open-consul/agent/acl.go

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package agent
import (
"fmt"
2020-11-17 22:10:21 +00:00
"github.com/hashicorp/serf/serf"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/acl"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/structs"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/api"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/types"
)
// aclAccessorID is used to convert an ACLToken's secretID to its accessorID for non-
// critical purposes, such as logging. Therefore we interpret all errors as empty-string
// so we can safely log it without handling non-critical errors at the usage site.
func (a *Agent) aclAccessorID(secretID string) string {
ident, err := a.delegate.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(secretID, nil, nil)
if acl.IsErrNotFound(err) {
return ""
}
if err != nil {
a.logger.Debug("non-critical error resolving acl token accessor for logging", "error", err)
return ""
}
return ident.AccessorID()
}
// vetServiceRegister makes sure the service registration action is allowed by
// the given token.
func (a *Agent) vetServiceRegister(token string, service *structs.NodeService) error {
// Resolve the token and bail if ACLs aren't enabled.
authz, err := a.delegate.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(token, nil, nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return a.vetServiceRegisterWithAuthorizer(authz, service)
}
func (a *Agent) vetServiceRegisterWithAuthorizer(authz acl.Authorizer, service *structs.NodeService) error {
var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext
// Vet the service itself.
service.FillAuthzContext(&authzContext)
if authz.ServiceWrite(service.Service, &authzContext) != acl.Allow {
return acl.PermissionDeniedByACL(authz, &authzContext, acl.ResourceService, acl.AccessWrite, service.Service)
}
// Vet any service that might be getting overwritten.
if existing := a.State.Service(service.CompoundServiceID()); existing != nil {
existing.FillAuthzContext(&authzContext)
if authz.ServiceWrite(existing.Service, &authzContext) != acl.Allow {
return acl.PermissionDeniedByACL(authz, &authzContext, acl.ResourceService, acl.AccessWrite, existing.Service)
}
}
// If the service is a proxy, ensure that it has write on the destination too
// since it can be discovered as an instance of that service.
if service.Kind == structs.ServiceKindConnectProxy {
service.FillAuthzContext(&authzContext)
if authz.ServiceWrite(service.Proxy.DestinationServiceName, &authzContext) != acl.Allow {
return acl.PermissionDeniedByACL(authz, &authzContext, acl.ResourceService, acl.AccessWrite, service.Proxy.DestinationServiceName)
}
}
return nil
}
func (a *Agent) vetServiceUpdateWithAuthorizer(authz acl.Authorizer, serviceID structs.ServiceID) error {
var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext
// Vet any changes based on the existing services's info.
if existing := a.State.Service(serviceID); existing != nil {
existing.FillAuthzContext(&authzContext)
if authz.ServiceWrite(existing.Service, &authzContext) != acl.Allow {
return acl.PermissionDeniedByACL(authz, &authzContext, acl.ResourceService, acl.AccessWrite, existing.Service)
}
} else {
// Take care if modifying this error message.
// agent/local/state.go's deleteService assumes the Catalog.Deregister RPC call
// will include "Unknown service"in the error if deregistration fails due to a
// service with that ID not existing.
return NotFoundError{Reason: fmt.Sprintf(
"Unknown service ID %q. Ensure that the service ID is passed, not the service name.",
serviceID)}
}
return nil
}
func (a *Agent) vetCheckRegisterWithAuthorizer(authz acl.Authorizer, check *structs.HealthCheck) error {
var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext
check.FillAuthzContext(&authzContext)
// Vet the check itself.
if len(check.ServiceName) > 0 {
if authz.ServiceWrite(check.ServiceName, &authzContext) != acl.Allow {
return acl.PermissionDeniedByACL(authz, &authzContext, acl.ResourceService, acl.AccessWrite, check.ServiceName)
}
} else {
// N.B. Should this authzContext be derived from a.AgentEnterpriseMeta()
if authz.NodeWrite(a.config.NodeName, &authzContext) != acl.Allow {
return acl.PermissionDeniedByACL(authz, &authzContext, acl.ResourceNode, acl.AccessWrite, a.config.NodeName)
}
}
// Vet any check that might be getting overwritten.
if existing := a.State.Check(check.CompoundCheckID()); existing != nil {
if len(existing.ServiceName) > 0 {
// N.B. Should this authzContext be derived from existing.EnterpriseMeta?
if authz.ServiceWrite(existing.ServiceName, &authzContext) != acl.Allow {
return acl.PermissionDeniedByACL(authz, &authzContext, acl.ResourceService, acl.AccessWrite, existing.ServiceName)
}
} else {
// N.B. Should this authzContext be derived from a.AgentEnterpriseMeta()
if authz.NodeWrite(a.config.NodeName, &authzContext) != acl.Allow {
return acl.PermissionDeniedByACL(authz, &authzContext, acl.ResourceNode, acl.AccessWrite, a.config.NodeName)
}
}
}
return nil
}
func (a *Agent) vetCheckUpdateWithAuthorizer(authz acl.Authorizer, checkID structs.CheckID) error {
var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext
checkID.FillAuthzContext(&authzContext)
// Vet any changes based on the existing check's info.
if existing := a.State.Check(checkID); existing != nil {
if len(existing.ServiceName) > 0 {
if authz.ServiceWrite(existing.ServiceName, &authzContext) != acl.Allow {
return acl.PermissionDeniedByACL(authz, &authzContext, acl.ResourceService, acl.AccessWrite, existing.ServiceName)
}
} else {
if authz.NodeWrite(a.config.NodeName, &authzContext) != acl.Allow {
return acl.PermissionDeniedByACL(authz, &authzContext, acl.ResourceNode, acl.AccessWrite, a.config.NodeName)
}
}
} else {
return NotFoundError{Reason: fmt.Sprintf(
"Unknown check ID %q. Ensure that the check ID is passed, not the check name.",
checkID.String())}
}
return nil
}
// filterMembers redacts members that the token doesn't have access to.
func (a *Agent) filterMembers(token string, members *[]serf.Member) error {
// Resolve the token and bail if ACLs aren't enabled.
authz, err := a.delegate.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(token, nil, nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext
// Filter out members based on the node policy.
m := *members
for i := 0; i < len(m); i++ {
node := m[i].Name
serfMemberFillAuthzContext(&m[i], &authzContext)
if authz.NodeRead(node, &authzContext) == acl.Allow {
continue
}
accessorID := authz.AccessorID()
a.logger.Debug("dropping node from result due to ACLs", "node", node, "accessorID", accessorID)
m = append(m[:i], m[i+1:]...)
i--
}
*members = m
return nil
}
func (a *Agent) filterServicesWithAuthorizer(authz acl.Authorizer, services map[string]*api.AgentService) error {
var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext
// Filter out services based on the service policy.
for id, service := range services {
agentServiceFillAuthzContext(service, &authzContext)
if authz.ServiceRead(service.Service, &authzContext) == acl.Allow {
continue
}
a.logger.Debug("dropping service from result due to ACLs", "service", id)
delete(services, id)
}
return nil
}
func (a *Agent) filterChecksWithAuthorizer(authz acl.Authorizer, checks map[types.CheckID]*structs.HealthCheck) error {
var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext
// Filter out checks based on the node or service policy.
for id, check := range checks {
check.FillAuthzContext(&authzContext)
if len(check.ServiceName) > 0 {
if authz.ServiceRead(check.ServiceName, &authzContext) == acl.Allow {
continue
}
} else {
if authz.NodeRead(a.config.NodeName, &authzContext) == acl.Allow {
continue
}
}
a.logger.Debug("dropping check from result due to ACLs", "check", id)
delete(checks, id)
}
return nil
}