open-consul/agent/consul/discovery_chain_endpoint.go

106 lines
2.8 KiB
Go
Raw Normal View History

// Copyright (c) HashiCorp, Inc.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MPL-2.0
package consul
import (
"fmt"
"time"
metrics "github.com/armon/go-metrics"
memdb "github.com/hashicorp/go-memdb"
server: suppress spurious blocking query returns where multiple config entries are involved (#12362) Starting from and extending the mechanism introduced in #12110 we can specially handle the 3 main special Consul RPC endpoints that react to many config entries in a single blocking query in Connect: - `DiscoveryChain.Get` - `ConfigEntry.ResolveServiceConfig` - `Intentions.Match` All of these will internally watch for many config entries, and at least one of those will likely be not found in any given query. Because these are blends of multiple reads the exact solution from #12110 isn't perfectly aligned, but we can tweak the approach slightly and regain the utility of that mechanism. ### No Config Entries Found In this case, despite looking for many config entries none may be found at all. Unlike #12110 in this scenario we do not return an empty reply to the caller, but instead synthesize a struct from default values to return. This can be handled nearly identically to #12110 with the first 1-2 replies being non-empty payloads followed by the standard spurious wakeup suppression mechanism from #12110. ### No Change Since Last Wakeup Once a blocking query loop on the server has completed and slept at least once, there is a further optimization we can make here to detect if any of the config entries that were present at specific versions for the prior execution of the loop are identical for the loop we just woke up for. In that scenario we can return a slightly different internal sentinel error and basically externally handle it similar to #12110. This would mean that even if 20 discovery chain read RPC handling goroutines wakeup due to the creation of an unrelated config entry, the only ones that will terminate and reply with a blob of data are those that genuinely have new data to report. ### Extra Endpoints Since this pattern is pretty reusable, other key config-entry-adjacent endpoints used by `agent/proxycfg` also were updated: - `ConfigEntry.List` - `Internal.IntentionUpstreams` (tproxy)
2022-02-25 21:46:34 +00:00
hashstructure_v2 "github.com/mitchellh/hashstructure/v2"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/acl"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/consul/discoverychain"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/consul/state"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/structs"
)
type DiscoveryChain struct {
srv *Server
}
func (c *DiscoveryChain) Get(args *structs.DiscoveryChainRequest, reply *structs.DiscoveryChainResponse) error {
// Exit early if Connect hasn't been enabled.
if !c.srv.config.ConnectEnabled {
return ErrConnectNotEnabled
}
if done, err := c.srv.ForwardRPC("DiscoveryChain.Get", args, reply); done {
return err
}
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"discovery_chain", "get"}, time.Now())
// Fetch the ACL token, if any.
entMeta := args.GetEnterpriseMeta()
var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext
authz, err := c.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, entMeta, &authzContext)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if err := authz.ToAllowAuthorizer().ServiceReadAllowed(args.Name, &authzContext); err != nil {
return err
}
if args.Name == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("Must provide service name")
}
evalDC := args.EvaluateInDatacenter
if evalDC == "" {
evalDC = c.srv.config.Datacenter
}
server: suppress spurious blocking query returns where multiple config entries are involved (#12362) Starting from and extending the mechanism introduced in #12110 we can specially handle the 3 main special Consul RPC endpoints that react to many config entries in a single blocking query in Connect: - `DiscoveryChain.Get` - `ConfigEntry.ResolveServiceConfig` - `Intentions.Match` All of these will internally watch for many config entries, and at least one of those will likely be not found in any given query. Because these are blends of multiple reads the exact solution from #12110 isn't perfectly aligned, but we can tweak the approach slightly and regain the utility of that mechanism. ### No Config Entries Found In this case, despite