open-consul/agent/connect/ca/provider_consul.go

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// Copyright (c) HashiCorp, Inc.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MPL-2.0
package ca
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/sha256"
"crypto/x509"
"crypto/x509/pkix"
"encoding/pem"
"errors"
"fmt"
"math/big"
"net/url"
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/hashicorp/go-hclog"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/connect"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/structs"
)
var (
// NotBefore will be CertificateTimeDriftBuffer in the past to account for
// time drift between different servers.
CertificateTimeDriftBuffer = time.Minute
ErrNotInitialized = errors.New("provider not initialized")
)
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type ConsulProvider struct {
Delegate ConsulProviderStateDelegate
config *structs.ConsulCAProviderConfig
id string
clusterID string
isPrimary bool
spiffeID *connect.SpiffeIDSigning
logger hclog.Logger
// testState is only used to test Consul leader's handling of providers that
// need to persist state. Consul provider actually manages it's state directly
// in the FSM since it is highly sensitive not (root private keys) not just
// metadata for lookups. We could make a whole mock provider to keep this out
// of Consul but that would still need to be configurable through real config
// and is a lot more boilerplate to test this for equivalent functionality.
testState map[string]string
sync.RWMutex
}
var _ Provider = (*ConsulProvider)(nil)
// NewConsulProvider returns a new ConsulProvider that is ready to be used.
func NewConsulProvider(delegate ConsulProviderStateDelegate, logger hclog.Logger) *ConsulProvider {
return &ConsulProvider{Delegate: delegate, logger: logger}
}
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type ConsulProviderStateDelegate interface {
ProviderState(id string) (*structs.CAConsulProviderState, error)
ApplyCARequest(*structs.CARequest) (interface{}, error)
}
func hexStringHash(input string) string {
hash := sha256.Sum256([]byte(input))
return connect.HexString(hash[:])
}
// Configure sets up the provider using the given configuration.
func (c *ConsulProvider) Configure(cfg ProviderConfig) error {
// Parse the raw config and update our ID.
config, err := ParseConsulCAConfig(cfg.RawConfig)
if err != nil {
return err
}
c.config = config
c.id = hexStringHash(fmt.Sprintf("%s,%s,%s,%d,%v", config.PrivateKey, config.RootCert, config.PrivateKeyType, config.PrivateKeyBits, cfg.IsPrimary))
c.clusterID = cfg.ClusterID
c.isPrimary = cfg.IsPrimary
c.spiffeID = connect.SpiffeIDSigningForCluster(c.clusterID)
// Passthrough test state for state handling tests. See testState doc.
c.parseTestState(cfg.RawConfig, cfg.State)
// Exit early if the state store has an entry for this provider's config.
providerState, err := c.Delegate.ProviderState(c.id)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if providerState != nil {
return nil
}
oldIDs := []string{
hexStringHash(fmt.Sprintf("%s,%s,%v", config.PrivateKey, config.RootCert, cfg.IsPrimary)),
fmt.Sprintf("%s,%s", config.PrivateKey, config.RootCert),
}
// Check if there are any entries with old ID schemes.
for _, oldID := range oldIDs {
providerState, err = c.Delegate.ProviderState(oldID)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Found an entry with the old ID, so update it to the new ID and
// delete the old entry.
if providerState != nil {
newState := *providerState
newState.ID = c.id
createReq := &structs.CARequest{
Op: structs.CAOpSetProviderState,
ProviderState: &newState,
}
if _, err := c.Delegate.ApplyCARequest(createReq); err != nil {
return err
}
deleteReq := &structs.CARequest{
Op: structs.CAOpDeleteProviderState,
ProviderState: providerState,
}
if _, err := c.Delegate.ApplyCARequest(deleteReq); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
}
args := &structs.CARequest{
Op: structs.CAOpSetProviderState,
ProviderState: &structs.CAConsulProviderState{ID: c.id},
}
if _, err := c.Delegate.ApplyCARequest(args); err != nil {
return err
}
c.logger.Debug("consul CA provider configured", "id", c.id, "is_primary", c.isPrimary)
return nil
}
// State implements Provider. Consul actually does store all it's state in raft
// but it manages it independently through a separate table already so this is a
// no-op. This method just passes through testState which allows tests to verify
// state handling behavior without needing to plumb a full test mock provider
// right through Consul server code.
