780 lines
23 KiB
Go
780 lines
23 KiB
Go
// Copyright (c) HashiCorp, Inc.
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: MPL-2.0
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package vault
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import (
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"context"
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"fmt"
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"reflect"
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"sort"
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"strings"
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"github.com/armon/go-radix"
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"github.com/hashicorp/go-multierror"
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"github.com/hashicorp/go-secure-stdlib/strutil"
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"github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/identity"
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"github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/namespace"
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"github.com/hashicorp/vault/sdk/logical"
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"github.com/mitchellh/copystructure"
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)
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// ACL is used to wrap a set of policies to provide
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// an efficient interface for access control.
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type ACL struct {
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// exactRules contains the path policies that are exact
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exactRules *radix.Tree
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// prefixRules contains the path policies that are a prefix
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prefixRules *radix.Tree
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segmentWildcardPaths map[string]interface{}
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// root is enabled if the "root" named policy is present.
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root bool
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// Stores policies that are actually RGPs for later fetching
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rgpPolicies []*Policy
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}
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type PolicyCheckOpts struct {
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RootPrivsRequired bool
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Unauth bool
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}
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type AuthResults struct {
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ACLResults *ACLResults
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SentinelResults *SentinelResults
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Allowed bool
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RootPrivs bool
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DeniedError bool
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Error *multierror.Error
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}
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type ACLResults struct {
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Allowed bool
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RootPrivs bool
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IsRoot bool
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MFAMethods []string
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ControlGroup *ControlGroup
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CapabilitiesBitmap uint32
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GrantingPolicies []logical.PolicyInfo
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}
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type SentinelResults struct {
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GrantingPolicies []logical.PolicyInfo
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}
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// NewACL is used to construct a policy based ACL from a set of policies.
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func NewACL(ctx context.Context, policies []*Policy) (*ACL, error) {
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// Initialize
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a := &ACL{
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exactRules: radix.New(),
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prefixRules: radix.New(),
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segmentWildcardPaths: make(map[string]interface{}, len(policies)),
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root: false,
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}
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ns, err := namespace.FromContext(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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if ns == nil {
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return nil, namespace.ErrNoNamespace
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}
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// Inject each policy
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for _, policy := range policies {
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// Ignore a nil policy object
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if policy == nil {
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continue
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}
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switch policy.Type {
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case PolicyTypeACL:
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case PolicyTypeRGP:
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a.rgpPolicies = append(a.rgpPolicies, policy)
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continue
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default:
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("unable to parse policy (wrong type)")
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}
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// Check if this is root
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if policy.Name == "root" {
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if ns.ID != namespace.RootNamespaceID {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("root policy is only allowed in root namespace")
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}
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if len(policies) != 1 {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("other policies present along with root")
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}
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a.root = true
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}
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for _, pc := range policy.Paths {
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var raw interface{}
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var ok bool
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var tree *radix.Tree
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switch {
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case pc.HasSegmentWildcards:
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raw, ok = a.segmentWildcardPaths[pc.Path]
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default:
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// Check which tree to use
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tree = a.exactRules
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if pc.IsPrefix {
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tree = a.prefixRules
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}
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// Check for an existing policy
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raw, ok = tree.Get(pc.Path)
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}
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if !ok {
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clonedPerms, err := pc.Permissions.Clone()
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("error cloning ACL permissions: %w", err)
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}
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// Store this policy name as the policy that permits these
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// capabilities
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clonedPerms.GrantingPoliciesMap = addGrantingPoliciesToMap(nil, policy, clonedPerms.CapabilitiesBitmap)
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switch {
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case pc.HasSegmentWildcards:
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a.segmentWildcardPaths[pc.Path] = clonedPerms
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default:
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tree.Insert(pc.Path, clonedPerms)
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}
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continue
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}
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// these are the ones already in the tree
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existingPerms := raw.(*ACLPermissions)
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switch {
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case existingPerms.CapabilitiesBitmap&DenyCapabilityInt > 0:
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// If we are explicitly denied in the existing capability set,
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// don't save anything else
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continue
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case pc.Permissions.CapabilitiesBitmap&DenyCapabilityInt > 0:
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// If this new policy explicitly denies, only save the deny value
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existingPerms.CapabilitiesBitmap = DenyCapabilityInt
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existingPerms.AllowedParameters = nil
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existingPerms.DeniedParameters = nil
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goto INSERT
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default:
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// Insert the capabilities in this new policy into the existing
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// value
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existingPerms.CapabilitiesBitmap = existingPerms.CapabilitiesBitmap | pc.Permissions.CapabilitiesBitmap
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existingPerms.GrantingPoliciesMap = addGrantingPoliciesToMap(existingPerms.GrantingPoliciesMap, policy, pc.Permissions.CapabilitiesBitmap)
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}
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// Note: In these stanzas, we're preferring minimum lifetimes. So
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// we take the lesser of two specified max values, or we take the
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// lesser of two specified min values, the idea being, allowing
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// token lifetime to be minimum possible.
