap the `memberlist.NetTransport` when running
with gateway federation enabled (in a `wanfed.Transport`). The general gist is
that if it tries to dial a node in the SAME datacenter (deduced by looking
at the suffix of the node name) there is no change. If dialing a DIFFERENT
datacenter it is wrapped up in a TLS+ALPN blob and sent through some mesh
gateways to eventually end up in a server's :8300 port.
* a new flag when launching a mesh gateway via `consul connect envoy` to
indicate that the servers are to be exposed. This sets a special service
meta when registering the gateway into the catalog.
* `proxycfg/xds` notice this metadata blob to activate additional watches for
the FederationState objects as well as the location of all of the consul
servers in that datacenter.
* `xds:` if the extra metadata is in place additional clusters are defined in a
DC to bulk sink all traffic to another DC's gateways. For the current
datacenter we listen on a wildcard name (`server.<dc>.consul`) that load
balances all servers as well as one mini-cluster per node
(`<node>.server.<dc>.consul`)
* the `consul tls cert create` command got a new flag (`-node`) to help create
an additional SAN in certs that can be used with this flavor of federation.
We set RawToString=true so that []uint8 => string when decoding an interface{}.
We set the MapType so that map[interface{}]interface{} decodes to map[string]interface{}.
Add tests to ensure that this doesn't break existing usages.
Fixes#7223
* Updates to the Txn API for namespaces
* Update agent/consul/txn_endpoint.go
Co-Authored-By: R.B. Boyer <rb@hashicorp.com>
Co-authored-by: R.B. Boyer <public@richardboyer.net>
Currently when using the built-in CA provider for Connect, root certificates are valid for 10 years, however secondary DCs get intermediates that are valid for only 1 year. There is no mechanism currently short of rotating the root in the primary that will cause the secondary DCs to renew their intermediates.
This PR adds a check that renews the cert if it is half way through its validity period.
In order to be able to test these changes, a new configuration option was added: IntermediateCertTTL which is set extremely low in the tests.
freddygv