func (c *ConsulProvider) State() (map[string]string, error) {
return c.testState, nil
}
Connect CA Primary Provider refactor (#16749) * Rename Intermediate cert references to LeafSigningCert Within the Consul CA subsystem, the term "Intermediate" is confusing because the meaning changes depending on provider and datacenter (primary vs secondary). For example, when using the Consul CA the "ActiveIntermediate" may return the root certificate in a primary datacenter. At a high level, we are interested in knowing which CA is responsible for signing leaf certs, regardless of its position in a certificate chain. This rename makes the intent clearer. * Move provider state check earlier * Remove calls to GenerateLeafSigningCert GenerateLeafSigningCert (formerly known as GenerateIntermediate) is vestigial in non-Vault providers, as it simply returns the root certificate in primary datacenters. By folding Vault's intermediate cert logic into `GenerateRoot` we can encapsulate the intermediate cert handling within `newCARoot`. * Move GenerateLeafSigningCert out of PrimaryProvidder Now that the Vault Provider calls GenerateLeafSigningCert within GenerateRoot, we can remove the method from all other providers that never used it in a meaningful way. * Add test for IntermediatePEM * Rename GenerateRoot to GenerateCAChain "Root" was being overloaded in the Consul CA context, as different providers and configs resulted in a single root certificate or a chain originating from an external trusted CA. Since the Vault provider also generates intermediates, it seems more accurate to call this a CAChain.
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// GenerateCAChain initializes a new root certificate and private key if needed.
func (c *ConsulProvider) GenerateCAChain() (CAChainResult, error) {
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providerState, err := c.getState()
if err != nil {
Connect CA Primary Provider refactor (#16749) * Rename Intermediate cert references to LeafSigningCert Within the Consul CA subsystem, the term "Intermediate" is confusing because the meaning changes depending on provider and datacenter (primary vs secondary). For example, when using the Consul CA the "ActiveIntermediate" may return the root certificate in a primary datacenter. At a high level, we are interested in knowing which CA is responsible for signing leaf certs, regardless of its position in a certificate chain. This rename makes the intent clearer. * Move provider state check earlier * Remove calls to GenerateLeafSigningCert GenerateLeafSigningCert (formerly known as GenerateIntermediate) is vestigial in non-Vault providers, as it simply returns the root certificate in primary datacenters. By folding Vault's intermediate cert logic into `GenerateRoot` we can encapsulate the intermediate cert handling within `newCARoot`. * Move GenerateLeafSigningCert out of PrimaryProvidder Now that the Vault Provider calls GenerateLeafSigningCert within GenerateRoot, we can remove the method from all other providers that never used it in a meaningful way. * Add test for IntermediatePEM * Rename GenerateRoot to GenerateCAChain "Root" was being overloaded in the Consul CA context, as different providers and configs resulted in a single root certificate or a chain originating from an external trusted CA. Since the Vault provider also generates intermediates, it seems more accurate to call this a CAChain.
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return CAChainResult{}, err
}
if !c.isPrimary {
Connect CA Primary Provider refactor (#16749) * Rename Intermediate cert references to LeafSigningCert Within the Consul CA subsystem, the term "Intermediate" is confusing because the meaning changes depending on provider and datacenter (primary vs secondary). For example, when using the Consul CA the "ActiveIntermediate" may return the root certificate in a primary datacenter. At a high level, we are interested in knowing which CA is responsible for signing leaf certs, regardless of its position in a certificate chain. This rename makes the intent clearer. * Move provider state check earlier * Remove calls to GenerateLeafSigningCert GenerateLeafSigningCert (formerly known as GenerateIntermediate) is vestigial in non-Vault providers, as it simply returns the root certificate in primary datacenters. By folding Vault's intermediate cert logic into `GenerateRoot` we can encapsulate the intermediate cert handling within `newCARoot`. * Move GenerateLeafSigningCert out of PrimaryProvidder Now that the Vault Provider calls GenerateLeafSigningCert within GenerateRoot, we can remove the method from all other providers that never used it in a meaningful way. * Add test for IntermediatePEM * Rename GenerateRoot to GenerateCAChain "Root" was being overloaded in the Consul CA context, as different providers and configs resulted in a single root certificate or a chain originating from an external trusted CA. Since the Vault provider also generates intermediates, it seems more accurate to call this a CAChain.