looking for many config entries none may be found at all. Unlike #12110 in this scenario we do not return an empty reply to the caller, but instead synthesize a struct from default values to return. This can be handled nearly identically to #12110 with the first 1-2 replies being non-empty payloads followed by the standard spurious wakeup suppression mechanism from #12110. ### No Change Since Last Wakeup Once a blocking query loop on the server has completed and slept at least once, there is a further optimization we can make here to detect if any of the config entries that were present at specific versions for the prior execution of the loop are identical for the loop we just woke up for. In that scenario we can return a slightly different internal sentinel error and basically externally handle it similar to #12110. This would mean that even if 20 discovery chain read RPC handling goroutines wakeup due to the creation of an unrelated config entry, the only ones that will terminate and reply with a blob of data are those that genuinely have new data to report. ### Extra Endpoints Since this pattern is pretty reusable, other key config-entry-adjacent endpoints used by `agent/proxycfg` also were updated: - `ConfigEntry.List` - `Internal.IntentionUpstreams` (tproxy)
2022-02-25 21:46:34 +00:00
var (
priorHash uint64
ranOnce bool
)
return c.srv.blockingQuery(
&args.QueryOptions,
&reply.QueryMeta,
func(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.Store) error {
req := discoverychain.CompileRequest{
ServiceName: args.Name,
EvaluateInNamespace: entMeta.NamespaceOrDefault(),
2021-08-20 16:57:45 +00:00
EvaluateInPartition: entMeta.PartitionOrDefault(),
connect: fix failover through a mesh gateway to a remote datacenter (#6259) Failover is pushed entirely down to the data plane by creating envoy clusters and putting each successive destination in a different load assignment priority band. For example this shows that normally requests go to 1.2.3.4:8080 but when that fails they go to 6.7.8.9:8080: - name: foo load_assignment: cluster_name: foo policy: overprovisioning_factor: 100000 endpoints: - priority: 0 lb_endpoints: - endpoint: address: socket_address: address: 1.2.3.4 port_value: 8080 - priority: 1 lb_endpoints: - endpoint: address: socket_address: address: 6.7.8.9 port_value: 8080 Mesh gateways route requests based solely on the SNI header tacked onto the TLS layer. Envoy currently only lets you configure the outbound SNI header at the cluster layer. If you try to failover through a mesh gateway you ideally would configure the SNI value per endpoint, but that's not possible in envoy today. This PR introduces a simpler way around the problem for now: 1. We identify any target of failover that will use mesh gateway mode local or remote and then further isolate any resolver node in the compiled discovery chain that has a failover destination set to one of those targets. 2. For each of these resolvers we will perform a small measurement of comparative healths of the endpoints that come back from the health API for the set of primary target and serial failover targets. We walk the list of targets in order and if any endpoint is healthy we return that target, otherwise we move on to the next target. 3. The CDS and EDS endpoints both perform the measurements in (2) for the affected resolver nodes. 4. For CDS this measurement selects which TLS SNI field to use for the cluster (note the cluster is always going to be named for the primary target) 5. For EDS this measurement selects which set of endpoints will populate the cluster. Priority tiered failover is ignored. One of the big downsides to this approach to failover is that the failover detection and correction is going to be controlled by consul rather than deferring that entirely to the data plane as with the prior version. This also means that we are bound to only failover using official health signals and cannot make use of data plane signals like outlier detection to affect failover. In this specific scenario the lack of data plane signals is ok because the effectiveness is already muted by the fact that the ultimate destination endpoints will have their data plane signals scrambled when they pass through the mesh gateway wrapper anyway so we're not losing much. Another related fix is that we now use the endpoint health from the underlying service, not the health of the gateway (regardless of failover mode).
