Extend Consul’s intentions model to allow for request-based access control enforcement for HTTP-like protocols in addition to the existing connection-based enforcement for unspecified protocols (e.g. tcp).
- Upgrade the ConfigEntry.ListAll RPC to be kind-aware so that older
copies of consul will not see new config entries it doesn't understand
replicate down.
- Add shim conversion code so that the old API/CLI method of interacting
with intentions will continue to work so long as none of these are
edited via config entry endpoints. Almost all of the read-only APIs will
continue to function indefinitely.
- Add new APIs that operate on individual intentions without IDs so that
the UI doesn't need to implement CAS operations.
- Add a new serf feature flag indicating support for
intentions-as-config-entries.
- The old line-item intentions way of interacting with the state store
will transparently flip between the legacy memdb table and the config
entry representations so that readers will never see a hiccup during
migration where the results are incomplete. It uses a piece of system
metadata to control the flip.
- The primary datacenter will begin migrating intentions into config
entries on startup once all servers in the datacenter are on a version
of Consul with the intentions-as-config-entries feature flag. When it is
complete the old state store representations will be cleared. We also
record a piece of system metadata indicating this has occurred. We use
this metadata to skip ALL of this code the next time the leader starts
up.
- The secondary datacenters continue to run the old intentions
replicator until all servers in the secondary DC and primary DC support
intentions-as-config-entries (via serf flag). Once this condition it met
the old intentions replicator ceases.
- The secondary datacenters replicate the new config entries as they are
migrated in the primary. When they detect that the primary has zeroed
it's old state store table it waits until all config entries up to that
point are replicated and then zeroes its own copy of the old state store
table. We also record a piece of system metadata indicating this has
occurred. We use this metadata to skip ALL of this code the next time
the leader starts up.
Whenever an upsert/deletion of a config entry happens, within the open
state store transaction we speculatively test compile all discovery
chains that may be affected by the pending modification to verify that
the write would not create an erroneous scenario (such as splitting
traffic to a subset that did not exist).
If a single discovery chain evaluation references two config entries
with the same kind and name in different namespaces then sometimes the
upsert/deletion would be falsely rejected. It does not appear as though
this bug would've let invalid writes through to the state store so the
correction does not require a cleanup phase.
Fixes#8466
Since Consul 1.8.0 there was a bug in how ingress gateway protocol
compatibility was enforced. At the point in time that an ingress-gateway
config entry was modified the discovery chain for each upstream was
checked to ensure the ingress gateway protocol matched. Unfortunately
future modifications of other config entries were not validated against
existing ingress-gateway definitions, such as:
1. create tcp ingress-gateway pointing to 'api' (ok)
2. create service-defaults for 'api' setting protocol=http (worked, but not ok)
3. create service-splitter or service-router for 'api' (worked, but caused an agent panic)
If you were to do these in a different order, it would fail without a
crash:
1. create service-defaults for 'api' setting protocol=http (ok)
2. create service-splitter or service-router for 'api' (ok)
3. create tcp ingress-gateway pointing to 'api' (fail with message about
protocol mismatch)
This PR introduces the missing validation. The two new behaviors are:
1. create tcp ingress-gateway pointing to 'api' (ok)
2. (NEW) create service-defaults for 'api' setting protocol=http ("ok" for back compat)
3. (NEW) create service-splitter or service-router for 'api' (fail with
message about protocol mismatch)
In consideration for any existing users that may be inadvertently be
falling into item (2) above, that is now officiall a valid configuration
to be in. For anyone falling into item (3) above while you cannot use
the API to manufacture that scenario anymore, anyone that has old (now
bad) data will still be able to have the agent use them just enough to
generate a new agent/proxycfg error message rather than a panic.
Unfortunately we just don't have enough information to properly fix the
config entries.
This change was mostly automated with the following
First generate a list of functions with:
git grep -o 'Store) \([^(]\+\)(tx \*txn' ./agent/consul/state | awk '{print $2}' | grep -o '^[^(]\+'
Then the list was curated a bit with trial/error to remove and add funcs
as necessary.