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return CAChainResult{}, fmt.Errorf("provider is not the root certificate authority")
}
if providerState.RootCert != "" {
Connect CA Primary Provider refactor (#16749) * Rename Intermediate cert references to LeafSigningCert Within the Consul CA subsystem, the term "Intermediate" is confusing because the meaning changes depending on provider and datacenter (primary vs secondary). For example, when using the Consul CA the "ActiveIntermediate" may return the root certificate in a primary datacenter. At a high level, we are interested in knowing which CA is responsible for signing leaf certs, regardless of its position in a certificate chain. This rename makes the intent clearer. * Move provider state check earlier * Remove calls to GenerateLeafSigningCert GenerateLeafSigningCert (formerly known as GenerateIntermediate) is vestigial in non-Vault providers, as it simply returns the root certificate in primary datacenters. By folding Vault's intermediate cert logic into `GenerateRoot` we can encapsulate the intermediate cert handling within `newCARoot`. * Move GenerateLeafSigningCert out of PrimaryProvidder Now that the Vault Provider calls GenerateLeafSigningCert within GenerateRoot, we can remove the method from all other providers that never used it in a meaningful way. * Add test for IntermediatePEM * Rename GenerateRoot to GenerateCAChain "Root" was being overloaded in the Consul CA context, as different providers and configs resulted in a single root certificate or a chain originating from an external trusted CA. Since the Vault provider also generates intermediates, it seems more accurate to call this a CAChain.
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return CAChainResult{PEM: providerState.RootCert}, nil
}
// Generate a private key if needed
newState := *providerState
if c.config.PrivateKey == "" {
_, pk, err := connect.GeneratePrivateKeyWithConfig(c.config.PrivateKeyType, c.config.PrivateKeyBits)
if err != nil {
Connect CA Primary Provider refactor (#16749) * Rename Intermediate cert references to LeafSigningCert Within the Consul CA subsystem, the term "Intermediate" is confusing because the meaning changes depending on provider and datacenter (primary vs secondary). For example, when using the Consul CA the "ActiveIntermediate" may return the root certificate in a primary datacenter. At a high level, we are interested in knowing which CA is responsible for signing leaf certs, regardless of its position in a certificate chain. This rename makes the intent clearer. * Move provider state check earlier * Remove calls to GenerateLeafSigningCert GenerateLeafSigningCert (formerly known as GenerateIntermediate) is vestigial in non-Vault providers, as it simply returns the root certificate in primary datacenters. By folding Vault's intermediate cert logic into `GenerateRoot` we can encapsulate the intermediate cert handling within `newCARoot`. * Move GenerateLeafSigningCert out of PrimaryProvidder Now that the Vault Provider calls GenerateLeafSigningCert within GenerateRoot, we can remove the method from all other providers that never used it in a meaningful way. * Add test for IntermediatePEM * Rename GenerateRoot to GenerateCAChain "Root" was being overloaded in the Consul CA context, as different providers and configs resulted in a single root certificate or a chain originating from an external trusted CA. Since the Vault provider also generates intermediates, it seems more accurate to call this a CAChain.
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return CAChainResult{}, err
}
newState.PrivateKey = pk
} else {
newState.PrivateKey = c.config.PrivateKey
}
// Generate the root CA if necessary
if c.config.RootCert == "" {
nextSerial, err := c.incrementAndGetNextSerialNumber()
if err != nil {
Connect CA Primary Provider refactor (#16749) * Rename Intermediate cert references to LeafSigningCert Within the Consul CA subsystem, the term "Intermediate" is confusing because the meaning changes depending on provider and datacenter (primary vs secondary). For example, when using the Consul CA the "ActiveIntermediate" may return the root certificate in a primary datacenter. At a high level, we are interested in knowing which CA is responsible for signing leaf certs, regardless of its position in a certificate chain. This rename makes the intent clearer. * Move provider state check earlier * Remove calls to GenerateLeafSigningCert GenerateLeafSigningCert (formerly known as GenerateIntermediate) is vestigial in non-Vault providers, as it simply returns the root certificate in primary datacenters. By folding Vault's intermediate cert logic into `GenerateRoot` we can encapsulate the intermediate cert handling within `newCARoot`. * Move GenerateLeafSigningCert out of PrimaryProvidder Now that the Vault Provider calls GenerateLeafSigningCert within GenerateRoot, we can remove the method from all other providers that never used it in a meaningful way. * Add test for IntermediatePEM * Rename GenerateRoot to GenerateCAChain "Root" was being overloaded in the Consul CA context, as different providers and configs resulted in a single root certificate or a chain originating from an external trusted CA. Since the Vault provider also generates intermediates, it seems more accurate to call this a CAChain.
