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update ACLs for cluster peering (#15317) 

* update ACLs for cluster peering

* add changelog

* Update .changelog/15317.txt

Co-authored-by: Eric Haberkorn <erichaberkorn@gmail.com>

Co-authored-by: Eric Haberkorn <erichaberkorn@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
malizz 2022-11-09 13:02:58 -08:00 committed by GitHub
parent 656df780ee
commit 8d2ed1999d
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GPG Key ID: 4AEE18F83AFDEB23
7 changed files with 244 additions and 73 deletions
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3
.changelog/15317.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
```release-note:improvements
acl: Allow reading imported services and nodes from cluster peers with read all permissions
```

4
acl/acl.go
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@ -20,6 +20,10 @@ type ExportFetcher interface {
}
type ExportedServices struct {
// Data is a map of [namespace] -> [service] -> [list of partitions the service is exported to]
// This includes both the names of typical service instances and their corresponding sidecar proxy
// instance names. Meaning that if "web" is exported, "web-sidecar-proxy" instances will also be
// shown as exported.
Data map[string]map[string][]string
}

2
agent/consul/prepared_query_endpoint_test.go
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@ -1578,7 +1578,7 @@ func TestPreparedQuery_Execute(t *testing.T) {
execNoNodesToken := createTokenWithPolicyName(t, codec1, "no-nodes", `service_prefix "foo" { policy = "read" }`, "root")
rules := `
service_prefix "foo" { policy = "read" }
service_prefix "" { policy = "read" }
node_prefix "" { policy = "read" }
`
execToken := createTokenWithPolicyName(t, codec1, "with-read", rules, "root")

7
agent/structs/aclfilter/filter.go
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@ -142,6 +142,9 @@ func (f *Filter) Filter(subject any) {
if f.filterGatewayServices(&v.Gateways) {
v.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = true
}
if f.filterCheckServiceNodes(&v.ImportedNodes) {
v.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs = true
}
default:
panic(fmt.Errorf("Unhandled type passed to ACL filter: %T %#v", subject, subject))
@ -319,13 +322,11 @@ func (f *Filter) filterNodeServiceList(services *structs.NodeServiceList) bool {
// true if any elements were removed.
func (f *Filter) filterCheckServiceNodes(nodes *structs.CheckServiceNodes) bool {
csn := *nodes
var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext
var removed bool
for i := 0; i < len(csn); i++ {
node := csn[i]
node.Service.FillAuthzContext(&authzContext)
if f.allowNode(node.Node.Node, &authzContext) && f.allowService(node.Service.Service, &authzContext) {
if node.CanRead(f.authorizer) == acl.Allow {
continue
}
f.logger.Debug("dropping node from result due to ACLs", "node", structs.NodeNameString(node.Node.Node, node.Node.GetEnterpriseMeta()))

