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---
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layout: docs
page_title: ACL Rules
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sidebar_title: 'ACL Rules'
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sidebar_current: docs-acl-rules
description: >-
Consul provides an optional Access Control List (ACL) system which can be used
to control access to data and APIs. The ACL system is a Capability-based
system that relies on tokens which can have fine grained rules applied to
them. It is very similar to AWS IAM in many ways.
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---
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-> **1.4.0 and later:** This document only applies in Consul versions 1.4.0 and later. The documentation for the legacy ACL system is [here](/docs/acl/acl-legacy.html)
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# ACL Rules
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Consul provides an optional Access Control List (ACL) system which can be used
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to control access to data and APIs. To learn more about Consul's ACL review the
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[ACL system documentation](/docs/acl/acl-system.html)
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A core part of the ACL system is the rule language, which is used to describe the policy
that must be enforced. There are two types of rules: prefix based rules and exact matching
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rules.
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## Rule Specification
Rules are composed of a resource, a segment (for some resource areas) and a policy
disposition. The general structure of a rule is:
```text
<resource> "<segment>" {
policy = "<policy disposition>"
}
```
Segmented resource areas allow operators to more finely control access to those resources.
Note that not all resource areas are segmented such as the `keyring`, `operator`, and `acl` resources. For those rules they would look like:
```text
<resource> = "<policy disposition>"
```
Policies can have several control levels:
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- `read`: allow the resource to be read but not modified.
- `write`: allow the resource to be read and modified.
- `deny`: do not allow the resource to be read or modified.
- `list`: allows access to all the keys under a segment in the Consul KV. Note, this policy can only be used with the `key_prefix` resource and [`acl.enable_key_list_policy`](/docs/agent/options.html#acl_enable_key_list) must be set to true.
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When using prefix-based rules, the most specific prefix match determines the action. This
allows for flexible rules like an empty prefix to allow read-only access to all
resources, along with some specific prefixes that allow write access or that are
denied all access. Exact matching rules will only apply to the exact resource specified.
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The order of precedence for matching rules are, DENY has priority over WRITE or READ and
WRITE has priority over READ.
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We make use of the
[HashiCorp Configuration Language (HCL)](https://github.com/hashicorp/hcl/) to specify
rules. This language is human readable and interoperable with JSON making it easy to
machine-generate. Rules can make use of one or more policies.
Specification in the HCL format looks like:
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```hcl
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# These control access to the key/value store.
key_prefix "" {
policy = "read"
}
key_prefix "foo/" {
policy = "write"
}
key_prefix "foo/private/" {
policy = "deny"
}
# Or for exact key matches
key "foo/bar/secret" {
policy = "deny"
}
# This controls access to cluster-wide Consul operator information.
operator = "read"
```
This is equivalent to the following JSON input:
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```json
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{
"key_prefix": {
"": {
"policy": "read"
},
"foo/": {
"policy": "write"
},
"foo/private/": {
"policy": "deny"
}
},
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"key": {
"foo/bar/secret": {
"policy": "deny"
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}
},
"operator": "read"
}
```
The [ACL API](/api/acl/acl.html) allows either HCL or JSON to be used to define the content
of the rules section of a policy.
Here's a sample request using the HCL form:
```text
$ curl \
--request PUT \
--data \
'{
"Name": "my-app-policy",
"Rules": "key \"\" { policy = \"read\" } key \"foo/\" { policy = \"write\" } key \"foo/private/\" { policy = \"deny\" } operator = \"read\""
}' http://127.0.0.1:8500/v1/acl/policy?token=<token with ACL "write">
```
Here's an equivalent request using the JSON form:
```text
$ curl \
--request PUT \
--data \
'{
"Name": "my-app-policy",
"Rules": "{\"key\":{\"\":{\"policy\":\"read\"},\"foo/\":{\"policy\":\"write\"},\"foo/private\":{\"policy\":\"deny\"}},\"operator\":\"read\"}"
}' http://127.0.0.1:8500/v1/acl/policy?token=<management token>
```
On success, the Policy is returned:
```json
{
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"CreateIndex": 7,
"Hash": "UMG6QEbV40Gs7Cgi6l/ZjYWUwRS0pIxxusFKyKOt8qI=",
"ID": "5f423562-aca1-53c3-e121-cb0eb2ea1cd3",
"ModifyIndex": 7,
"Name": "my-app-policy",
"Rules": "key \"\" { policy = \"read\" } key \"foo/\" { policy = \"write\" } key \"foo/private/\" { policy = \"deny\" } operator = \"read\""
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}
```
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The created policy can now be specified either by name or by ID when
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[creating a token](https://learn.hashicorp.com/consul/security-networking/production-acls#create-the-agent-token). This will grant the rules
provided to the [bearer of that token](/api/index.html#authentication).