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//
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// If we have an existing max, and we either don't have a current
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// max, or the current is greater than the previous, use the
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// existing.
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if pc.Permissions.MaxWrappingTTL > 0 &&
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(existingPerms.MaxWrappingTTL == 0 ||
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pc.Permissions.MaxWrappingTTL < existingPerms.MaxWrappingTTL) {
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existingPerms.MaxWrappingTTL = pc.Permissions.MaxWrappingTTL
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}
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// If we have an existing min, and we either don't have a current
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// min, or the current is greater than the previous, use the
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// existing
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if pc.Permissions.MinWrappingTTL > 0 &&
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(existingPerms.MinWrappingTTL == 0 ||
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pc.Permissions.MinWrappingTTL < existingPerms.MinWrappingTTL) {
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existingPerms.MinWrappingTTL = pc.Permissions.MinWrappingTTL
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}
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if len(pc.Permissions.AllowedParameters) > 0 {
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if existingPerms.AllowedParameters == nil {
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clonedAllowed, err := copystructure.Copy(pc.Permissions.AllowedParameters)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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existingPerms.AllowedParameters = clonedAllowed.(map[string][]interface{})
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} else {
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for key, value := range pc.Permissions.AllowedParameters {
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pcValue, ok := existingPerms.AllowedParameters[key]
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// If an empty array exist it should overwrite any other
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// value.
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if len(value) == 0 || (ok && len(pcValue) == 0) {
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existingPerms.AllowedParameters[key] = []interface{}{}
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} else {
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// Merge the two maps, appending values on key conflict.
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existingPerms.AllowedParameters[key] = append(value, existingPerms.AllowedParameters[key]...)
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}
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}
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}
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}
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if len(pc.Permissions.DeniedParameters) > 0 {
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if existingPerms.DeniedParameters == nil {
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clonedDenied, err := copystructure.Copy(pc.Permissions.DeniedParameters)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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existingPerms.DeniedParameters = clonedDenied.(map[string][]interface{})
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} else {
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for key, value := range pc.Permissions.DeniedParameters {
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pcValue, ok := existingPerms.DeniedParameters[key]
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// If an empty array exist it should overwrite any other
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// value.
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if len(value) == 0 || (ok && len(pcValue) == 0) {
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existingPerms.DeniedParameters[key] = []interface{}{}
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} else {
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// Merge the two maps, appending values on key conflict.
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existingPerms.DeniedParameters[key] = append(value, existingPerms.DeniedParameters[key]...)
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}
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}
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}
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}
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if len(pc.Permissions.RequiredParameters) > 0 {
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if len(existingPerms.RequiredParameters) == 0 {
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existingPerms.RequiredParameters = pc.Permissions.RequiredParameters
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} else {
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for _, v := range pc.Permissions.RequiredParameters {
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if !strutil.StrListContains(existingPerms.RequiredParameters, v) {
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existingPerms.RequiredParameters = append(existingPerms.RequiredParameters, v)
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}
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}
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}
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}
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if len(pc.Permissions.MFAMethods) > 0 {
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if existingPerms.MFAMethods == nil {
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existingPerms.MFAMethods = pc.Permissions.MFAMethods
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} else {
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existingPerms.MFAMethods = append(existingPerms.MFAMethods, pc.Permissions.MFAMethods...)
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}
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existingPerms.MFAMethods = strutil.RemoveDuplicates(existingPerms.MFAMethods, false)
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}
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// No need to dedupe this list since any authorization can satisfy any factor, so long as
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// the factor matches the specified permission requested.
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if pc.Permissions.ControlGroup != nil {
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if len(pc.Permissions.ControlGroup.Factors) > 0 {
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if existingPerms.ControlGroup == nil {
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cg, err := pc.Permissions.ControlGroup.Clone()
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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existingPerms.ControlGroup = cg
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} else {
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existingPerms.ControlGroup.Factors = append(existingPerms.ControlGroup.Factors, pc.Permissions.ControlGroup.Factors...)