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return CAChainResult{}, fmt.Errorf("error computing next serial number: %v", err)
}
ca, err := c.generateCA(newState.PrivateKey, nextSerial, c.config.RootCertTTL)
if err != nil {
Connect CA Primary Provider refactor (#16749) * Rename Intermediate cert references to LeafSigningCert Within the Consul CA subsystem, the term "Intermediate" is confusing because the meaning changes depending on provider and datacenter (primary vs secondary). For example, when using the Consul CA the "ActiveIntermediate" may return the root certificate in a primary datacenter. At a high level, we are interested in knowing which CA is responsible for signing leaf certs, regardless of its position in a certificate chain. This rename makes the intent clearer. * Move provider state check earlier * Remove calls to GenerateLeafSigningCert GenerateLeafSigningCert (formerly known as GenerateIntermediate) is vestigial in non-Vault providers, as it simply returns the root certificate in primary datacenters. By folding Vault's intermediate cert logic into `GenerateRoot` we can encapsulate the intermediate cert handling within `newCARoot`. * Move GenerateLeafSigningCert out of PrimaryProvidder Now that the Vault Provider calls GenerateLeafSigningCert within GenerateRoot, we can remove the method from all other providers that never used it in a meaningful way. * Add test for IntermediatePEM * Rename GenerateRoot to GenerateCAChain "Root" was being overloaded in the Consul CA context, as different providers and configs resulted in a single root certificate or a chain originating from an external trusted CA. Since the Vault provider also generates intermediates, it seems more accurate to call this a CAChain.
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return CAChainResult{}, fmt.Errorf("error generating CA: %v", err)
}
newState.RootCert = ca
} else {
newState.RootCert = c.config.RootCert
}
// Write the provider state
args := &structs.CARequest{
Op: structs.CAOpSetProviderState,
ProviderState: &newState,
}
if _, err := c.Delegate.ApplyCARequest(args); err != nil {
Connect CA Primary Provider refactor (#16749) * Rename Intermediate cert references to LeafSigningCert Within the Consul CA subsystem, the term "Intermediate" is confusing because the meaning changes depending on provider and datacenter (primary vs secondary). For example, when using the Consul CA the "ActiveIntermediate" may return the root certificate in a primary datacenter. At a high level, we are interested in knowing which CA is responsible for signing leaf certs, regardless of its position in a certificate chain. This rename makes the intent clearer. * Move provider state check earlier * Remove calls to GenerateLeafSigningCert GenerateLeafSigningCert (formerly known as GenerateIntermediate) is vestigial in non-Vault providers, as it simply returns the root certificate in primary datacenters. By folding Vault's intermediate cert logic into `GenerateRoot` we can encapsulate the intermediate cert handling within `newCARoot`. * Move GenerateLeafSigningCert out of PrimaryProvidder Now that the Vault Provider calls GenerateLeafSigningCert within GenerateRoot, we can remove the method from all other providers that never used it in a meaningful way. * Add test for IntermediatePEM * Rename GenerateRoot to GenerateCAChain "Root" was being overloaded in the Consul CA context, as different providers and configs resulted in a single root certificate or a chain originating from an external trusted CA. Since the Vault provider also generates intermediates, it seems more accurate to call this a CAChain.