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Below is a breakdown of each rule type.
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#### ACL Resource Rules
The `acl` resource controls access to ACL operations in the
[ACL API](/api/acl/acl.html).
ACL rules look like this:
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```hcl
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acl = "write"
```
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There is only one acl rule allowed per policy and its value is set to one of the [policy dispositions](/docs/acl/acl-rules.html#rule-specification). In the example
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above ACLs may be read or written including discovering any token's secret ID. Snapshotting also requires `acl = "write"`
permissions due to the fact that all the token secrets are contained within the snapshot.
#### Agent Rules
The `agent` and `agent_prefix` resources control access to the utility operations in the [Agent API](/api/agent.html),
such as join and leave. All of the catalog-related operations are covered by the [`node` or `node_prefix`](#node-rules)
and [`service` or `service_prefix`](#service-rules) policies instead.
Agent rules look like this:
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```hcl
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agent_prefix "" {
policy = "read"
}
agent "foo" {
policy = "write"
}
agent_prefix "bar" {
policy = "deny"
}
```
Agent rules are keyed by the node name they apply to. In the example above the rules
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allow read-only access to any node name by using the empty prefix, read-write access to
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the node with the _exact_ name `foo`, and denies all access to any node name that starts
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with `bar`.
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Since [Agent API](/api/agent.html) utility operations may be required before an agent is joined to
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a cluster, or during an outage of the Consul servers or ACL datacenter, a special token may be
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configured with [`acl.tokens.agent_master`](/docs/agent/options.html#acl_tokens_agent_master) to allow
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write access to these operations even if no ACL resolution capability is available.
#### Event Rules
The `event` and `event_prefix` resources control access to event operations in the [Event API](/api/event.html), such as
firing events and listing events.
Event rules look like this:
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```hcl
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event_prefix "" {
policy = "read"
}
event "deploy" {
policy = "write"
}
```
Event rules are segmented by the event name they apply to. In the example above, the rules allow
read-only access to any event, and firing of the "deploy" event.
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The [`consul exec`](/docs/commands/exec.html) command uses events with the "\_rexec" prefix during
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operation, so to enable this feature in a Consul environment with ACLs enabled, you will need to
give agents a token with access to this event prefix, in addition to configuring
[`disable_remote_exec`](/docs/agent/options.html#disable_remote_exec) to `false`.
#### Key/Value Rules
The `key` and `key_prefix` resources control access to key/value store operations in the [KV API](/api/kv.html). Key
rules look like this:
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```hcl
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key_prefix "" {
policy = "read"
}
key "foo" {
policy = "write"
}
key "bar" {
policy = "deny"
}
```
Key rules are segmented by the key name they apply to. In the example above, the rules allow read-only access
to any key name with the empty prefix rule, allow read-write access to the "foo" key, and deny access to the "bar" key.
#### List Policy for Keys
Consul 1.0 introduces a new `list` policy for keys that is only enforced when opted in via the boolean config param "acl.enable_key_list_policy".
`list` controls access to recursively list entries and keys, and enables more fine grained policies. With "acl.enable_key_list_policy",
recursive reads via [the KV API](/api/kv.html#recurse) with an invalid token result in a 403. Example:
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```hcl
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key_prefix "" {
policy = "deny"
}
key_prefix "bar" {
policy = "list"
}
key_prefix "baz" {
policy = "read"
}
```
In the example above, the rules allow reading the key "baz", and only allow recursive reads on the prefix "bar".
A token with `write` access on a prefix also has `list` access. A token with `list` access on a prefix also has `read` access on all its suffixes.