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}
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}
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}
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INSERT:
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switch {
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case pc.HasSegmentWildcards:
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a.segmentWildcardPaths[pc.Path] = existingPerms
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default:
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tree.Insert(pc.Path, existingPerms)
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}
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}
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}
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return a, nil
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}
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func (a *ACL) Capabilities(ctx context.Context, path string) (pathCapabilities []string) {
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req := &logical.Request{
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Path: path,
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// doesn't matter, but use List to trigger fallback behavior so we can
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// model real behavior
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Operation: logical.ListOperation,
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}
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res := a.AllowOperation(ctx, req, true)
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if res.IsRoot {
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return []string{RootCapability}
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}
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capabilities := res.CapabilitiesBitmap
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if capabilities&SudoCapabilityInt > 0 {
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pathCapabilities = append(pathCapabilities, SudoCapability)
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}
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if capabilities&ReadCapabilityInt > 0 {
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pathCapabilities = append(pathCapabilities, ReadCapability)
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}
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if capabilities&ListCapabilityInt > 0 {
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pathCapabilities = append(pathCapabilities, ListCapability)
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}
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if capabilities&UpdateCapabilityInt > 0 {
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pathCapabilities = append(pathCapabilities, UpdateCapability)
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}
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if capabilities&DeleteCapabilityInt > 0 {
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pathCapabilities = append(pathCapabilities, DeleteCapability)
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}
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if capabilities&CreateCapabilityInt > 0 {
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pathCapabilities = append(pathCapabilities, CreateCapability)
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}
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if capabilities&PatchCapabilityInt > 0 {
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pathCapabilities = append(pathCapabilities, PatchCapability)
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}
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// If "deny" is explicitly set or if the path has no capabilities at all,
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// set the path capabilities to "deny"
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if capabilities&DenyCapabilityInt > 0 || len(pathCapabilities) == 0 {
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pathCapabilities = []string{DenyCapability}
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}
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return
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}
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// AllowOperation is used to check if the given operation is permitted.
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func (a *ACL) AllowOperation(ctx context.Context, req *logical.Request, capCheckOnly bool) (ret *ACLResults) {
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ret = new(ACLResults)
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// Fast-path root
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if a.root {
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ret.Allowed = true
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ret.RootPrivs = true
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ret.IsRoot = true
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ret.GrantingPolicies = []logical.PolicyInfo{{
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Name: "root",
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NamespaceId: "root",
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NamespacePath: "",
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Type: "acl",
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}}
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return
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}
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op := req.Operation
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// Help is always allowed
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if op == logical.HelpOperation {
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ret.Allowed = true
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return
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}
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var permissions *ACLPermissions
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ns, err := namespace.FromContext(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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path := ns.Path + req.Path
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// The request path should take care of this already but this is useful for
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// tests and as defense in depth
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for {
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if len(path) > 0 && path[0] == '/' {
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path = path[1:]
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} else {
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break
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}
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}
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// Find an exact matching rule, look for prefix if no match
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var capabilities uint32
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raw, ok := a.exactRules.Get(path)
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if ok {
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permissions = raw.(*ACLPermissions)
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capabilities = permissions.CapabilitiesBitmap
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goto CHECK
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}
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if op == logical.ListOperation {
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raw, ok = a.exactRules.Get(strings.TrimSuffix(path, "/"))
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if ok {
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permissions = raw.(*ACLPermissions)
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capabilities = permissions.CapabilitiesBitmap
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goto CHECK
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}
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}
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// List operations need to check without the trailing slash first, because
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// there could be other rules with trailing wildcards that will match the
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// path
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if op == logical.ListOperation && strings.HasSuffix(path, "/") {
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permissions = a.CheckAllowedFromNonExactPaths(strings.TrimSuffix(path, "/"), false)
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if permissions != nil {
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capabilities = permissions.CapabilitiesBitmap
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goto CHECK
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}
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}
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permissions = a.CheckAllowedFromNonExactPaths(path, false)
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if permissions != nil {
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capabilities = permissions.CapabilitiesBitmap
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goto CHECK
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}
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// No exact, prefix, or segment wildcard paths found, return without
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// setting allowed
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return
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CHECK:
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// Check if the minimum permissions are met
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// If "deny" has been explicitly set, only deny will be in the map, so we