2019-08-05 18:30:35 +00:00
EvaluateInDatacenter: evalDC,
OverrideMeshGateway: args.OverrideMeshGateway,
OverrideProtocol: args.OverrideProtocol,
OverrideConnectTimeout: args.OverrideConnectTimeout,
}
index, chain, entries, err := state.ServiceDiscoveryChain(ws, args.Name, entMeta, req)
if err != nil {
return err
}
server: suppress spurious blocking query returns where multiple config entries are involved (#12362) Starting from and extending the mechanism introduced in #12110 we can specially handle the 3 main special Consul RPC endpoints that react to many config entries in a single blocking query in Connect: - `DiscoveryChain.Get` - `ConfigEntry.ResolveServiceConfig` - `Intentions.Match` All of these will internally watch for many config entries, and at least one of those will likely be not found in any given query. Because these are blends of multiple reads the exact solution from #12110 isn't perfectly aligned, but we can tweak the approach slightly and regain the utility of that mechanism. ### No Config Entries Found In this case, despite looking for many config entries none may be found at all. Unlike #12110 in this scenario we do not return an empty reply to the caller, but instead synthesize a struct from default values to return. This can be handled nearly identically to #12110 with the first 1-2 replies being non-empty payloads followed by the standard spurious wakeup suppression mechanism from #12110. ### No Change Since Last Wakeup Once a blocking query loop on the server has completed and slept at least once, there is a further optimization we can make here to detect if any of the config entries that were present at specific versions for the prior execution of the loop are identical for the loop we just woke up for. In that scenario we can return a slightly different internal sentinel error and basically externally handle it similar to #12110. This would mean that even if 20 discovery chain read RPC handling goroutines wakeup due to the creation of an unrelated config entry, the only ones that will terminate and reply with a blob of data are those that genuinely have new data to report. ### Extra Endpoints Since this pattern is pretty reusable, other key config-entry-adjacent endpoints used by `agent/proxycfg` also were updated: - `ConfigEntry.List` - `Internal.IntentionUpstreams` (tproxy)
2022-02-25 21:46:34 +00:00
// Generate a hash of the config entry content driving this
// response. Use it to determine if the response is identical to a
// prior wakeup.
newHash, err := hashstructure_v2.Hash(chain, hashstructure_v2.FormatV2, nil)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error hashing reply for spurious wakeup suppression: %w", err)
}
if ranOnce && priorHash == newHash {
priorHash = newHash
reply.Index = index
// NOTE: the prior response is still alive inside of *reply, which
// is desirable
return errNotChanged
} else {
priorHash = newHash
ranOnce = true
}
reply.Index = index
reply.Chain = chain
if entries.IsEmpty() {
server: suppress spurious blocking query returns where multiple config entries are involved (#12362) Starting from and extending the mechanism introduced in #12110 we can specially handle the 3 main special Consul RPC endpoints that react to many config entries in a single blocking query in Connect: - `DiscoveryChain.Get` - `ConfigEntry.ResolveServiceConfig` - `Intentions.Match` All of these will internally watch for many config entries, and at least one of those will likely be not found in any given query. Because these are blends of multiple reads the exact solution from #12110 isn't perfectly aligned, but we can tweak the approach slightly and regain the utility of that mechanism. ### No Config Entries Found In this case, despite looking for many config entries none may be found at all. Unlike #12110 in this scenario we do not return an empty reply to the caller, but instead synthesize a struct from default values to return. This can be handled nearly identically to #12110 with the first 1-2 replies being non-empty payloads followed by the standard spurious wakeup suppression mechanism from #12110. ### No Change Since Last Wakeup Once a blocking query loop on the server has completed and slept at least once, there is a further optimization we can make here to detect if any of the config entries that were present at specific versions for the prior execution of the loop are identical for the loop we just woke up for. In that scenario we can return a slightly different internal sentinel error and basically externally handle it similar to #12110. This would mean that even if 20 discovery chain read RPC handling goroutines wakeup due to the creation of an unrelated config entry, the only ones that will terminate and reply with a blob of data are those that genuinely have new data to report. ### Extra Endpoints Since this pattern is pretty reusable, other key config-entry-adjacent endpoints used by `agent/proxycfg` also were updated: - `ConfigEntry.List` - `Internal.IntentionUpstreams` (tproxy)
2022-02-25 21:46:34 +00:00
return errNotFound
}
return nil
})
}