#### Sentinel Integration
Consul Enterprise supports additional optional fields for key write policies for
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[Sentinel](https://docs.hashicorp.com/sentinel/consul/) integration. An example key rule with a
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Sentinel code policy looks like this:
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```hcl
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key "foo" {
policy = "write"
sentinel {
code = <<EOF
import "strings"
main = rule { strings.has_suffix(value, "bar") }
EOF
enforcementlevel = "hard-mandatory"
}
}
```
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For more detailed information, see the [Consul Sentinel documentation](/docs/agent/sentinel.html).
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#### Keyring Rules
The `keyring` resource controls access to keyring operations in the
[Keyring API](/api/operator/keyring.html).
Keyring rules look like this:
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```hcl
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keyring = "write"
```
There's only one keyring policy allowed per rule set, and its value is set to one of the policy
dispositions. In the example above, the keyring may be read and updated.
#### Node Rules
The `node` and `node_prefix` resources controls node-level registration and read access to the [Catalog API](/api/catalog.html),
service discovery with the [Health API](/api/health.html), and filters results in [Agent API](/api/agent.html)
operations like fetching the list of cluster members.
Node rules look like this:
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```hcl
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node_prefix "" {
policy = "read"
}
node "app" {
policy = "write"
}
node "admin" {
policy = "deny"
}
```
Node rules are segmented by the node name they apply to. In the example above, the rules allow read-only access to any node name with the empty prefix, allow
read-write access to the "app" node, and deny all access to the "admin" node.
Agents need to be configured with an [`acl.tokens.agent`](/docs/agent/options.html#acl_tokens_agent)
with at least "write" privileges to their own node name in order to register their information with
the catalog, such as node metadata and tagged addresses. If this is configured incorrectly, the agent
will print an error to the console when it tries to sync its state with the catalog.
Consul's DNS interface is also affected by restrictions on node rules. If the
[`acl.token.default`](/docs/agent/options.html#acl_tokens_default) used by the agent does not have "read" access to a
given node, then the DNS interface will return no records when queried for it.
When reading from the catalog or retrieving information from the health endpoints, node rules are
used to filter the results of the query. This allows for configurations where a token has access
to a given service name, but only on an allowed subset of node names.
Node rules come into play when using the [Agent API](/api/agent.html) to register node-level
checks. The agent will check tokens locally as a check is registered, and Consul also performs
periodic [anti-entropy](/docs/internals/anti-entropy.html) syncs, which may require an
ACL token to complete. To accommodate this, Consul provides two methods of configuring ACL tokens
to use for registration events:
1. Using the [acl.tokens.default](/docs/agent/options.html#acl_tokens_default) configuration
directive. This allows a single token to be configured globally and used
during all check registration operations.
2. Providing an ACL token with service and check definitions at
registration time. This allows for greater flexibility and enables the use
of multiple tokens on the same agent. Examples of what this looks like are
available for both [services](/docs/agent/services.html) and
[checks](/docs/agent/checks.html). Tokens may also be passed to the
[HTTP API](/api/index.html) for operations that require them.
In addition to ACLs, in Consul 0.9.0 and later, the agent must be configured with
[`enable_script_checks`](/docs/agent/options.html#_enable_script_checks) set to `true` in order to enable
script checks.
#### Operator Rules
The `operator` resource controls access to cluster-level operations in the
[Operator API](/api/operator.html), other than the [Keyring API](/api/operator/keyring.html).
Operator rules look like this:
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```hcl
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operator = "read"
```
There's only one operator rule allowed per rule set, and its value is set to one of the policy
dispositions. In the example above, the token could be used to query the operator endpoints for
diagnostic purposes but not make any changes.
#### Prepared Query Rules
The `query` and `query_prefix` resources control access to create, update, and delete prepared queries in the
[Prepared Query API](/api/query.html). Executing queries is subject to `node`/`node_prefix` and `service`/`service_prefix`
policies, as will be explained below.
Query rules look like this:
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```hcl
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query_prefix "" {
policy = "read"
}
query "foo" {
policy = "write"
}
```
Query rules are segmented by the query name they apply to. In the example above, the rules allow read-only
access to any query name with the empty prefix, and allow read-write access to the query named "foo".
This allows control of the query namespace to be delegated based on ACLs.