211
agent/structs/aclfilter/filter_test.go
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@ -1107,12 +1107,51 @@ func TestACL_filterIndexedNodesWithGateways(t *testing.T) {
{Service: structs.ServiceNameFromString("foo")},
{Service: structs.ServiceNameFromString("bar")},
},
ImportedNodes: structs.CheckServiceNodes{
{
Node: &structs.Node{
Node: "imported-node",
PeerName: "cluster-02",
},
Service: &structs.NodeService{
ID: "zip",
Service: "zip",
PeerName: "cluster-02",
},
Checks: structs.HealthChecks{
{
Node: "node1",
CheckID: "check1",
ServiceName: "zip",
PeerName: "cluster-02",
},
},
},
},
}
}
t.Run("allowed", func(t *testing.T) {
type testCase struct {
authzFn func() acl.Authorizer
expect *structs.IndexedNodesWithGateways
}
run := func(t *testing.T, tc testCase) {
authz := tc.authzFn()
list := makeList()
New(authz, logger).Filter(list)
require.Equal(t, tc.expect, list)
}
tt := map[string]testCase{
"not filtered": {
authzFn: func() acl.Authorizer {
policy, err := acl.NewPolicyFromSource(`
service "baz" {
policy = "write"
}
service "foo" {
policy = "read"
}
@ -1127,17 +1166,58 @@ func TestACL_filterIndexedNodesWithGateways(t *testing.T) {
authz, err := acl.NewPolicyAuthorizerWithDefaults(acl.DenyAll(), []*acl.Policy{policy}, nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
list := makeList()
New(authz, logger).Filter(list)
require.Len(t, list.Nodes, 1)
require.Len(t, list.Gateways, 2)
require.False(t, list.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs, "ResultsFilteredByACLs should be false")
})
t.Run("not allowed to read the node", func(t *testing.T) {
return authz
},
expect: &structs.IndexedNodesWithGateways{
Nodes: structs.CheckServiceNodes{
{
Node: &structs.Node{
Node: "node1",
},
Service: &structs.NodeService{
ID: "foo",
Service: "foo",
},
Checks: structs.HealthChecks{
{
Node: "node1",
CheckID: "check1",
ServiceName: "foo",
},
},
},
},
Gateways: structs.GatewayServices{
{Service: structs.ServiceNameFromString("foo")},
{Service: structs.ServiceNameFromString("bar")},
},
// Service write to "bar" allows reading all imported services
ImportedNodes: structs.CheckServiceNodes{
{
Node: &structs.Node{
Node: "imported-node",
PeerName: "cluster-02",
},
Service: &structs.NodeService{
ID: "zip",
Service: "zip",
PeerName: "cluster-02",
},
Checks: structs.HealthChecks{
{
Node: "node1",
CheckID: "check1",
ServiceName: "zip",
PeerName: "cluster-02",
},
},
},
},
QueryMeta: structs.QueryMeta{ResultsFilteredByACLs: false},
},
},
"not allowed to read the node": {
authzFn: func() acl.Authorizer {
policy, err := acl.NewPolicyFromSource(`
service "foo" {
policy = "read"
@ -1150,17 +1230,20 @@ func TestACL_filterIndexedNodesWithGateways(t *testing.T) {
authz, err := acl.NewPolicyAuthorizerWithDefaults(acl.DenyAll(), []*acl.Policy{policy}, nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
list := makeList()
New(authz, logger).Filter(list)
require.Empty(t, list.Nodes)
require.Len(t, list.Gateways, 2)
require.True(t, list.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs, "ResultsFilteredByACLs should be true")
})
t.Run("allowed to read the node, but not the service", func(t *testing.T) {
return authz
},
expect: &structs.IndexedNodesWithGateways{
Nodes: structs.CheckServiceNodes{},
Gateways: structs.GatewayServices{
{Service: structs.ServiceNameFromString("foo")},
{Service: structs.ServiceNameFromString("bar")},
},
ImportedNodes: structs.CheckServiceNodes{},
QueryMeta: structs.QueryMeta{ResultsFilteredByACLs: true},
},
},
"not allowed to read the service": {
authzFn: func() acl.Authorizer {
policy, err := acl.NewPolicyFromSource(`
node "node1" {
policy = "read"
@ -1173,17 +1256,19 @@ func TestACL_filterIndexedNodesWithGateways(t *testing.T) {
authz, err := acl.NewPolicyAuthorizerWithDefaults(acl.DenyAll(), []*acl.Policy{policy}, nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
list := makeList()
New(authz, logger).Filter(list)
require.Empty(t, list.Nodes)
require.Len(t, list.Gateways, 1)
require.True(t, list.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs, "ResultsFilteredByACLs should be true")
})
t.Run("not allowed to read the other gatway service", func(t *testing.T) {
return authz
},
expect: &structs.IndexedNodesWithGateways{
Nodes: structs.CheckServiceNodes{},
Gateways: structs.GatewayServices{
{Service: structs.ServiceNameFromString("bar")},
},
ImportedNodes: structs.CheckServiceNodes{},
QueryMeta: structs.QueryMeta{ResultsFilteredByACLs: true},
},
},
"not allowed to read the other gateway service": {
authzFn: func() acl.Authorizer {
policy, err := acl.NewPolicyFromSource(`
service "foo" {
policy = "read"
@ -1196,24 +1281,50 @@ func TestACL_filterIndexedNodesWithGateways(t *testing.T) {
authz, err := acl.NewPolicyAuthorizerWithDefaults(acl.DenyAll(), []*acl.Policy{policy}, nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
return authz
},
expect: &structs.IndexedNodesWithGateways{
Nodes: structs.CheckServiceNodes{
{
Node: &structs.Node{
Node: "node1",
},
Service: &structs.NodeService{
ID: "foo",
Service: "foo",
},
Checks: structs.HealthChecks{
{
Node: "node1",
CheckID: "check1",
ServiceName: "foo",
},
},
},
},
Gateways: structs.GatewayServices{
{Service: structs.ServiceNameFromString("foo")},
},
ImportedNodes: structs.CheckServiceNodes{},
QueryMeta: structs.QueryMeta{ResultsFilteredByACLs: true},
},
},
"denied": {
authzFn: acl.DenyAll,
expect: &structs.IndexedNodesWithGateways{
Nodes: structs.CheckServiceNodes{},
Gateways: structs.GatewayServices{},
ImportedNodes: structs.CheckServiceNodes{},
QueryMeta: structs.QueryMeta{ResultsFilteredByACLs: true},
},
},
}
list := makeList()
New(authz, logger).Filter(list)
require.Len(t, list.Nodes, 1)
require.Len(t, list.Gateways, 1)
require.True(t, list.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs, "ResultsFilteredByACLs should be true")
})
t.Run("denied", func(t *testing.T) {
list := makeList()
New(acl.DenyAll(), logger).Filter(list)
require.Empty(t, list.Nodes)
require.Empty(t, list.Gateways)
require.True(t, list.QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs, "ResultsFilteredByACLs should be true")
for name, tc := range tt {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
run(t, tc)
})
}
}
func TestACL_filterIndexedServiceDump(t *testing.T) {