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// only need to check for the existence of other values
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ret.RootPrivs = capabilities&SudoCapabilityInt > 0
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// This is after the RootPrivs check so we can gate on it being from sudo
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// rather than policy root
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if capCheckOnly {
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ret.CapabilitiesBitmap = capabilities
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return ret
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}
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ret.MFAMethods = permissions.MFAMethods
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ret.ControlGroup = permissions.ControlGroup
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var grantingPolicies []logical.PolicyInfo
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operationAllowed := false
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switch op {
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case logical.ReadOperation:
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operationAllowed = capabilities&ReadCapabilityInt > 0
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grantingPolicies = permissions.GrantingPoliciesMap[ReadCapabilityInt]
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case logical.ListOperation:
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operationAllowed = capabilities&ListCapabilityInt > 0
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grantingPolicies = permissions.GrantingPoliciesMap[ListCapabilityInt]
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case logical.UpdateOperation:
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operationAllowed = capabilities&UpdateCapabilityInt > 0
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grantingPolicies = permissions.GrantingPoliciesMap[UpdateCapabilityInt]
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case logical.DeleteOperation:
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operationAllowed = capabilities&DeleteCapabilityInt > 0
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grantingPolicies = permissions.GrantingPoliciesMap[DeleteCapabilityInt]
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case logical.CreateOperation:
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operationAllowed = capabilities&CreateCapabilityInt > 0
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grantingPolicies = permissions.GrantingPoliciesMap[CreateCapabilityInt]
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case logical.PatchOperation:
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operationAllowed = capabilities&PatchCapabilityInt > 0
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grantingPolicies = permissions.GrantingPoliciesMap[PatchCapabilityInt]
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// These three re-use UpdateCapabilityInt since that's the most appropriate
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// capability/operation mapping
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case logical.RevokeOperation, logical.RenewOperation, logical.RollbackOperation:
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operationAllowed = capabilities&UpdateCapabilityInt > 0
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grantingPolicies = permissions.GrantingPoliciesMap[UpdateCapabilityInt]
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default:
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return
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}
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if !operationAllowed {
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return
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}
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ret.GrantingPolicies = grantingPolicies
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if permissions.MaxWrappingTTL > 0 {
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if req.WrapInfo == nil || req.WrapInfo.TTL > permissions.MaxWrappingTTL {
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return
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}
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}
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if permissions.MinWrappingTTL > 0 {
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if req.WrapInfo == nil || req.WrapInfo.TTL < permissions.MinWrappingTTL {
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return
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}
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}
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// This situation can happen because of merging, even though in a single
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// path statement we check on ingress
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if permissions.MinWrappingTTL != 0 &&
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permissions.MaxWrappingTTL != 0 &&
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permissions.MaxWrappingTTL < permissions.MinWrappingTTL {
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return
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}
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// Only check parameter permissions for operations that can modify
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// parameters.
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if op == logical.ReadOperation || op == logical.UpdateOperation || op == logical.CreateOperation || op == logical.PatchOperation {
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for _, parameter := range permissions.RequiredParameters {
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if _, ok := req.Data[strings.ToLower(parameter)]; !ok {
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return
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}
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}
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// If there are no data fields, allow
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if len(req.Data) == 0 {
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ret.Allowed = true
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return
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}
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if len(permissions.DeniedParameters) == 0 {
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goto ALLOWED_PARAMETERS
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}
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// Check if all parameters have been denied
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if _, ok := permissions.DeniedParameters["*"]; ok {
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return
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}
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for parameter, value := range req.Data {
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// Check if parameter has been explicitly denied
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if valueSlice, ok := permissions.DeniedParameters[strings.ToLower(parameter)]; ok {
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// If the value exists in denied values slice, deny
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if valueInParameterList(value, valueSlice) {
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return
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}
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}
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}
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ALLOWED_PARAMETERS:
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// If we don't have any allowed parameters set, allow
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if len(permissions.AllowedParameters) == 0 {
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ret.Allowed = true
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return
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}
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_, allowedAll := permissions.AllowedParameters["*"]
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if len(permissions.AllowedParameters) == 1 && allowedAll {
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ret.Allowed = true
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return
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}
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for parameter, value := range req.Data {
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valueSlice, ok := permissions.AllowedParameters[strings.ToLower(parameter)]
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// Requested parameter is not in allowed list
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if !ok && !allowedAll {
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return
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}
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// If the value doesn't exists in the allowed values slice,
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// deny
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if ok && !valueInParameterList(value, valueSlice) {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret.Allowed = true
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type wcPathDescr struct {
|
|
firstWCOrGlob int
|
|
wildcards int
|
|
isPrefix bool
|
|
wcPath string
|
|
perms *ACLPermissions
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// CheckAllowedFromNonExactPaths returns permissions corresponding to a
|
|
// matching path with wildcards/globs. If bareMount is true, the path should
|
|
// correspond to a mount prefix, and what is returned is either a non-nil set
|
|
// of permissions from some allowed path underneath the mount (for use in mount
|
|
// access checks), or nil indicating no non-deny permissions were found.