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return CAChainResult{}, err
}
Connect CA Primary Provider refactor (#16749) * Rename Intermediate cert references to LeafSigningCert Within the Consul CA subsystem, the term "Intermediate" is confusing because the meaning changes depending on provider and datacenter (primary vs secondary). For example, when using the Consul CA the "ActiveIntermediate" may return the root certificate in a primary datacenter. At a high level, we are interested in knowing which CA is responsible for signing leaf certs, regardless of its position in a certificate chain. This rename makes the intent clearer. * Move provider state check earlier * Remove calls to GenerateLeafSigningCert GenerateLeafSigningCert (formerly known as GenerateIntermediate) is vestigial in non-Vault providers, as it simply returns the root certificate in primary datacenters. By folding Vault's intermediate cert logic into `GenerateRoot` we can encapsulate the intermediate cert handling within `newCARoot`. * Move GenerateLeafSigningCert out of PrimaryProvidder Now that the Vault Provider calls GenerateLeafSigningCert within GenerateRoot, we can remove the method from all other providers that never used it in a meaningful way. * Add test for IntermediatePEM * Rename GenerateRoot to GenerateCAChain "Root" was being overloaded in the Consul CA context, as different providers and configs resulted in a single root certificate or a chain originating from an external trusted CA. Since the Vault provider also generates intermediates, it seems more accurate to call this a CAChain.
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return CAChainResult{PEM: newState.RootCert}, nil
}
// GenerateIntermediateCSR creates a private key and generates a CSR
// for another datacenter's root to sign.
func (c *ConsulProvider) GenerateIntermediateCSR() (string, string, error) {
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providerState, err := c.getState()
if err != nil {
return "", "", err
}
if c.isPrimary {
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("provider is the root certificate authority, " +
"cannot generate an intermediate CSR")
}
// Create a new private key and CSR.
signer, pk, err := connect.GeneratePrivateKeyWithConfig(c.config.PrivateKeyType, c.config.PrivateKeyBits)
if err != nil {
return "", "", err
}
csr, err := connect.CreateCACSR(c.spiffeID, signer)
if err != nil {
return "", "", err
}
// Write the new provider state to the store.
newState := *providerState
newState.PrivateKey = pk
args := &structs.CARequest{
Op: structs.CAOpSetProviderState,
ProviderState: &newState,
}
if _, err := c.Delegate.ApplyCARequest(args); err != nil {
return "", "", err
}
return csr, "", nil
}
// SetIntermediate validates that the given intermediate is for the right private key
// and writes the given intermediate and root certificates to the state.
func (c *ConsulProvider) SetIntermediate(intermediatePEM, rootPEM, _ string) error {
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providerState, err := c.getState()
if err != nil {
return err
}
if c.isPrimary {
return fmt.Errorf("cannot set an intermediate using another root in the primary datacenter")
}
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if err = validateSetIntermediate(intermediatePEM, rootPEM, c.spiffeID); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := validateIntermediateSignedByPrivateKey(intermediatePEM, providerState.PrivateKey); err != nil {
return err
}
// Update the state
newState := *providerState
newState.IntermediateCert = intermediatePEM
newState.RootCert = rootPEM
args := &structs.CARequest{
Op: structs.CAOpSetProviderState,
ProviderState: &newState,
}
if _, err := c.Delegate.ApplyCARequest(args); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
Connect CA Primary Provider refactor (#16749) * Rename Intermediate cert references to LeafSigningCert Within the Consul CA subsystem, the term "Intermediate" is confusing because the meaning changes depending on provider and datacenter (primary vs secondary). For example, when using the Consul CA the "ActiveIntermediate" may return the root certificate in a primary datacenter. At a high level, we are interested in knowing which CA is responsible for signing leaf certs, regardless of its position in a certificate chain. This rename makes the intent clearer. * Move provider state check earlier * Remove calls to GenerateLeafSigningCert GenerateLeafSigningCert (formerly known as GenerateIntermediate) is vestigial in non-Vault providers, as it simply returns the root certificate in primary datacenters. By folding Vault's intermediate cert logic into `GenerateRoot` we can encapsulate the intermediate cert handling within `newCARoot`. * Move GenerateLeafSigningCert out of PrimaryProvidder Now that the Vault Provider calls GenerateLeafSigningCert within GenerateRoot, we can remove the method from all other providers that never used it in a meaningful way. * Add test for IntermediatePEM * Rename GenerateRoot to GenerateCAChain "Root" was being overloaded in the Consul CA context, as different providers and configs resulted in a single root certificate or a chain originating from an external trusted CA. Since the Vault provider also generates intermediates, it seems more accurate to call this a CAChain.
