Commit Graph

68 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Matt Keeler baa89c7c65
Intentions ACL enforcement updates (#7028)
* Renamed structs.IntentionWildcard to structs.WildcardSpecifier

* Refactor ACL Config

Get rid of remnants of enterprise only renaming.

Add a WildcardName field for specifying what string should be used to indicate a wildcard.

* Add wildcard support in the ACL package

For read operations they can call anyAllowed to determine if any read access to the given resource would be granted.

For write operations they can call allAllowed to ensure that write access is granted to everything.

* Make v1/agent/connect/authorize namespace aware

* Update intention ACL enforcement

This also changes how intention:read is granted. Before the Intention.List RPC would allow viewing an intention if the token had intention:read on the destination. However Intention.Match allowed viewing if access was allowed for either the source or dest side. Now Intention.List and Intention.Get fall in line with Intention.Matches previous behavior.

Due to this being done a few different places ACL enforcement for a singular intention is now done with the CanRead and CanWrite methods on the intention itself.

* Refactor Intention.Apply to make things easier to follow.
2020-01-13 15:51:40 -05:00
R.B. Boyer 446f0533cd connect: ensure that updates to the secondary root CA configuration use the correct signing key ID values for comparison (#7012)
Fixes #6886
2020-01-09 16:28:16 +01:00
Matt Keeler f30af37d11
Fix the TestLeader_SecondaryCA_IntermediateRefresh test flakiness 2019-12-04 19:19:55 -05:00
Paul Banks ca96d5fa72
connect: Allow CA Providers to store small amount of state (#6751)
* pass logger through to provider

* test for proper operation of NeedsLogger

* remove public testServer function

* Ooops actually set the logger in all the places we need it - CA config set wasn't and causing segfault

* Fix all the other places in tests where we set the logger

* Allow CA Providers to persist some state

* Update CA provider plugin interface

* Fix plugin stubs to match provider changes

* Update agent/connect/ca/provider.go

Co-Authored-By: R.B. Boyer <rb@hashicorp.com>

* Cleanup review comments
2019-11-11 20:57:16 +00:00
Paul Banks 5f405c3277
Fix support for RSA CA keys in Connect. (#6638)
* Allow RSA CA certs for consul and vault providers to correctly sign EC leaf certs.

* Ensure key type ad bits are populated from CA cert and clean up tests

* Add integration test and fix error when initializing secondary CA with RSA key.

* Add more tests, fix review feedback

* Update docs with key type config and output

* Apply suggestions from code review

Co-Authored-By: R.B. Boyer <rb@hashicorp.com>
2019-11-01 13:20:26 +00:00
R.B. Boyer bc22eb8090
unflake TestLeader_SecondaryCA_Initialize (#6631) 2019-10-16 16:49:01 -05:00
R.B. Boyer a4c5b8e85c
appease the retry linter (#6629) 2019-10-16 11:39:22 -05:00
Paul Banks 979ad7fecb
Allow time for secondary CA to initialize (#6627) 2019-10-16 17:03:31 +01:00
R.B. Boyer 8433ef02a8
connect: connect CA Roots in secondary datacenters should use a SigningKeyID derived from their local intermediate (#6513)
This fixes an issue where leaf certificates issued in secondary
datacenters would be reissued very frequently (every ~20 seconds)
because the logic meant to detect root rotation was errantly triggering
because a hash of the ultimate root (in the primary) was being compared
against a hash of the local intermediate root (in the secondary) and
always failing.
2019-09-26 11:54:14 -05:00
R.B. Boyer cc889443a5
connect: don't colon-hex-encode the AuthorityKeyId and SubjectKeyId fields in connect certs (#6492)
The fields in the certs are meant to hold the original binary
representation of this data, not some ascii-encoded version.

The only time we should be colon-hex-encoding fields is for display
purposes or marshaling through non-TLS mediums (like RPC).
2019-09-23 12:52:35 -05:00
Matt Keeler 31d9d2e557
Store primaries root in secondary after intermediate signature (#6333)
* Store primaries root in secondary after intermediate signature

This ensures that the intermediate exists within the CA root stored in raft and not just in the CA provider state. This has the very nice benefit of actually outputting the intermediate cert within the ca roots HTTP/RPC endpoints.

This change means that if signing the intermediate fails it will not set the root within raft. So far I have not come up with a reason why that is bad. The secondary CA roots watch will pull the root again and go through all the motions. So as soon as getting an intermediate CA works the root will get set.

* Make TestAgentAntiEntropy_Check_DeferSync less flaky

I am not sure this is the full fix but it seems to help for me.
2019-08-30 11:38:46 -04:00
Alvin Huang e4e9381851
revert commits on master (#6413) 2019-08-27 17:45:58 -04:00
tradel 2838a1550a update tests to match new method signatures 2019-08-27 14:16:39 -07:00
Matt Keeler 89ac998e8b
Secondary CA `establishLeadership` fix (#6383)
This prevents ACL issues (or other issues) during intermediate CA cert signing from failing leader establishment.
2019-08-23 11:32:37 -04:00
R.B. Boyer 357ca39868
connect: ensure intention replication continues to work when the replication ACL token changes (#6288) 2019-08-07 11:34:09 -05:00
Matt Keeler a7c4b7af7c
Fix CA Replication when ACLs are enabled (#6201)
Secondary CA initialization steps are:

• Wait until the primary will be capable of signing intermediate certs. We use serf metadata to check the versions of servers in the primary which avoids needing a token like the previous implementation that used RPCs. We require at least one alive server in the primary and the all alive servers meet the version requirement.
• Initialize the secondary CA by getting the primary to sign an intermediate

When a primary dc is configured, if no existing CA is initialized and for whatever reason we cannot initialize a secondary CA the secondary DC will remain without a CA. As soon as it can it will initialize the secondary CA by pulling the primaries roots and getting the primary to sign an intermediate.

This also fixes a segfault that can happen during leadership revocation. There was a spot in the secondaryCARootsWatch that was getting the CA Provider and executing methods on it without nil checking. Under normal circumstances it wont be nil but during leadership revocation it gets nil'ed out. Therefore there is a period of time between closing the stop chan and when the go routine is actually stopped where it could read a nil provider and cause a segfault.
2019-07-26 15:57:57 -04:00
Matt Keeler 39bb0e3e77 Implement Mesh Gateways
This includes both ingress and egress functionality.
2019-07-01 16:28:30 -04:00
Matt Keeler 0fc4da6861 Implement intention replication and secondary CA initialization 2019-07-01 16:28:30 -04:00