Finally the replacement was done with:
dir=agent/consul/state
file=${1-funcnames}
while read fn; do
echo "$fn"
sed -i -e "s/(s \*Store) $fn(/$fn(/" $dir/*.go
sed -i -e "s/s\.$fn(/$fn(/" $dir/*.go
sed -i -e "s/s\.store\.$fn(/$fn(/" $dir/*.go
done < $file
We require any non-wildcard services to match the protocol defined in
the listener on write, so that we can maintain a consistent experience
through ingress gateways. This also helps guard against accidental
misconfiguration by a user.
- Update tests that require an updated protocol for ingress gateways
This now requires some type of protocol setting in ingress gateway tests
to ensure the services are not filtered out.
- small refactor to add a max(x, y) function
- Use internal configEntryTxn function and add MaxUint64 to lib
* Implements a simple, tcp ingress gateway workflow
This adds a new type of gateway for allowing Ingress traffic into Connect from external services.
Co-authored-by: Chris Piraino <cpiraino@hashicorp.com>
This config entry will be used to configure terminating gateways.
It accepts the name of the gateway and a list of services the gateway will represent.
For each service users will be able to specify: its name, namespace, and additional options for TLS origination.
Co-authored-by: Kyle Havlovitz <kylehav@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Chris Piraino <cpiraino@hashicorp.com>
* Add Ingress gateway config entry and other relevant structs
* Add api package tests for ingress gateways
* Embed EnterpriseMeta into ingress service struct
* Add namespace fields to api module and test consul config write decoding
* Don't require a port for ingress gateways
* Add snakeJSON and camelJSON cases in command test
* Run Normalize on service's ent metadata
Sadly cannot think of a way to test this in OSS.
* Every protocol requires at least 1 service
* Validate ingress protocols
* Update agent/structs/config_entry_gateways.go
Co-authored-by: Chris Piraino <cpiraino@hashicorp.com>
Co-authored-by: Freddy <freddygv@users.noreply.github.com>
Previously this happened to be validating only the chains in the default namespace. Now it will validate all chains in all namespaces when the global proxy-defaults is changed.
Failover is pushed entirely down to the data plane by creating envoy
clusters and putting each successive destination in a different load
assignment priority band. For example this shows that normally requests
go to 1.2.3.4:8080 but when that fails they go to 6.7.8.9:8080:
- name: foo
load_assignment:
cluster_name: foo
policy:
overprovisioning_factor: 100000
endpoints:
- priority: 0
lb_endpoints:
- endpoint:
address:
socket_address:
address: 1.2.3.4
port_value: 8080
- priority: 1
lb_endpoints:
- endpoint:
address:
socket_address:
address: 6.7.8.9
port_value: 8080
Mesh gateways route requests based solely on the SNI header tacked onto
the TLS layer. Envoy currently only lets you configure the outbound SNI
header at the cluster layer.
If you try to failover through a mesh gateway you ideally would
configure the SNI value per endpoint, but that's not possible in envoy
today.
This PR introduces a simpler way around the problem for now:
1. We identify any target of failover that will use mesh gateway mode local or
remote and then further isolate any resolver node in the compiled discovery
chain that has a failover destination set to one of those targets.
2. For each of these resolvers we will perform a small measurement of
comparative healths of the endpoints that come back from the health API for the
set of primary target and serial failover targets. We walk the list of targets
in order and if any endpoint is healthy we return that target, otherwise we
move on to the next target.
3. The CDS and EDS endpoints both perform the measurements in (2) for the
affected resolver nodes.
4. For CDS this measurement selects which TLS SNI field to use for the cluster
(note the cluster is always going to be named for the primary target)
5. For EDS this measurement selects which set of endpoints will populate the
cluster. Priority tiered failover is ignored.
One of the big downsides to this approach to failover is that the failover
detection and correction is going to be controlled by consul rather than
deferring that entirely to the data plane as with the prior version. This also
means that we are bound to only failover using official health signals and
cannot make use of data plane signals like outlier detection to affect
failover.
In this specific scenario the lack of data plane signals is ok because the
effectiveness is already muted by the fact that the ultimate destination
endpoints will have their data plane signals scrambled when they pass through
the mesh gateway wrapper anyway so we're not losing much.
Another related fix is that we now use the endpoint health from the
underlying service, not the health of the gateway (regardless of
failover mode).
Freddy