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func (c *ConsulProvider) ActiveLeafSigningCert() (string, error) {
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providerState, err := c.getState()
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
if c.isPrimary {
return providerState.RootCert, nil
}
return providerState.IntermediateCert, nil
}
// Remove the state store entry for this provider instance.
func (c *ConsulProvider) Cleanup(_ bool, _ map[string]interface{}) error {
// This method only gets called for final cleanup. Therefore we don't
// need to worry about the case where a ca config update is made to
// change the cert ttls but leaving the private key and root cert the
// same. Changing those would change the id field on the provider.
args := &structs.CARequest{
Op: structs.CAOpDeleteProviderState,
ProviderState: &structs.CAConsulProviderState{ID: c.id},
}
if _, err := c.Delegate.ApplyCARequest(args); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
// Sign returns a new certificate valid for the given SpiffeIDService
// using the current CA.
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func (c *ConsulProvider) Sign(csr *x509.CertificateRequest) (string, error) {
connect.HackSANExtensionForCSR(csr)
// Lock during the signing so we don't use the same index twice
// for different cert serial numbers.
c.Lock()
defer c.Unlock()
// Get the provider state
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providerState, err := c.getState()
if err != nil {
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return "", err
}
if providerState.PrivateKey == "" {
return "", ErrNotInitialized
}
// Create the keyId for the cert from the signing private key.
signer, err := connect.ParseSigner(providerState.PrivateKey)
if err != nil {
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return "", err
}
if signer == nil {
return "", ErrNotInitialized
}
keyId, err := connect.KeyId(signer.Public())
if err != nil {
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return "", err
}
// Create the subjectKeyId for the cert from the csr public key.
subjectKeyID, err := connect.KeyId(csr.PublicKey)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
// Parse the CA cert
Connect CA Primary Provider refactor (#16749) * Rename Intermediate cert references to LeafSigningCert Within the Consul CA subsystem, the term "Intermediate" is confusing because the meaning changes depending on provider and datacenter (primary vs secondary). For example, when using the Consul CA the "ActiveIntermediate" may return the root certificate in a primary datacenter. At a high level, we are interested in knowing which CA is responsible for signing leaf certs, regardless of its position in a certificate chain. This rename makes the intent clearer. * Move provider state check earlier * Remove calls to GenerateLeafSigningCert GenerateLeafSigningCert (formerly known as GenerateIntermediate) is vestigial in non-Vault providers, as it simply returns the root certificate in primary datacenters. By folding Vault's intermediate cert logic into `GenerateRoot` we can encapsulate the intermediate cert handling within `newCARoot`. * Move GenerateLeafSigningCert out of PrimaryProvidder Now that the Vault Provider calls GenerateLeafSigningCert within GenerateRoot, we can remove the method from all other providers that never used it in a meaningful way. * Add test for IntermediatePEM * Rename GenerateRoot to GenerateCAChain "Root" was being overloaded in the Consul CA context, as different providers and configs resulted in a single root certificate or a chain originating from an external trusted CA. Since the Vault provider also generates intermediates, it seems more accurate to call this a CAChain.
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certPEM, err := c.ActiveLeafSigningCert()
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
caCert, err := connect.ParseCert(certPEM)
if err != nil {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("error parsing CA cert: %s", err)
}
nextSerial, err := c.incrementAndGetNextSerialNumber()
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("error computing next serial number: %v", err)
}
// Cert template for generation
sn := &big.Int{}
sn.SetUint64(nextSerial)
// Sign the certificate valid from 1 minute in the past, this helps it be
// accepted right away even when nodes are not in close time sync across the
// cluster. A minute is more than enough for typical DC clock drift.
effectiveNow := time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Minute)
template := x509.Certificate{
SerialNumber: sn,
URIs: csr.URIs,
Signature: csr.Signature,
// We use the correct signature algorithm for the CA key we are signing with
// regardless of the algorithm used to sign the CSR signature above since
// the leaf might use a different key type.
