Many places in consul already treated node names case insensitively.
The state store indexes already do it, but there are a few places that
did a direct byte comparison which have now been corrected.
One place of particular consideration is ensureCheckIfNodeMatches
which is executed during snapshot restore (among other places). If a
node check used a slightly different casing than the casing of the node
during register then the snapshot restore here would deterministically
fail. This has been fixed.
Primary approach:
git grep -i "node.*[!=]=.*node" -- ':!*_test.go' ':!docs'
git grep -i '\[[^]]*member[^]]*\]
git grep -i '\[[^]]*\(member\|name\|node\)[^]]*\]' -- ':!*_test.go' ':!website' ':!ui' ':!agent/proxycfg/testing.go:' ':!*.md'
We no long need to read the acl serf tag, because servers are always either ACL enabled or
ACL disabled.
We continue to write the tag so that during an upgarde older servers will see the tag.
This is a collection of refactors that make upcoming PRs easier to digest.
The main change is the introduction of the authmethod.Identity struct.
In the one and only current auth method (type=kubernetes) all of the
trusted identity attributes are both selectable and projectable, so they
were just passed around as a map[string]string.
When namespaces were added, this was slightly changed so that the
enterprise metadata can also come back from the login operation, so
login now returned two fields.
Now with some upcoming auth methods it won't be true that all identity
attributes will be both selectable and projectable, so rather than
update the login function to return 3 pieces of data it seemed worth it
to wrap those fields up and give them a proper name.
Also reduce the log level of some version checking messages on the server as they can be pretty noisy during upgrades and really are more for debugging purposes.
Secondary CA initialization steps are:
• Wait until the primary will be capable of signing intermediate certs. We use serf metadata to check the versions of servers in the primary which avoids needing a token like the previous implementation that used RPCs. We require at least one alive server in the primary and the all alive servers meet the version requirement.
• Initialize the secondary CA by getting the primary to sign an intermediate
When a primary dc is configured, if no existing CA is initialized and for whatever reason we cannot initialize a secondary CA the secondary DC will remain without a CA. As soon as it can it will initialize the secondary CA by pulling the primaries roots and getting the primary to sign an intermediate.
This also fixes a segfault that can happen during leadership revocation. There was a spot in the secondaryCARootsWatch that was getting the CA Provider and executing methods on it without nil checking. Under normal circumstances it wont be nil but during leadership revocation it gets nil'ed out. Therefore there is a period of time between closing the stop chan and when the go routine is actually stopped where it could read a nil provider and cause a segfault.
* Add leader token upgrade test and fix various ACL enablement bugs
* Update the leader ACL initialization tests.
* Add a StateStore ACL tests for ACLTokenSet and ACLTokenGetBy* functions
* Advertise the agents acl support status with the agent/self endpoint.
* Make batch token upsert CAS’able to prevent consistency issues with token auto-upgrade
* Finish up the ACL state store token tests
* Finish the ACL state store unit tests
Also rename some things to make them more consistent.
* Do as much ACL replication testing as I can.
This PR is almost a complete rewrite of the ACL system within Consul. It brings the features more in line with other HashiCorp products. Obviously there is quite a bit left to do here but most of it is related docs, testing and finishing the last few commands in the CLI. I will update the PR description and check off the todos as I finish them over the next few days/week.
Description
At a high level this PR is mainly to split ACL tokens from Policies and to split the concepts of Authorization from Identities. A lot of this PR is mostly just to support CRUD operations on ACLTokens and ACLPolicies. These in and of themselves are not particularly interesting. The bigger conceptual changes are in how tokens get resolved, how backwards compatibility is handled and the separation of policy from identity which could lead the way to allowing for alternative identity providers.
On the surface and with a new cluster the ACL system will look very similar to that of Nomads. Both have tokens and policies. Both have local tokens. The ACL management APIs for both are very similar. I even ripped off Nomad's ACL bootstrap resetting procedure. There are a few key differences though.
Nomad requires token and policy replication where Consul only requires policy replication with token replication being opt-in. In Consul local tokens only work with token replication being enabled though.
All policies in Nomad are globally applicable. In Consul all policies are stored and replicated globally but can be scoped to a subset of the datacenters. This allows for more granular access management.
Unlike Nomad, Consul has legacy baggage in the form of the original ACL system. The ramifications of this are:
A server running the new system must still support other clients using the legacy system.
A client running the new system must be able to use the legacy RPCs when the servers in its datacenter are running the legacy system.
The primary ACL DC's servers running in legacy mode needs to be a gate that keeps everything else in the entire multi-DC cluster running in legacy mode.
So not only does this PR implement the new ACL system but has a legacy mode built in for when the cluster isn't ready for new ACLs. Also detecting that new ACLs can be used is automatic and requires no configuration on the part of administrators. This process is detailed more in the "Transitioning from Legacy to New ACL Mode" section below.
R.B. Boyer