|
|
func (a *ACL) CheckAllowedFromNonExactPaths(path string, bareMount bool) *ACLPermissions {
|
|
wcPathDescrs := make([]wcPathDescr, 0, len(a.segmentWildcardPaths)+1)
|
|
|
|
less := func(i, j int) bool {
|
|
// In the case of multiple matches, we use this priority order,
|
|
// which tries to most closely match longest-prefix:
|
|
//
|
|
// * First glob or wildcard position (prefer foo/a* over foo/+,
|
|
// foo/bar/+/baz over foo/+/bar/baz)
|
|
// * Whether it's a prefix (prefer foo/+/bar over foo/+/ba*,
|
|
// foo/+ over foo/*)
|
|
// * Number of wildcard segments (prefer foo/bar/+/baz over foo/+/+/baz)
|
|
// * Length check (prefer foo/+/bar/ba* over foo/+/bar/b*)
|
|
// * Lexicographical ordering (preferring less, arbitrarily)
|
|
//
|
|
// That final case (lexigraphical) should never really come up. It's more
|
|
// of a throwing-up-hands scenario akin to panic("should not be here")
|
|
// statements, but less panicky.
|
|
|
|
pdi, pdj := wcPathDescrs[i], wcPathDescrs[j]
|
|
|
|
// If the first wildcard (+) or glob (*) occurs earlier in pdi,
|
|
// pdi is lower priority
|
|
if pdi.firstWCOrGlob < pdj.firstWCOrGlob {
|
|
return true
|
|
} else if pdi.firstWCOrGlob > pdj.firstWCOrGlob {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If pdi ends in * and pdj doesn't, pdi is lower priority
|
|
if pdi.isPrefix && !pdj.isPrefix {
|
|
return true
|
|
} else if !pdi.isPrefix && pdj.isPrefix {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If pdi has more wc segs, pdi is lower priority
|
|
if pdi.wildcards > pdj.wildcards {
|
|
return true
|
|
} else if pdi.wildcards < pdj.wildcards {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If pdi is shorter, it is lower priority
|
|
if len(pdi.wcPath) < len(pdj.wcPath) {
|
|
return true
|
|
} else if len(pdi.wcPath) > len(pdj.wcPath) {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If pdi is smaller lexicographically, it is lower priority
|
|
if pdi.wcPath < pdj.wcPath {
|
|
return true
|
|
} else if pdi.wcPath > pdj.wcPath {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Find a prefix rule if any.
|
|
{
|
|
prefix, raw, ok := a.prefixRules.LongestPrefix(path)
|
|
if ok {
|
|
if len(a.segmentWildcardPaths) == 0 {
|
|
return raw.(*ACLPermissions)
|
|
}
|
|
wcPathDescrs = append(wcPathDescrs, wcPathDescr{
|
|
firstWCOrGlob: len(prefix),
|
|
wcPath: prefix,
|
|
isPrefix: true,
|
|
perms: raw.(*ACLPermissions),
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(a.segmentWildcardPaths) == 0 {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pathParts := strings.Split(path, "/")
|
|
|
|
SWCPATH:
|
|
for fullWCPath := range a.segmentWildcardPaths {
|
|
if fullWCPath == "" {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
pd := wcPathDescr{firstWCOrGlob: strings.Index(fullWCPath, "+")}
|
|
|
|
currWCPath := fullWCPath
|
|
if currWCPath[len(currWCPath)-1] == '*' {
|
|
pd.isPrefix = true
|
|
currWCPath = currWCPath[0 : len(currWCPath)-1]
|
|
}
|
|
pd.wcPath = currWCPath
|
|
|
|
splitCurrWCPath := strings.Split(currWCPath, "/")
|
|
|
|
if !bareMount && len(pathParts) < len(splitCurrWCPath) {
|
|
// check if the path coming in is shorter; if so it can't match
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if !bareMount && !pd.isPrefix && len(splitCurrWCPath) != len(pathParts) {
|
|
// If it's not a prefix we expect the same number of segments
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
segments := make([]string, 0, len(splitCurrWCPath))
|
|
for i, aclPart := range splitCurrWCPath {
|
|
switch {
|
|
case aclPart == "+":
|
|
pd.wildcards++
|
|
segments = append(segments, pathParts[i])
|
|
|
|
case aclPart == pathParts[i]:
|
|
segments = append(segments, pathParts[i])
|
|
|
|
case pd.isPrefix && i == len(splitCurrWCPath)-1 && strings.HasPrefix(pathParts[i], aclPart):
|
|
segments = append(segments, pathParts[i:]...)