9
agent/structs/structs.go
View File

@ -1998,6 +1998,15 @@ func (csn *CheckServiceNode) CanRead(authz acl.Authorizer) acl.EnforcementDecisi
authzContext := new(acl.AuthorizerContext)
csn.Service.EnterpriseMeta.FillAuthzContext(authzContext)
if csn.Node.PeerName != "" || csn.Service.PeerName != "" {
if authz.ServiceReadAll(authzContext) == acl.Allow ||
authz.ServiceWriteAny(authzContext) == acl.Allow {
return acl.Allow
}
return acl.Deny
}
if authz.NodeRead(csn.Node.Node, authzContext) != acl.Allow {
return acl.Deny
}

43
agent/structs/structs_test.go
View File

@ -1759,6 +1759,33 @@ func TestCheckServiceNode_CanRead(t *testing.T) {
authz: acl.AllowAll(),
expected: acl.Allow,
},
{
name: "can read imported csn if can read all",
csn: CheckServiceNode{
Node: &Node{Node: "name", PeerName: "cluster-2"},
Service: &NodeService{Service: "service-name", PeerName: "cluster-2"},
},
authz: aclAuthorizerCheckServiceNode{allowReadAllServices: true},
expected: acl.Allow,
},
{
name: "can read imported csn if can write any",
csn: CheckServiceNode{
Node: &Node{Node: "name", PeerName: "cluster-2"},
Service: &NodeService{Service: "service-name", PeerName: "cluster-2"},
},
authz: aclAuthorizerCheckServiceNode{allowServiceWrite: true},
expected: acl.Allow,
},
{
name: "can't read imported csn with authz for local services and nodes",
csn: CheckServiceNode{
Node: &Node{Node: "name", PeerName: "cluster-2"},
Service: &NodeService{Service: "service-name", PeerName: "cluster-2"},
},
authz: aclAuthorizerCheckServiceNode{allowService: true, allowNode: true},
expected: acl.Deny,
},
}
for _, tc := range testCases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
@ -1771,6 +1798,8 @@ type aclAuthorizerCheckServiceNode struct {
acl.Authorizer
allowNode bool
allowService bool
allowServiceWrite bool
allowReadAllServices bool
}
func (a aclAuthorizerCheckServiceNode) ServiceRead(string, *acl.AuthorizerContext) acl.EnforcementDecision {
@ -1787,6 +1816,20 @@ func (a aclAuthorizerCheckServiceNode) NodeRead(string, *acl.AuthorizerContext)
return acl.Deny
}
func (a aclAuthorizerCheckServiceNode) ServiceReadAll(*acl.AuthorizerContext) acl.EnforcementDecision {
if a.allowReadAllServices {
return acl.Allow
}
return acl.Deny
}
func (a aclAuthorizerCheckServiceNode) ServiceWriteAny(*acl.AuthorizerContext) acl.EnforcementDecision {
if a.allowServiceWrite {
return acl.Allow
}
return acl.Deny
}
func TestStructs_DirEntry_Clone(t *testing.T) {
e := &DirEntry{
LockIndex: 5,