SignatureAlgorithm: connect.SigAlgoForKey(signer),
PublicKeyAlgorithm: csr.PublicKeyAlgorithm,
PublicKey: csr.PublicKey,
BasicConstraintsValid: true,
KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageDataEncipherment |
x509.KeyUsageKeyAgreement |
x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature |
x509.KeyUsageKeyEncipherment,
ExtKeyUsage: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{
x509.ExtKeyUsageClientAuth,
x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth,
},
NotAfter: effectiveNow.Add(c.config.LeafCertTTL),
NotBefore: effectiveNow,
AuthorityKeyId: keyId,
SubjectKeyId: subjectKeyID,
DNSNames: csr.DNSNames,
IPAddresses: csr.IPAddresses,
}
// Create the certificate, PEM encode it and return that value.
var buf bytes.Buffer
bs, err := x509.CreateCertificate(
rand.Reader, &template, caCert, csr.PublicKey, signer)
if err != nil {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("error generating certificate: %s", err)
}
err = pem.Encode(&buf, &pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: bs})
if err != nil {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("error encoding certificate: %s", err)
}
// Set the response
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return buf.String(), nil
}
// SignIntermediate will validate the CSR to ensure the trust domain in the
// URI SAN matches the local one and that basic constraints for a CA certificate
// are met. It should return a signed CA certificate with a path length constraint
// of 0 to ensure that the certificate cannot be used to generate further CA certs.
func (c *ConsulProvider) SignIntermediate(csr *x509.CertificateRequest) (string, error) {
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providerState, err := c.getState()
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
err = validateSignIntermediate(csr, c.spiffeID)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
// Get the signing private key.
signer, err := connect.ParseSigner(providerState.PrivateKey)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
subjectKeyID, err := connect.KeyId(csr.PublicKey)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
// Parse the CA cert
caCert, err := connect.ParseCert(providerState.RootCert)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("error parsing CA cert: %s", err)
}
nextSerial, err := c.incrementAndGetNextSerialNumber()
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("error computing next serial number: %v", err)
}
// Cert template for generation
sn := &big.Int{}
sn.SetUint64(nextSerial)
// Sign the certificate valid from 1 minute in the past, this helps it be
// accepted right away even when nodes are not in close time sync across the
// cluster. A minute is more than enough for typical DC clock drift.
effectiveNow := time.Now().Add(-1 * CertificateTimeDriftBuffer)
template := x509.Certificate{
SerialNumber: sn,
DNSNames: csr.DNSNames,
EmailAddresses: csr.EmailAddresses,
IPAddresses: csr.IPAddresses,
URIs: csr.URIs,
ExtraExtensions: csr.ExtraExtensions,
Subject: csr.Subject,
Signature: csr.Signature,
SignatureAlgorithm: connect.SigAlgoForKey(signer),
PublicKeyAlgorithm: csr.PublicKeyAlgorithm,
PublicKey: csr.PublicKey,
BasicConstraintsValid: true,
KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageCertSign |
x509.KeyUsageCRLSign |
x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature,
IsCA: true,
MaxPathLenZero: true,
NotAfter: effectiveNow.Add(c.config.IntermediateCertTTL),
NotBefore: effectiveNow,
SubjectKeyId: subjectKeyID,
}
// Create the certificate, PEM encode it and return that value.
var buf bytes.Buffer
bs, err := x509.CreateCertificate(
rand.Reader, &template, caCert, csr.PublicKey, signer)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("error generating certificate: %s", err)
}
err = pem.Encode(&buf, &pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: bs})
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("error encoding certificate: %s", err)
}
// Set the response
return buf.String(), nil
}
// CrossSignCA returns the given CA cert signed by the current active root.
func (c *ConsulProvider) CrossSignCA(cert *x509.Certificate) (string, error) {
c.Lock()
defer c.Unlock()
if c.config.DisableCrossSigning {
return "", errors.New("cross-signing disabled")
}
// Get the provider state
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providerState, err := c.getState()
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
privKey, err := connect.ParseSigner(providerState.PrivateKey)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("error parsing private key %q: %s", providerState.PrivateKey, err)
}
rootCA, err := connect.ParseCert(providerState.RootCert)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
keyId, err := connect.KeyId(privKey.Public())
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
nextSerial, err := c.incrementAndGetNextSerialNumber()
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("error computing next serial number: %v", err)
}
// Create the cross-signing template from the existing root CA
serialNum := &big.Int{}
serialNum.SetUint64(nextSerial)
template := *cert
template.SerialNumber = serialNum
template.SignatureAlgorithm = rootCA.SignatureAlgorithm
template.AuthorityKeyId = keyId
// Sign the certificate valid from 1 minute in the past, this helps it be
// accepted right away even when nodes are not in close time sync across the
// cluster. A minute is more than enough for typical DC clock drift.
