Merge pull request #664 from ryanbreen/master
Grammatical cleanups to doc/agent/encryption
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@ -3,31 +3,31 @@ layout: "docs"
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page_title: "Encryption"
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sidebar_current: "docs-agent-encryption"
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description: |-
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The Consul agent supports encrypting all of its network traffic. The exact method of this encryption is described on the encryption internals page. There are two separate systems, one for gossip traffic and one for RPC.
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The Consul agent supports encrypting all of its network traffic. The exact method of encryption is described on the encryption internals page. There are two separate encryption systems, one for gossip traffic and one for RPC.
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---
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# Encryption
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The Consul agent supports encrypting all of its network traffic. The exact
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method of this encryption is described on the
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[encryption internals page](/docs/internals/security.html). There are two
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separate systems, one for gossip traffic and one for RPC.
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method of encryption is described on the [encryption internals page](/docs/internals/security.html).
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There are two separate encryption systems, one for gossip traffic and one for RPC.
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## Gossip Encryption
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Enabling gossip encryption only requires that you set an encryption key when
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starting the Consul agent. The key can be set by setting the `encrypt` parameter
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in a configuration file for the agent. The key must be 16-bytes that are base64
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encoded. The easiest method to obtain a cryptographically suitable key is by
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using `consul keygen`.
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starting the Consul agent. The key can be set via the `encrypt` parameter: the
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value of this setting is a configuration file containing the encryption key.
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The key must be 16-bytes, Base64 encoded. As a convenience, Consul provides the
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`consul keygen` commmand to generate a cryptographically suitable key:
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```text
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$ consul keygen
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cg8StVXbQJ0gPvMd9o7yrg==
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```
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With that key, you can enable encryption on the agent. You can verify
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encryption is enabled because the output will include "Encrypted: true".
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With that key, you can enable encryption on the agent. If encryption is enabled,
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the output of `consul agent` will include "Encrypted: true":
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```text
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$ cat encrypt.json
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@ -53,28 +53,27 @@ order to send and receive cluster information.
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# RPC Encryption with TLS
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Consul supports using TLS to verify the authenticity of servers and clients. For this
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to work, Consul requires that all clients and servers have key pairs that are generated
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by a single Certificate Authority. This can be a private CA, used only internally. The
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CA then signs keys for each of the agents. [Here](https://langui.sh/2009/01/18/openssl-self-signed-ca/)
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is a tutorial on generating both a CA and signing keys using OpenSSL. Client certificates
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must have extended key usage enabled for client and server authentication.
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Consul supports using TLS to verify the authenticity of servers and clients. To enable this,
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Consul requires that all clients and servers have key pairs that are generated by a single
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Certificate Authority. This can be a private CA, used only internally. The
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CA then signs keys for each of the agents, as in
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[this tutorial on generating both a CA and signing keys](https://langui.sh/2009/01/18/openssl-self-signed-ca/)
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using OpenSSL. Note: client certificates must have
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[Extended Key Usage](https://www.openssl.org/docs/apps/x509v3_config.html#extended_key_usage_) enabled
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for client and server authentication.
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There are a number of things to consider when setting up TLS for Consul. Either we can
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use TLS just to verify the authenticity of the servers, or we can also verify the authenticity
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of clients. The former can be used to prevent unauthorized access. This behavior is controlled
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using either the `verify_incoming` and `verify_outgoing` [options](/docs/agent/options.html).
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TLS can be used to verify the authenticity of the servers or verify the authenticity of clients.
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These modes are controlled by the `verify_outgoing` and `verify_incoming` [options](/docs/agent/options.html),
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respectively.
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If `verify_outgoing` is set, then agents verify the authenticity of Consuls for outgoing
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connections. This means server nodes must present a certificate signed by the `ca_file` that
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the agent has. This option must be set on all agents, and there must be a `ca_file` provided
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to check the certificate against. If this is set, then all server nodes must have an appropriate
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key pair set using `cert_file` and `key_file`.
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If `verify_outgoing` is set, agents verify the authenticity of Consul for outgoing
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connections. Server nodes must present a certificate signed by the certificate authority
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present on all agents, set via the agent's `ca_file` option. All server nodes must have an
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appropriate key pair set using `cert_file` and `key_file`.
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If `verify_incoming` is set, then the servers verify the authenticity of all incoming
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connections. Servers will also disallow any non-TLS connections. If this is set, then all
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clients must have a valid key pair set using `cert_file` and `key_file`. To force clients to
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use TLS, `verify_outgoing` must also be set.
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If `verify_incoming` is set, the servers verify the authenticity of all incoming
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connections. All clients must have a valid key pair set using `cert_file` and `key_file`. Servers will
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also disallow any non-TLS connections. To force clients to use TLS, `verify_outgoing` must also be set.
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TLS is used to secure the RPC calls between agents, but gossip between nodes is done over UDP
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and is secured using a symmetric key. See above for enabling gossip encryption.
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