|
|
|
|
case !bareMount:
|
|
// Found a mismatch, give up on this segmentWildcardPath
|
|
continue SWCPATH
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// -2 because we're always invoked with a trailing "/" in case bareMount.
|
|
if bareMount && i == len(pathParts)-2 {
|
|
joinedPath := strings.Join(segments, "/") + "/"
|
|
// Check the current joined path so far. If we find a prefix,
|
|
// check permissions. If they're defined but not deny, success.
|
|
if strings.HasPrefix(joinedPath, path) {
|
|
permissions := a.segmentWildcardPaths[fullWCPath].(*ACLPermissions)
|
|
if permissions.CapabilitiesBitmap&DenyCapabilityInt == 0 && permissions.CapabilitiesBitmap > 0 {
|
|
return permissions
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
continue SWCPATH
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
pd.perms = a.segmentWildcardPaths[fullWCPath].(*ACLPermissions)
|
|
wcPathDescrs = append(wcPathDescrs, pd)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if bareMount || len(wcPathDescrs) == 0 {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// We don't do this in the bare mount check because we don't care about
|
|
// priority, we only care about any capability at all.
|
|
sort.Slice(wcPathDescrs, less)
|
|
|
|
return wcPathDescrs[len(wcPathDescrs)-1].perms
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (c *Core) performPolicyChecks(ctx context.Context, acl *ACL, te *logical.TokenEntry, req *logical.Request, inEntity *identity.Entity, opts *PolicyCheckOpts) *AuthResults {
|
|
ret := new(AuthResults)
|
|
|
|
// First, perform normal ACL checks if requested. The only time no ACL
|
|
// should be applied is if we are only processing EGPs against a login
|
|
// path in which case opts.Unauth will be set.
|
|
if acl != nil && !opts.Unauth {
|
|
ret.ACLResults = acl.AllowOperation(ctx, req, false)
|
|
ret.RootPrivs = ret.ACLResults.RootPrivs
|
|
// Root is always allowed; skip Sentinel/MFA checks
|
|
if ret.ACLResults.IsRoot {
|
|
// logger.Warn("token is root, skipping checks")
|
|
ret.Allowed = true
|
|
return ret
|
|
}
|
|
if !ret.ACLResults.Allowed {
|
|
return ret
|
|
}
|
|
// Since HelpOperation was fast-pathed inside AllowOperation, RootPrivs will not have been populated in this
|
|
// case, so we need to special-case that here as well, or we'll block HelpOperation on all sudo-protected paths.
|
|
if !ret.RootPrivs && opts.RootPrivsRequired && req.Operation != logical.HelpOperation {
|
|
return ret
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c.performEntPolicyChecks(ctx, acl, te, req, inEntity, opts, ret)
|
|
|
|
return ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func valueInParameterList(v interface{}, list []interface{}) bool {
|
|
// Empty list is equivalent to the item always existing in the list
|
|
if len(list) == 0 {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return valueInSlice(v, list)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func valueInSlice(v interface{}, list []interface{}) bool {
|
|
for _, el := range list {
|
|
if el == nil || v == nil {
|
|
// It doesn't seem possible to set up a nil entry in the list, but it is possible
|
|
// to pass in a null entry in the API request being checked. Just in case,
|
|
// nil will match nil.
|
|
if el == v {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
} else if reflect.TypeOf(el).String() == "string" && reflect.TypeOf(v).String() == "string" {
|
|
item := el.(string)
|
|
val := v.(string)
|
|
|
|
if strutil.GlobbedStringsMatch(item, val) {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
} else if reflect.DeepEqual(el, v) {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|