There are a few variations when using ACLs with prepared queries, each of which uses ACLs in one of two
ways: open, protected by unguessable IDs or closed, managed by ACL policies. These variations are covered
here, with examples:
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- Static queries with no `Name` defined are not controlled by any ACL policies.
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These types of queries are meant to be ephemeral and not shared to untrusted
clients, and they are only reachable if the prepared query ID is known. Since
these IDs are generated using the same random ID scheme as ACL Tokens, it is
infeasible to guess them. When listing all prepared queries, only a management
token will be able to see these types, though clients can read instances for
which they have an ID. An example use for this type is a query built by a
startup script, tied to a session, and written to a configuration file for a
process to use via DNS.
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- Static queries with a `Name` defined are controlled by the `query` and `query_prefix`
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ACL resources. Clients are required to have an ACL token with permissions on to
access that query name. Clients can list or read queries for
which they have "read" access based on their prefix, and similar they can
update any queries for which they have "write" access. An example use for
this type is a query with a well-known name (eg. `prod-master-customer-db`)
that is used and known by many clients to provide geo-failover behavior for
a database.
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- [Template queries](/api/query.html#templates)
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queries work like static queries with a `Name` defined, except that a catch-all
template with an empty `Name` requires an ACL token that can write to any query
prefix.
When prepared queries are executed via DNS lookups or HTTP requests, the ACL
checks are run against the service being queried, similar to how ACLs work with
other service lookups. There are several ways the ACL token is selected for this
check:
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- If an ACL Token was captured when the prepared query was defined, it will be
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used to perform the service lookup. This allows queries to be executed by
clients with lesser or even no ACL Token, so this should be used with care.
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- If no ACL Token was captured, then the client's ACL Token will be used to
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perform the service lookup.
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- If no ACL Token was captured and the client has no ACL Token, then the
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anonymous token will be used to perform the service lookup.
In the common case, the ACL Token of the invoker is used
to test the ability to look up a service. If a `Token` was specified when the
prepared query was created, the behavior changes and now the captured
ACL Token set by the definer of the query is used when looking up a service.
Capturing ACL Tokens is analogous to
[PostgreSQL’ s](http://www.postgresql.org/docs/current/static/sql-createfunction.html)
`SECURITY DEFINER` attribute which can be set on functions, and using the client's ACL
Token is similar to the complementary `SECURITY INVOKER` attribute.
Prepared queries were originally introduced in Consul 0.6.0, and ACL behavior remained
unchanged through version 0.6.3, but was then changed to allow better management of the
prepared query namespace.
These differences are outlined in the table below:
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| Operation | Version <= 0.6.3 | Version > 0.6.3 |
| ---------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Create static query without `Name` | The ACL Token used to create the prepared query is checked to make sure it can access the service being queried. This token is captured as the `Token` to use when executing the prepared query. | No ACL policies are used as long as no `Name` is defined. No `Token` is captured by default unless specifically supplied by the client when creating the query. |
| Create static query with `Name` | The ACL Token used to create the prepared query is checked to make sure it can access the service being queried. This token is captured as the `Token` to use when executing the prepared query. | The client token's `query` ACL policy is used to determine if the client is allowed to register a query for the given `Name`. No `Token` is captured by default unless specifically supplied by the client when creating the query. |
| Manage static query without `Name` | The ACL Token used to create the query or a token with management privileges must be supplied in order to perform these operations. | Any client with the ID of the query can perform these operations. |
| Manage static query with a `Name` | The ACL token used to create the query or a token with management privileges must be supplied in order to perform these operations. | Similar to create, the client token's `query` ACL policy is used to determine if these operations are allowed. |
| List queries | A token with management privileges is required to list any queries. | The client token's `query` ACL policy is used to determine which queries they can see. Only tokens with management privileges can see prepared queries without `Name`. |
| Execute query | Since a `Token` is always captured when a query is created, that is used to check access to the service being queried. Any token supplied by the client is ignored. | The captured token, client's token, or anonymous token is used to filter the results, as described above. |
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#### Service Rules
The `service` and `service_prefix` resources control service-level registration and read access to the [Catalog API](/api/catalog.html)
and service discovery with the [Health API](/api/health.html).