effectiveNow := time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Minute)
template.NotBefore = effectiveNow
// This cross-signed cert is only needed during rotation, and only while old
// leaf certs are still in use. They expire within 3 days currently so 7 is
// safe. TODO(banks): make this be based on leaf expiry time when that is
// configurable.
template.NotAfter = effectiveNow.AddDate(0, 0, 7)
bs, err := x509.CreateCertificate(
rand.Reader, &template, rootCA, cert.PublicKey, privKey)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("error generating CA certificate: %s", err)
}
var buf bytes.Buffer
err = pem.Encode(&buf, &pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: bs})
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("error encoding private key: %s", err)
}
return buf.String(), nil
}
// SupportsCrossSigning implements Provider
func (c *ConsulProvider) SupportsCrossSigning() (bool, error) {
return !c.config.DisableCrossSigning, nil
}
// getState returns the current provider state from the state delegate, and returns
// ErrNotInitialized if no entry is found.
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func (c *ConsulProvider) getState() (*structs.CAConsulProviderState, error) {
providerState, err := c.Delegate.ProviderState(c.id)
if err != nil {
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return nil, err
}
if providerState == nil {
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return nil, ErrNotInitialized
}
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return providerState, nil
}
func (c *ConsulProvider) incrementAndGetNextSerialNumber() (uint64, error) {
args := &structs.CARequest{
Op: structs.CAOpIncrementProviderSerialNumber,
}
raw, err := c.Delegate.ApplyCARequest(args)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
return raw.(uint64), nil
}
// generateCA makes a new root CA using the current private key
func (c *ConsulProvider) generateCA(privateKey string, sn uint64, rootCertTTL time.Duration) (string, error) {
privKey, err := connect.ParseSigner(privateKey)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("error parsing private key %q: %s", privateKey, err)
}
// The URI (SPIFFE compatible) for the cert
id := connect.SpiffeIDSigningForCluster(c.clusterID)
keyId, err := connect.KeyId(privKey.Public())
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
// Create the CA cert
uid, err := connect.CompactUID()
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
cn := connect.CACN("consul", uid, c.clusterID, c.isPrimary)
serialNum := &big.Int{}
serialNum.SetUint64(sn)
template := x509.Certificate{
SerialNumber: serialNum,
Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: cn},
URIs: []*url.URL{id.URI()},
BasicConstraintsValid: true,
KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageCertSign |
x509.KeyUsageCRLSign |
x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature,
IsCA: true,
NotAfter: time.Now().Add(rootCertTTL),
NotBefore: time.Now(),
AuthorityKeyId: keyId,
SubjectKeyId: keyId,
}
bs, err := x509.CreateCertificate(
rand.Reader, &template, &template, privKey.Public(), privKey)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("error generating CA certificate: %s", err)
}
var buf bytes.Buffer
err = pem.Encode(&buf, &pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: bs})
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("error encoding private key: %s", err)
}
return buf.String(), nil
}
func (c *ConsulProvider) parseTestState(rawConfig map[string]interface{}, state map[string]string) {
c.testState = nil
if rawTestState, ok := rawConfig["test_state"]; ok {
if ts, ok := rawTestState.(map[string]string); ok {
c.testState = ts
return
}
// Secondary's config takes a trip through the state store before Configure
// is called and RPC calls that msgpack encode also have the same effect. It
// means we end up with map[string]string encoded as map[string]interface{}.
// We just handle that case. There is no struct error handling because this
// is test-only code (undocumented config key) and we'd rather not leave a
// way to error CA setup and leave cluster unavailable in prod by
// accidentally setting a bad test_state config.
if ts, ok := rawTestState.(map[string]interface{}); ok {
c.testState = make(map[string]string)
for k, v := range ts {
if s, ok := v.(string); ok {
c.testState[k] = s
}
}
}
}
// If config didn't explicitly specify test_state to return, but there is some
// actual state from a previous provider. Just use that since that is expected
// behavior that providers with state would preserve the state they are passed
// in the common case.
if len(state) > 0 && c.testState == nil {
c.testState = state
}
}