Service rules look like this:
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```hcl
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service_prefix "" {
policy = "read"
}
service "app" {
policy = "write"
}
service "admin" {
policy = "deny"
}
```
Service rules are segmented by the service name they apply to. In the example above, the rules allow read-only
access to any service name with the empty prefix, allow read-write access to the "app" service, and deny all
access to the "admin" service.
Consul's DNS interface is affected by restrictions on service rules. If the
[`acl.tokens.default`](/docs/agent/options.html#acl_tokens_default) used by the agent does not have "read" access to a
given service, then the DNS interface will return no records when queried for it.
When reading from the catalog or retrieving information from the health endpoints, service rules are
used to filter the results of the query.
Service rules come into play when using the [Agent API](/api/agent.html) to register services or
checks. The agent will check tokens locally as a service or check is registered, and Consul also
performs periodic [anti-entropy](/docs/internals/anti-entropy.html) syncs, which may require an
ACL token to complete. To accommodate this, Consul provides two methods of configuring ACL tokens
to use for registration events:
1. Using the [acl.tokens.default](/docs/agent/options.html#acl_tokens_default) configuration
directive. This allows a single token to be configured globally and used
during all service and check registration operations.
2. Providing an ACL token with service and check definitions at registration
time. This allows for greater flexibility and enables the use of multiple
tokens on the same agent. Examples of what this looks like are available for
both [services](/docs/agent/services.html) and
[checks](/docs/agent/checks.html). Tokens may also be passed to the [HTTP
API](/api/index.html) for operations that require them. **Note:** all tokens
passed to an agent are persisted on local disk to allow recovery from
restarts. See [`-data-dir` flag
documentation](/docs/agent/options.html#acl_token) for notes on securing
access.
In addition to ACLs, in Consul 0.9.0 and later, the agent must be configured with
[`enable_script_checks`](/docs/agent/options.html#_enable_script_checks) or
[`enable_local_script_checks`](/docs/agent/options.html#_enable_local_script_checks)
set to `true` in order to enable script checks.
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-> Note: [Intention privileges](/docs/connect/intentions.html#intention-management-permissions) are managed with service rules.
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#### Session Rules
The `session` and `session_prefix` resources controls access to [Session API](/api/session.html) operations.
Session rules look like this:
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```hcl
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session_prefix "" {
policy = "read"
}
session "app" {
policy = "write"
}
session "admin" {
policy = "deny"
}
```
Session rules are segmented by the node name they apply to. In the example above, the rules allow read-only
access to sessions on node name with the empty prefix, allow creating sessions on the node named "app",
and deny all access to any sessions on the "admin" node.
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#### Namespace Rules <span class="label-enterprise label-enterprise-lg">Enterprise</span>
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[Consul Enterprise](https://www.hashicorp.com/consul.html) 1.7.0 adds support for namespacing many
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Consul resources. ACL rules themselves can then be defined to only to apply to specific namespaces.
A Namespace specific rule would look like this:
```hcl
namespace_prefix "" {
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# grant service:read for all services in all namespaces
service_prefix "" {
policy = "read"
}
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# grant node:read for all nodes in all namespaces
node_prefix "" {
policy = "read"
}
}
namespace "foo" {
# grants permission to manage ACLs only for the foo namespace
acl = "write"
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# grants write permissions to the KV for namespace foo
key_prefix "" {
policy = "write"
}
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# grants write permissions for sessions for namespace foo
session_prefix "" {
policy = "write"
}
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# grants service:write for all services in the foo namespace
service_prefix "" {
policy = "write"
}
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# grants node:read for all nodes
node_prefix "" {
policy = "read"
}
}
```
Note, when a rule is defined in any user created namespace, the following restrictions apply.
1. `operator` rules are not allowed.
2. `event` rules are not allowed.
3. `keyring` rules are not allowed.
4. `query` rules are not allowed.
5. `node` rules that attempt to grant `write` privileges are not allowed.
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These restrictions do not apply to the `default` namespace created by Consul. In general all of the
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above are permissions that only an operator should have and thus granting these permissions can
only be done within the default namespace.
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-> **Implicit namespacing:** Rules and policies created within a namespace will inherit the namespace configuration.
This means that rules and policies will be implicitly namespaced and do not need additional configuration.
The restrictions outlined above will apply to these rules and policies. Additionally, rules and policies within a
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specific namespace are prevented from accessing resources in another namespace.